UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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PREFACE

The success or failure of the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to negotiate a viable and binding peace agreement, acceptable to all parties and guaranteeing the territorial integrity of all states within defined borders, will depend, in part, upon their ability to provide for a United Nations presence whose mandate is clear and unequivocal and whose main objective is to police demilitarized zones.

Given the past record of the peacekeeping forces in the Middle East, the intensity of hostilities there, and the lack of agreement between the great powers over the mandate of peacekeeping forces, this will be no easy task. But, as the pieces of the Middle East are assembled in the aftermath of the October 1973 War, there will be a need for United Nations involvement. Despite the large role of the United States in the initial separation of forces agreement, the United Nations will be centrally involved if a new era of coexistence in the region is to take hold. In particular, the United Nations peacekeeping forces will need better, and more support from all states in the world community in order to help improve its performance in the field.

Following the introduction of a new United Nations Emergency Force between Israeli and Egyptian troops in the Sinai, the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements and the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia held two joint hearings to examine this new United Nations Middle East force and U.S. policy toward peacekeeping. The subcommittees received testimony from two State Department officials with current responsibilities in United Nations affairs, two former senior U.S. officials with United Nations experience, a former UNEF commander in the field, and a scholar with intimate knowledge of the workings of the United Nations system and of peacekeeping.

The principal conclusions of these two brief hearings are:

First, the record of past United Nations peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East do not necessarily indicate the effectiveness of the new UNEF–II. Indeed, although its mandate is now for only 6 months, there has been significant agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the role and mandate of the new force and on the principle that this force cannot be removed without the affirmative vote of the U.N. Security Council.

Second, Secretary of State Kissinger's maiden United Nations speech mentioned the importance of improving the United Nations peacekeeping capability and the hearings also emphasized our desire for better peacekeeping machinery. The United States and the Soviet Union could usefully discuss the general issue of increasing the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping as well as the specific issues of improving the Military Staff Committee, creating a permanent U.N. peacekeeping force, improving the logistics and communications support for forces in the field and insuring the ability of the U.N. force to be able to respond quickly and effectively when needed.

Third, peacekeeping efforts will succeed only if states want them to succeed. If peacekeeping machinery is to become institutionalized and readily available, members of the United Nations, especially the permanent members of the Security Council, must move in the direction of reconciling differences on peacekeeping operations and giving U.N. forces more muscle.

Fourth, in the Middle East, the need for a better organized, equipped, and financed peacekeeping force is urgent. Such a force must be politically neutral, have sophisticated electronic surveillance and reconnaisance equipment, be a permanent force that cannot be removed by one party and that exists on both sides of the border and, finally, have a strong mandate in demilitarized zones.

It is expected that UNEF–II, the child of the post-October War diplomacy, will resolve some of these problems and that this 6,000-man force between Israel and Egypt will be supplemented in the near future by a similar force along the Syrian-Israeli front as the result of an Israeli-Syrian separation of forces agreement.

We may now have started down the road of building a lasting peace in the strife-torn Middle East, and parties to the conflict now are seemingly more willing to negotiate problems at the table rather than through the barrel of a gun. The road to peace in the Middle East will be long and there will be detours, but one of the essential ingredients for the lengthy negotiations is an effective United Nations presence both in Geneva and in the field.

For Members of Congress and for all Americans interested in peacekeeping and in the process of peace in the Middle East, these hearings offer a useful, candid, and thoughtful analysis about the art of peacekeeping in late 1973. That art is by no means well established, but right now it may be all the world community has got.

DONALD M. FRASER,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements.

LEE H. HAMILTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia.

MARCH 6, 1974.


ISRAEL
LEBANON
SYRIA
JORDAN
ISRAEL
UNITED ARAB
REPUBLIC
JORDAN
SAUDI
ARABIA



Golan Heights Positions After October 1973 War.



Suez Canal Positions After October 1973 War.


NORTH-CENTRAL ISRAEL
and Adjacent Areas
LEBANON
SYRIA
ISRAEL
(Israeli-occupied Territory)
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
ISRAEL
JORDAN
U.A.R.
(Israeli-occupied Territory)

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1973

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS AND ON THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met, at 10:12 a.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Fraser (chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements) presiding.

Mr. FRASER. The Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements and the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia are meeting in joint session today and tomorrow to consider the subject of United Nations peacekeeping in the Middle East. This week seems to be a particularly appropriate time for us to discuss this important topic because of the attention it is now being given at the United Nations, here in Washington and in capitals throughout the world.

The United Nations Security Council has ordered the establishment of a new emergency force for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Congress is now considering legislation providing for a financial contribution by the United States to the new emergency force as well as other legislation for emergency security assistance for Israel. Secretary of State Kissinger, in his speech before the United Nations General Assembly in September, indicated that the United States is now prepared to discuss with the Soviet Union ways in which a larger role for the Security Council might be agreed upon in guidelines for future U.N. peacekeeping operations.

The two main questions which prompted the scheduling of our hearings are: (1) What is the current situation in the Middle East regarding the U.N. Emergency Force and what are its chances for success; (2) How can the longstanding United States-Soviet deadlock on U.N. peacekeeping be resolved in order that general guidelines may be agreed upon to govern the financing and control of future U.N. peacekeeping operations? Under the heading of these two large questions we will be interested in knowing what are the main issues in the United States-Soviet deadlock. What is the proper role of the big powers in U.N. peacekeeping operations? How much will the new U.N. Emergency Force cost the United States and what will other countries be expected to pay or contribute? Can we expect the present emergency force in the Middle East to succeed where past efforts have failed? We will be looking for answers to these and other questions as we proceed.

All three of our distinguished witnesses today have had long and intimate Government experience with the problems of U.N. peacekeeping. Ambassador Charles W. Yost concluded a brilliant 30-year career in the U.S. Foreign Service as U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations. Ambassador William Schaufele in his present assignment to the U.S. mission to the United Nations is the U.S. member on the U.N. Peacekeeping Committee. Adm. John M. Lee has had experience in political and military affairs as senior military adviser at the U.S. mission in the United Nations under Ambassador Yost and as Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

At this time without objection we will place in the record two papers for general background information: A study by Marjorie Ann Browne of Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress on U.N. Peacekeeping Forces in the Middle East, the Congo, and Cyprus; and an article by Seymour Maxwell Finger entitled "Breaking the Deadlock on U.N. Peacekeeping" from the August issue of Orbis. (See appendix, pp. 78, 81.)

The Chair asks that members withhold their questions until after all three witnesses have completed their initial statements. At that time we will address questions to the witnesses as a panel.

Ambassador Yost, I find your name first on the list. If you are ready, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES W. YOST, FORMER U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. YOST. Thank you, Congressman.

I will address myself in my brief opening statement to the second of the two questions that you mentioned in your statement primarily because that is what I have had more experience in. I imagine Ambassador Schaufele is more up to date on the latest developments in Middle Eastern peacekeeping than I am although I will be happy to answer any questions that I can on that subject.

CONTROLLING CONFLICTS

Mr. Chairman, the international community has twice in this century, in 1919 and in 1945, come to the conclusion that international conflict must be controlled and that such control should not be left to the hazards of unilateral action by great powers or by impromptu military coalitions. This conclusion was based on the repeated experience of conflict breaking out in one part of the globe, spreading rapidly over almost all of it, and before it was over wiping out tens of millions of human lives and causing enormous devastation.

Since 1945 this conclusion has been reinforced by other events and experiences. First, the development of nuclear weapons and the likelihood in a disorderly world of their further proliferation makes it clear that uncontrolled conflict could destroy human civilization. Second, in a world of more than 130 states, many of them with little experience in self-government but most of them intensely nationalistic and substantially armed, it would seem clear that, in the absence of control, international conflict would be more rather than less likely than in the past. Finally, it has been demonstrated that in such a world

an attempt by a great power to control conflict unilaterally, as in Vietnam, is likely to fail, and risks spreading rather than confining the conflict.

Critics of conflict control by international organizations, such as the United Nations, point out that such control has often been ineffective and that, even when it has succeeded temporarily, it has often not been decisive or durable. This is, of course, true. The record of failure to control conflict by national means, however, by balance of power, by military alliances, by great power spheres of influence, is far more extensive and convincing, going back to the beginning of human history and lasting up to the present day.

IMPROVING PEACEKEEPING

I submit therefore that the pragmatists are not those who advocate relying on the old methods, which have failed throughout history, but those who wish to make prompt and substantial improvements in United Nations peacekeeping, which has only been tried for a quarter century, which has achieved a few remarkable successes, and which has experienced so-called failures primarily where parties to a conflict have refused to resort to it at all or, having resorted to it, have refused to abide by its recommendations or decisions.

This judgment does not at all imply that the old methods of conflict control will not continue to have to be used in many cases until the new methods are perfected, but merely that the old methods are appallingly unreliable, that the state of modern technology is such that we can no longer risk muddling through, and that new methods should therefore be perfected much more rapidly than has so far been the case.

Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter lay down a framework for international conflict control which is still basically sound and requires only elaboration and implementation. Article 43 prescribes machinery for enforcement which has never been set up and still should be. In the absence of this formal machinery ad hoc arrangements for U.N. peacekeeping, with which the committee is familiar, have been worked out over the past two decades and applied with some success in several areas. They are now being applied again in the Middle East.

U.S. POSITION

It is very heartening that our Secretary of State chose to emphasize in his first address to the United Nations General Assembly last September the importance he attaches to U.N. peacekeeping, and to urge agreement on new peacekeeping guidelines so that the U.N., in his words, "can act swiftly, confidently and effectively in future crises." It is even more heartening that both the United States and the Soviet Union have, after some wavering, chosen to act primarily through U.N. machinery in the latest Middle East crisis and that the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states are participating in the U.N. peacekeeping there to an unprecedented extent.

It may be that new peacekeeping guidelines and a new effectiveness for U.N. conflict control will be hammered out in the forge of practical experience in the Middle East. I certainly hope so, though as history

shows no more difficult environment for such an experience can be imagined. If the U.N. succeeds there, it can succeed anywhere.

I should like to conclude my statement by listing the three areas of improvement in U.N. peacekeeping which seem to me most essential. This list should be preceded by two observations. First, the ultimate goal should be to implement the whole charter, including article 43. Second, no machinery, no matter how perfect in theory, will work unless the member states, particularly the great powers, are determined to use it faithfully, persistently and decisively.

POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS

First, far more attention should be paid to applying before conflict breaks out the means for pacific settlement of disputes referred to in chapter VI of the charter. These should include close and persistent attention to each serious dispute by the Security Council, acting in many cases through a standing subcommittee. They should include the active involvement of the Secretary General and his Under Secretaries in pacific settlement, the assignment by the Security Council where appropriate of distinguished factfinders and mediators from outside the U.N., and a willingness by the Council to insist on prior arbitration when the outbreak of a conflict seems imminent. If the Council is to be effectively utilized for these purposes, the permanent members should reserve their use of the veto to cases in which they are directly involved, as the authors of the charter contemplated, and refrain from using it to protect other parties to disputes or conflicts from recommendations or action deemed appropriate by the statutory majority of the Council.

CARRYING OUT DECISIONS

Second, more effective means must be found to carry out, if necessary to enforce, the decisions or the recommendations of the Council. If they are persistently ignored or flouted, the U.N. will fall into increasing contempt, and international conflict control will fail utterly. The U.N. cannot, at this stage of its evolution, send armies to enforce its decisions on recalcitrant states. More effective international pressures, short of military force, must be found to resolve disputes and settle conflicts if the world is to be spared another war. International ostracism, arms, or economic embargoes are among the several measures that might be considered as a last resort.

Finally, there should be far more comprehensive advance preparations for even the relatively elementary peacekeeping which the U.N. now conducts. There should be established and effective procedures which could be applied almost automatically as soon as the Security Council decides that the dispatch of U.N. observers or a peacekeeping force is necessary. Member states should be encouraged to earmark contingents which would be immediately available for U.N. use. The Secretary General should be authorized to maintain a roster of such earmarked contingents, of potential commanders for such forces, and of facilities and logistic support which would be available to them. Some elementary joint training for such earmarked forces should be provided, and regular military advice should be available to the Secretary General inside the U.N. Finally, there should be

firm agreement that all states which favor a particular peacekeeping operation should share, according to their means, in its financial support.

Decisions upon all these matters have been held up for about 8 years by differences among member states, principally between the United States and the U.S.S.R. These differences are not fundamental and could be surmounted by a little give and good will on both sides. What is needed for this purpose is an explicit decision at the highest level that these differences are to be ironed out within, say, 6 months and instructions to the respective U.N. Ambassadors to that effect.

That is all I have to volunteer, Mr. Chairman. I shall be happy to answer questions.

[Following is Ambassador Yost's prepared statement:]

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

The international community has twice in this century, in 1919 and in 1945, come to the conclusion that international conflict must be controlled and that such control should not be left to the hazards of unilateral action by great powers or by impromptu military coalitions. This conclusion was based on the repeated experience of conflict breaking out in one part of the globe, spreading rapidly over almost all of it, and before it was over wiping out tens of millions of human lives and causing enormous devastation.

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I submit therefore that the pragmatists are not those who advocate relying on the old methods, which have failed throughout history, but those who wish to make prompt and substantial improvements in United Nations peacekeeping, which has only been tried for a quarter century, which has achieved a few remarkable successes, and which has experienced so-called failures primarily where parties to a conflict have refused to resort to it at all or, having resorted to it, have refused to abide by its recommendations or decisions.

This judgment does not at all imply that the old methods of conflict control will not continue to have to be used in many cases until the new methods are perfected, but merely that the old methods are appallingly unreliable, that the state of modern technology is such that we can no longer risk muddling through, and that new methods should therefore be perfected much more rapidly than has so far been the case.

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I should like to conclude my statement by listing the three areas of improvement in UN peacekeeping which seems to me most essential. This list should be preceded by two observations. First, the ultimate goal should be to implement the whole Charter, including article 43. Second, no machinery, no matter how perfect in theory, will work unless the member states, particularly the great powers, are determined to use it faithfully, persistently and decisively.

One. First, far more attention should be paid to *applying before conflict breaks out the means for pacific settlement of disputes referred to in Chapter VI of the Charter.* These should include close and persistent attention to each serious dispute by the Security Council, acting in many cases through a standing subcommittee. They should include the active involvement of the Secretary General and his Undersecretaries in pacific settlement, the assignment by the Security Council where appropriate of distinguished fact-finders and mediators from outside the UN, and a willingness by the Council to insist on prior arbitration when the outbreak of a conflict seems imminent. If the Council is to be effectively utilized for these purposes, the permanent members should reserve their use of the veto to cases in which they are directly involved, as the authors of the Charter contemplated, and refrain from using it to protect other parties to disputes or conflicts from recommendations or action deemed appropriate by the statutory majority of the Council.

Two. Second, more effective means must be found to carry out, if necessary to *enforce the decisions or the recommendations of the Council.* If they are persistently ignored or flouted, the UN will fall into increasing contempt and international conflict control will fail utterly. The UN cannot, at this stage of its evolution, send armies to enforce its decisions on recalcitrant states. More effective international pressures, short of military force, must be found to resolve disputes and settle conflicts if the world is to be spared another war. *International ostracism, arms or economic embargoes,* are among the several measures that might be considered as a last resort.

Three. Finally, there should be far *more comprehensive advance preparations for even the relatively elementary peacekeeping which the UN now conducts.* There should be established and effective procedures which could be applied almost automatically as soon as the Security Council decides that the dispatch of UN observers or a peacekeeping force is necessary. Member states should be encouraged to earmark contingents which would be immediately available for UN use. The Secretary General should be authorized to maintain a roster of such earmarked contingents, of potential commanders for such forces, and of facilities and logistic support which would be available to them. Some elementary joint training for such earmarked forces should be provided and regular military advice should be available to the Secretary General inside the UN. Finally, there should be firm agreement that all states which favor a particular peacekeeping operation should share, according to their means, in its financial support.

Decisions upon all these matters have been held up for about eight years by differences among member states, principally between the US and the USSR. These differences are not fundamental and could be surmounted by a little give and good will on both sides. What is needed for this purpose is an explicit decision at the highest level that these differences are to be ironed out within say, six months and instructions to the respective UN Ambassadors to that effect.

That is all I have to volunteer, Mr. Chairman. I shall be happy to answer questions.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, for a very precise and clear statement.

Ambassador Schaufele.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM E. SCHAUFELE, SENIOR POLITICAL ADVISER, U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It gives me a great deal of pleasure to appear before the subcommittee this morning to discuss United Nations peacekeeping. As an American citizen, I am especially gratified that you are holding hearings on a subject which is the primary objective of the United Nations Charter and of diplomacy itself. One important reason which led me to welcome an assignment at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations was the inclusion of peacekeeping as one of my principal responsibilities.

DEADLOCK ON PEACEKEEPING

As you know, the U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has been virtually deadlocked for several years, after having made some initial progress in its efforts to reach agreement on the guidelines governing future peacekeeping operations. It is no secret that the major obstacle has been a difference between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the respective authority and responsibilities of the Secretary General and the Security Council. The Soviet Union has steadfastly supported the principle that the Security Council be responsible for day-to-day peacekeeping operations, thus making any decision subject to the veto. The United States, on the other hand, has emphasized the necessity of leaving nearly all operational decisions to the Secretary General and the force commander in the interests of efficiency and effective peacekeeping.

Secretary of State Kissinger signaled a willingness to take a new look at U.S. policy in his September 24 speech to the U.N. General Assembly when he said:

> The time has come to agree on peacekeeping guidelines so that this organization can act swiftly, confidently and effectively in future crises. To break the deadlock the United States is prepared to consider how the Security Council can play a more central role in the conduct of peacekeeping operations.

We are now exploring possibilities which would help achieve that end. In doing so, we hope that we can break the deadlock, facilitate the rapid establishment of peacekeeping operations in response to crisis situations, and achieve an agreement which accommodates the concerns of all. However, we expect other delegations, including the Soviet Union, which have significant peacekeeping interests and responsibilities to respond to the U.S. move.

ENCOURAGEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST

The peacekeeping operation in the Middle East which established a new U.N. Emergency Force encourages us to believe that an acceptable compromise may be attainable. Before going into the lessons of UNEF or the establishment of peacekeeping guidelines, I would like to describe briefly the genesis of that operation.

When it was demonstrated that the cease-fire established by Security Council Resolution 338 and reiterated in Resolution 339 was at best a fragile thing, the Security Council on October 25 adopted Resolution 340 which set up the force under the authority of the Security Council and requested the Secretary General to report on the steps

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taken to this effect. The Secretary General submitted a comprehensive report the following day. On October 27, the Security Council adopted Resolution 341 which approved the Secretary General's report and established the Force for a 6-month period at an estimated cost of $30 million.

In the resolution providing for the financing of the Force, the principle of collective responsibility has been accepted. Although the United States would have preferred that the operation be financed on the regular scale of assessments, we acceded to a compromise acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the membership. However, a special scale has been devised, and the United States and the other permanent members of the Security Council will pay 15 percent more than their scale of assessment for the regular budget. Developing countries will pay 80 or 90 percent less than their normal scale.

COMPOSING A FORCE

The delay in final approval of the Secretary General's report was due primarily to extensive, intricate, and time-consuming consultations on the composition of the Force. The United States proposed an amendment to the original eight-power draft which would exclude contingents from the permanent members of the Security Council. This amendment was adopted despite the reservations of the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain. We believe that regardless of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it is often desirable that the permanent members be excluded in order to prevent polarization or confrontation which could have effects in or beyond the area in which the Force would operate.

The Soviets believe very strongly that the "Western" nations have dominated U.N. peacekeeping activities in the past. They particularly noted that the first UNEF contingents which were withdrawn from the peacekeeping operation in Cyprus comprised of Swedes, Finns, and Austrians whom, though neutral, the Soviets tend to describe as "Western." The United States, however, was and is in the first instance concerned with the effectiveness of the Force and the impartiality of the contributing countries as to the issues and the parties concerned in the dispute. The terms of reference of UNEF concerning the geographic distribution of the Force, represent a compromise with which we are not entirely satisfied and which we certainly do not regard as a precedent.

WORKING WITHOUT AGREED GUIDELINES

What, then, can we learn from the establishment of the U.N. Emergency Force in the absence of agreed guidelines? First, it has been demonstrated that the U.N. for the benefit of all, can interpose itself in certain conflict situations. It cannot only improve the situation on the ground, but also, we have reason to hope, it can provide a means by which the parties to a conflict can construct a permanent settlement of their differences.

Second, we are encouraged by the fact that, in the case of the new UNEF, there was no argument at all about the primacy of the Security Council. That is as it should be. The Secretary General proposed the terms of reference, and the Council approved them. Since this is a "consent operation," not an enforcement action under article 42 of the

U.N. Charter, the Security Council wisely enlisted the full cooperation of the parties concerned. The Council defined the mandate, established the maximum size of the Force, provided for equitable financing of the operation, and gave its consent to other decisions before the operation could be launched.

Another lesson is that the terms of reference approved by the Security Council involved, in several instances, departures from positions previously held by several delegations in discussing peacekeeping guidelines in more theoretical terms. Our Government made such concessions, and so have others. That is a healthy development, proving that it may not be necessary to formulate guidelines so detailed as we had previously believed. In particular cases, we may find that agreement can—and perhaps should—be reached on either broader or narrower terms of reference as the situation may require. Thus, the developments of late October and November provide practical examples of how some knotty problems discussed in the Peacekeeping Committee for years were resolved at a time of international crisis. We discovered that a peacekeeping operation could in fact be established without predetermined guidelines.

Therefore, we believe that the Peacekeeping Committee in its future work should not neglect the important lessons which we can draw from the way in which this operation was established, especially concerning, such important matters as the establishment, financing, composition, size, and manner of termination of peacekeeping operations. Rather than taking comfort from our ability to establish UNEF in the absence of guidelines, we should seize the opportunity which this operation presents us in order to pursue, perhaps in more imaginative and general ways, the goal which we have been seeking for 8 years in the Peacekeeping Committee. Thank you.

[Following is Mr. Schaufele's prepared statement:]

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

It gives me a great deal of pleasure to appear before the subcommittee this morning to discuss United Nations peacekeeping. As an American citizen, I am especially gratified that you are holding hearings on a subject which is the primary objective of the United Nations Charter and of diplomacy itself. One important reason which led me to welcome an assignment at the United States Mission to the United Nations was the inclusion of peacekeeping as one of my principal responsibilities.

As you know, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has been virtually deadlocked for several years, after having made some initial progress in its efforts to reach agreement on the guidelines governing future peacekeeping operations. It is no secret that the major obstacle has been a difference between the U.S. and the Soviet Union regarding the respective authority and responsibilities of the Secretary General and the Security Council. The Soviet Union has steadfastly supported the principle that the Security Council be responsible for day-to-day peacekeeping operations, thus making any decision subject to the veto. The U.S., on the other hand, has emphasized the necessity of leaving nearly all operational decisions to the Secretary General and the force commander in the interests of efficiency and effective peacekeeping.

Secretary of State Kissinger signalled a willingness to take a new look at U.S. policy in his September 24 speech to the UN General Assembly when he said:

> The time has come to agree on peacekeeping guidelines so that this organization can act swiftly, confidently and effectively in future crises. To break the deadlock the U.S. is prepared to consider how the Security Council can play a more central role in the conduct of peacekeeping operations.

We are now exploring possibilities which would help achieve that end. In doing so, we hope that we can break the deadlock, facilitate the rapid establishment

of peacekeeping operations in response to crisis situations, and achieve an agreement which accommodates the concerns of all. However, we expect other delegations, including the Soviet Union, which have significant peacekeeping interests and responsibilities to respond to the U.S. move.

The peacekeeping operation in the Middle East which established a new UN Emergency Force encourages us to believe that an acceptable compromise may be attainable. Before going into the lessons of UNEF or the establishment of peacekeeping guidelines, I would like to describe briefly the genesis of that operation.

When it was demonstrated that the ceasefire established by Security Council Resolution 338 and reiterated in Resolution 339 was at best a fragile thing, the Security Council on October 25 adopted Resolution 340 which set up the force under the authority of the Security Council and requested the Secretary General to report on the steps taken to this effect. The Secretary General submitted a comprehensive report the following day. On October 27 the Security Council adopted Resolution 341 which approved the Secretary General's report and established the force for a six-month period at an estimated cost of $30 million. In the resolution providing for the financing of the force the principle of collective responsibility has been accepted. Although the U.S. would have preferred that the operation be financed on the regular scale of assessments, we acceded to a compromise acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the membership. However, a special scale has been devised and the U.S. and the other permanent members of the Security Council, will pay 15 percent more than their scale of assessment for the regular budget. Developing countries will pay 80 or 90 percent less than their normal scale.

The delay in final approval of the Secretary General's report was due primarily to extensive, intricate and time-consuming consultations on the composition of the force. The U.S. proposed an amendment to the original eight-power draft which would exclude contingents from the permanent members of the Security Council. This amendment was adopted despite the reservations of the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain. We believe that regardless of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it is often desirable that the permanent members be excluded in order to prevent polarization or confrontation which could have effects beyond the area in which the force would operate.

The Soviets believe very strongly that the "western" nations have dominated UN peacekeeping activities in the past. They particularly noted that the first UNEF contingents which were withdrawn from the peacekeeping operation in Cyprus comprised Swedes, Finns and Austrians, whom, though neutral, the Soviets tend to describe as "western". The U.S., however, was and is in the first instance concerned with the effectiveness of the force and the impartiality of the contributing countries as to the issues and the parties concerned in the dispute. The terms of reference of UNEF concerning the geographic distribution of the force represent a compromise with which we are not entirely satisfied and which we certainly do not regard as a precedent.

What then can we learn from the establishment of the UN Emergency Force in the absence of agreed guidelines? First, it has been demonstrated that the UN, for the benefit of all, can interpose itself in certain conflict situations. It can not only improve the situation on the ground, but also, we have reason to hope, it can provide a means by which the parties to a conflict can construct a permanent settlement of their differences. Second, we are encouraged by the fact that, in the case of the new UNEF, there was no argument at all about the primacy of the Security Council. That is at it should be. The Secretary General proposed the terms of reference and the Council approved them. Since this is a "consent operation", not an enforcement action under Article 42 of the UN Charter, the Security Council wisely enlisted the full cooperation of the parties concerned. The Council defined the mandate, established the maximum size of the force, provided for equitable financing of the operation and gave its consent to other decisions before the operation could be launched.

Another lesson is that the terms of reference approved by the Security Council involved, in several instances, departures from positions previously held by several delegations in discussing peacekeeping guidelines in more theoretical terms. Our government made such concessions, and so have others. That is a healthy development, proving that it may not be necessary to formulate guidelines so detailed as we had previously believed. In particular cases we may find that agreement can—and perhaps should—be reached on either broader or narrower terms of reference as the situation may require. Thus the developments of

late October and November provide practical examples of how some knotty problems discussed in the Peacekeeping Committee for years were resolved at a time of international crisis. We discovered that a peacekeeping operation could in fact be established without predetermined guidelines.

Therefore we believe that the Peacekeeping Committee in its future work should not neglect the important lessons which we can draw from the way in which this operation was established, especially concerning such important matters as the establishment, financing, composition, size and manner of termination of peacekeeping operations. Rather than taking comfort from our ability to establish UNEF in the absence of guidelines, we should seize the opportunity which this operation presents us in order to pursue, perhaps in more imaginative and general ways, the goal which we have been seeking for eight years in the peacekeeping committee. Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. That is a very informative statement.

The third witness is Admiral Lee.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. JOHN LEE (RETIRED), FORMER ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, AND FORMER SENIOR MILITARY ADVISER, U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Admiral LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittees, I am honored by this opportunity to appear before you.

Let me say to begin with that, after 42 years in the Navy, I have for the past 8 months been enjoying the delights of retirement in St. Petersburg, Fla. My information on current Middle East operations is, therefore, derived, almost exclusively, from Walter Cronkite and the St. Petersburg Times. Fortunately, you have other witnesses well qualified to speak on the present events; I will address myself to some general aspects of the U.N.'s peacekeeping.

INSTITUTIONALIZING PEACEKEEPING

Specifically, I would like to touch on two problems that seem central to improving and developing U.N. peacekeeping. These problems are, first, institutionalization—what organization and relationships at U.N. Headquarters might be feasible and would be effective for better controlling peacekeeping—and, second, great power participation—should we now begin to favor, rather than oppose, participation in peacekeeping operations by the veto powers and other major powers.

Taking institutionalization first, the lead question is, "Is it necessary?" The U.N. has been able to conduct a series of peacekeeping operations with its present ad hoc methods. Can it not continue to do so? The answer is, of course, that it can; it is indeed doing so today in the Middle East. But it does so at substantial cost in confusion and cross-purposes, with substantial risk of immobility or damaging reverses in future crises, and only by accepting severe limitations on the most that peacekeeping might hope to accomplish in the future.

In the words of Prof. Lawrence Finkelstein, "The best that might be attainable under these circumstances would be more of the improvisation at the brink of disaster that has characterized U.N. peacekeeping in the past * * *." This is not good enough, if our objective is to develop a stronger peacekeeping tool. Further, it would seem at

least possible that the recent movements in the relationships among the chief world power centers, plus the stimulus of the Arab-Israeli situation, might now make useful institutional agreements feasible.

There are dozens of blueprints for such agreements, and I will not bother you with another one. The long efforts of the Committee of 33, however, have defined the essence of the problem and suggest the area where compromise might be possible and where it could produce a workable result.

QUESTION OF CONTROL

The heart of the debate in the Committee of 33 and its working group was, of course, control as Ambassador Schaufele has just emphasized. Agreement on control would, I believe, break the deadlock.

Taken to an extreme, the U.S. position on control would delegate entire control of a peacekeeping operation to the Secretary General, subject only to an initial authorization and some consultation. At its extreme, the Soviet position would have all decisions, operational as well as other, made by the Secretary Council or an agency of the Council. This would make all operations, including the operation as a whole, continuously dependent on active day-by-day approval or at least abstention by each one of the veto powers. That U.S. position gives the Secretary General more independent authority than the Soviet Union will tolerate, and perhaps more than we would wish in many cases. That Soviet position is probably flatly unworkable. However, there does seem to be a usable middle ground.

Such a middle ground could have these characteristics:

The United States would concede that not only the original authorization, but a number of other specified key decisions, would require affirmative approval by the Secretary Council. These would have to include some decisions made not only at the start of an operation but during its course. Possible examples: designation and replacement of the commander, size and composition of the force—within reasonable tolerances—and changes thereto, general mission and broad tasks assigned, also including changes, and expenditure limitations. Perhaps approval of the participating nations would have to be included. And as an ultimate point, the United States might accept a provision that other significant operational decisions, not included in the specific list, would be subject to Council review and become inoperative if not approved within, say, 90 days.

SOME AGREEMENT

The Soviet Union would concede that the Secretary General would be the executive for carrying out the operations, with authority for all negotiations and operations within the authorizations.

Both sides could agree that an Operations Committee of the Council would be constituted, to be consulted on decisions and kept currently informed on the progress of operations by the Secretary General. Both sides would also, I hope, agree to resurrect and staff the Military Staff Committee to function not in the operational chain of command but as military advisors to the Council and further to be assigned by the Council to support the Secretary General.

Parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, while I will resist the temptation to go further into the Military Staff Committee than you would prob-

ably wish, I brought along a copy of a brief talk on the subject I gave last year to a seminar held by the International Peace Academy embodying my own views. If you will permit me, I will give the copy to your staff for anyone who is interested in the MSC (see appendix, p. 92).

What such agreements would accomplish would be to permit active and authoritative overseeing of operations by the Security Council and give the Council the tools and relationships to exercise its overseeing without hamstringing the Secretary General. On the other hand, it would affirmatively set up the Secretary General as the executive, which is essential in order to use his personal relationships and influence and the resources of the Secretariat, and it would support the Secretary General, in addition, with a needed military staff.

If something on the foregoing lines were accepted by the United States and the Soviet Union on the problem of control, the other organizational and doctrinal questions would, I believe, be manageable. Further, with the exception of the People's Republic of China—on whose position I have no knowledge whatever—such a package would seem to be salable, probably with some modifications, to the interested countries.

IMPROVING U.N. PERFORMANCE

Such agreements would make life more difficult for the Secretary General. They could, however, be the basis for getting on at last with active planning, preparation and readiness, and with greatly improved management and control, of peacekeeping operations. The agreed and stimulated organization would then have, if and when needed, a greater capability not only for tasks of the present order but also for even more demanding and threatening operations.

I am sure it is obvious, Mr. Chairman, that an underlying assumption of these thoughts is that U.N. peacekeeping cannot—at least not any longer—be made to serve the private purposes of any great power, including ourselves. Its function must be restricted to impartial and generally agreed upon prevention, control, or amelioration of violence or the threat of violence. The measures I have discussed postulate general agreement on any given peacekeeping operation, or at least no active opposition, among the veto powers and a large majority of other States. Without this, U.N. peacekeeping has little potential in any case.

May I now say a word or two on the subject of participation by the veto powers on peacekeeping operations. If the assumption is correct that we are coming into an era when U.N. peacekeeping will be clearly understood as impartial and cooperative, the chief objections to great power participation will be removed.

The value of grant power participation is not decisive in the essentially constabulary operations now in hand. If, however, we hope in time for greater U.N. potential, for the capacity to control larger, fluid, and possibly combatant situations—say something again of the scale of the Congo—then we will need the complex military resources of the principal powers who possess the projectable forces.

It is time, I believe, to start working in that direction.

[Vice Admiral Lee's prepared statement follows:]

Developing and Improving Peacekeeping

I am honored by this opportunity to appear before you.

Let me say to begin with that, after forty-two years in the Navy, I have for the past eight months been enjoying the delights of retirement in St. Petersburg, Florida. My information on current Middle East operations is, therefore, derived, almost exclusively, from Walter Cronkite and the St. Petersburg *Times*. Fortunately, you have other witnesses well qualified to speak on the present events; I will address myself to some general aspects of the U.N.'s peacekeeping.

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Institutionalization

Taking institutionalization first, the lead question is, "Is it necessary?" The U.N. has been able to conduct a series of peacekeeping operations with its present ad hoc methods. Can it not continue to do so? The answer is, of course, that it can; it is indeed doing so today in the Middle East. But it does so at substantial cost in confusion and cross-purpose, with substantial risk of immobility or damaging reverses in future crises, and only by accepting severe limitations on the most that peacekeeping might hope to accomplish in the future. In the words of Professor Lawrence Finkelstein "the best that might be attainable under these circumstances would be more of the improvisation at the brink of disaster that has characterized U.N. peacekeeping in the past. . . ." This is not good enough, if our objective is to develop a stronger peacekeeping tool. Further, it would seem at least possible that the recent movements in the relationships among the chief world power centers, plus the stimulus of the Arab-Israeli situation, might now make useful institutional agreements feasible.

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Both sides could agree that an Operations Committee of the Council would be constituted, to be consulted on decisions and kept currently informed on the progress of operations by the Secretary General. Both sides would also, I hope,

agree to resurrect and staff the Military Staff Committee, to function not in the operational chain of command, but as military advisors to the Council, and further assigned, by the Council, to support the Secretary General.

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PARTICIPATION BY GREAT POWERS

May I now say a word or two on the subject of participation by the veto powers in peacekeeping operations. If the assumption is correct that we are coming into an era when U.N. peacekeeping will be clearly understood as impartial and cooperative, the chief objections to great power participation will be removed.

The value of great power participation is not decisive in the essentially constabulary operations now in hand. If, however, we hope in time for greater U.N. potential, for the capacity to control larger, fluid, and possibly combatant situations—say something again of the scale of the Congo—then we will need the complex military resources of the principal powers who possess the projectable forces.

It is time, I believe, to start working in that direction.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Admiral, for a very helpful statement.

Chairman Hamilton.

PRESENT SOVIET POLICY

Mr. HAMILTON. Gentlemen, we appreciate your statements very much; they are most helpful.

I would like to talk about the present peacekeeping force in the Middle East and direct your attention to that if I may.

So far at least the Soviet Union has not been uncooperative in this peacekeeping effort and I suppose you could make a case for it being cooperative. Do you detect in this any basic change of attitude by the Soviet Union toward peacekeeping operations?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. If I could respond to that question, Mr. Congressman, we have not detected any basic change. I would say in this particular case that we have some elements which have elicited Soviet cooperation. One is the basic agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union starting with the agreement to submit a cease-fire proposal to the Security Council as being in the interest of both countries. The additional cooperation I think stems from that particular act.

The presentation of a resolution by the nonalined members of the Security Council for a peacekeeping operation was a very important factor for the Soviet Union because they tend wherever possible to support the positon of the nonalined. I think that one of the key factors in the handling of the peacekeeping operation within the United Nations mechanism is that the Soviet Union for the first time to my knowledge explicitly acknowledged the principle of collective responsibility and peacekeeping actions undertaken by the Security Council and has expressed its readiness to pay.

LENGTH OF PRESENT COMMITMENT

Mr. HAMILTON. For how long?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Well, the force is set up provisionally for 6 months with a renewal provision for another 6 months but it would have to be acted upon again at the end of that 6 months. So although I have not detected any basic change in the Soviet position, I think the Soviet cooperation is indeed welcome in this case. The fact that the Soviets did agree to terms of reference which are in violation of some of their expressed ideas about peacekeeping is also encouraging but we have had no indication so far on any change in their basic approach to peacekeeping itself.

Mr. HAMILTON. The Soviets are committed now for a period of 6 months, is that right?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. At the end of that period the Security Council must act again.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes; it would be a renewal action.

PAYING FOR PEACEKEEPING

Mr. HAMILTON. And their financing arrangements are the same as ours? I think you mentioned that each of the permanent members will pay 15 percent more than their scale of assessments in the regular budget.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. That is correct.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is this the first time they have participated in peacekeeping financial operations?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I think it is. They have withheld on past peacekeeping operations for various reasons, either that they were illegal or that the operation engaged in illegal acts or that the operation was set up by the General Assembly as opposed to the Security Council.

THE U.N. AND ISRAEL

Mr. HAMILTON. Over the years there have been certain tensions and disagreements between the U.N. peacekeeping operatives and the state of Israel. What is your feeling of that situation now? Do you think the attitude of Israel toward peacekeeping has improved at all?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Certainly in comparison to the last UNEF which Israel did not accept the Israeli position has changed somewhat. They did accept this force. The only caveat that they have put on it is that contingents from countries which do not have diplomatic relations with Israel cannot operate in Israeli controlled territory. So far that has not proved to be a serious impediment because the force is composed of contingents from countries which have relations with Israel and others which do not.

Mr. HAMILTON. Are there any guarantees this time that you could not have a withdrawal of the peacekeeping forces like you had in May 1967 which was one of the factors in triggering the June war?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. There is no guarantee, Mr. Chairman. However, the operation is for a specific period of time and implicit in that is that to bring it to an end any earlier would require a return to the Secretary Council for its approval.

THE MANDATE OF THE NEW FORCE

Mr. HAMILTON. What precisely is the mandate of the peacekeeping force there now?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Well, the mandate is based on the implementation of the cease-fire, and the mandate, specifically in operative paragraph 1 of the resolution, demands that "immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours G.m.t. on October 22, 1973." Then it goes on to request the Secretary General to set up the force and report to the Council, and so forth. So that is the specific mandate.

Now if I could get back to your previous question. In Resolution 341 which implements 340, the second paragraph states, "Decides that the force shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of 6 months." That is fairly clear language for U.N. documents.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is the size of that force?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. The ultimate size of the force is 7,000. It is not necessary to have 7,000 men, that is the maximum size of the force.

Mr. HAMILTON. How many are on it now?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. In place at the present time are 3,407, and the proposed totals on the basis of contingents which are scheduled to arrive shortly would be 6,057.

THE SYRIAN FRONT

Mr. HAMILTON. How many of these are at the Syrian front and how many at the Egyptian?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. None at the Syrian front. There has not yet been an arrangement made to place UNEF at the Syrian front. The 3,407 are now all at the Egyptian-Israeli front.

Mr. WILSON. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. On that point, Mr. Ambassador, although there may not be any U.N. forces on the ground to the Syrian front, there is a rather rigid line that is being observed under the auspices of the United Nations resolutions by both the Syrians and the Israelis. Isn't that correct?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. It simply does not have any U.N. soldiers standing on it.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. It does have the U.N. Supervisory Organization, and there are observers there but they are not part of UNEF.

I would like to correct myself, Mr. Chairman. The Soviets do pay for the operation of the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization in the Middle East and for the observer mission in Kashmir.

REPORTING VIOLATIONS

Mr. HAMILTON. When you have violations in the cease-fire as evidently occurred in recent days, what happens? What do the peacekeeping forces do?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I could not really answer that question in any detail. I know in several cases what is done. There was a breach of the cease-fire on the Israeli-Syrian front over the weekend, in which there was a heavy exchange of artillery and tank fire. The U.N. observer in the area went immediately to both sides, discussed it with them and called for a cease-fire or a restoration of the cease-fire no later than 12 noon of that day. His consultations were effective, and actually the cease-fire was reinstituted an hour and a half earlier than the deadline. So it is an advantage to both sides to stop the shooting or stop the movement.

Mr. YOST. Could I make a comment on that?

Mr. HAMILTON. Surely.

Mr. YOST. This action that Mr. Schaufele describes is all that the observers can do—to report the violation, attempt to negotiate its end and the reestablishment of the cease-fire. Of course, it is contemplated that when the UNEF force is fully in place, it will occupy a buffer zone between the two forces and hence would be in a position effectively to prevent any violations on the ground of the case-fire.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is the peacekeeping force deployed on both sides of the line?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. It is today?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. It is now; yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. How does this force now there compare with the force that was there in 1967, in size?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. It will be about the same size, although the earlier force which at its height was around 7,000, was gradually reduced, I think, to about 2,500 by the time it left in 1967.

INSURING DEMILITARIZATION

Mr. HAMILTON. If the peace negotiations succeed in establishing some kinds of demilitarized zones and so forth, would it be expected that the peacekeeping force would play a role in that demilitarization or in the withdrawal implementation?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I am not privy to all the possible options that may be open on this particular subject, but certainly over the years this is one of the possibilities that has been seriously considered.

Mr. HAMILTON. Could it do that under its present mandate?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. No, it could not.

Mr. HAMILTON. That would have to be taken back to the Security Council then?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes, or upon agreement of the parties.

Mr. YOST. During all of the negotiations that I took part in over the years after the 6-day war, it was contemplated that if there could be an agreement between the parties involving demilitarized zones, the United Nations Forces would occupy those zones and police them and help to maintain them.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gross.

SITUATION IN 1967

Mr. GROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have several questions.

What would happen if the situation of 1967 was repeated when Israel told the U.N. Forces to get out of the way because they were coming through?

Mr. WILSON. Would you yield?

Mr. GROSS. Beg pardon?

Mr. FRASER. What year?

Mr. GROSS. I said 1967. That is what happened in 1967.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. No; Israel didn't do it.

Mr. GROSS. Israel didn't do what?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. She didn't tell them to get out of the way.

Mr. GROSS. Well, Israel went on the offensive.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. She didn't tell the United Nations Forces to get out of the way, is all I said, Mr. Gross. I am not saying that she was engaged in hostilities.

Mr. FRASER. Perhaps we can let the witness respond to the question.

Mr. YOST. I think what happened was that the Egyptian Government asked that the UNEF be withdrawn, and it was in the process of being withdrawn when the war broke out. Then, of course, it is correct that Israel asked the Forces which were still there which had not had time to be withdrawn, to get out of the way, so in effect both of you gentlemen are right.

Mr. FRASER. Very diplomatic.

Mr. GROSS. I didn't know we were going to split hairs here this morning.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, if you will yield, Mr. Gross, it does seem to me the initiative for the removal of the Forces is what was significant and that came from Egypt. I am not trying to argue that the Israelis wanted them to get out of the way just prior to hostilities but it was ticked off by the Egyptians.

Mr. GROSS. They didn't pay any attention to what Egypt told them to do, they got out of the way because Israeli tanks moved across the Sinai, didn't they? Isn't that why they got out of the way?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I think that is a different position you are taking now.

Mr. GROSS. What is that?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is a different description of the events prior to hostilities. The Israelis demonstrated a need.

ARMS FOR UNEF

Mr. GROSS. Initiated a request. I just said they told them to get out of the way because they were coming through, that is all, and they got out of the way. I don't think the Egyptians moved them out of the way at all. They might have made a request but they didn't move them out of the way.

What kinds of arms does the present force have?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. The United Nations carries light arms, it does not have tanks or artillery.

Mr. GROSS. They might just as well be unarmed, is that right?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Well, one could say that, Mr. Congressman. On the other hand, I think the thing that prevented a serious incident at kilometer 109 very early in the December cease-fire is that the commanding general of the force when he moved to take over the Israeli checkpoint in accordance with the agreement signed between the Egyptians and Israelis on November 11 sent his troops to that checkpoint without arms and I suspect that is why there was no incident. To be unarmed is sometimes more effective than to be armed.

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Mr. GROSS. As a result of the 1967 war were any UN forces in the territory that Israel occupied as a result of that war?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes, sir. The U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization had observation posts in Israeli occupied territory both in the Golan Heights and east of the Suez Canal.

Mr. GROSS. What happened?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. They were either asked to withdraw or they were overrun. There were three officers killed in the Suez.

Mr. GROSS. So their presence there didn't mean very much? It meant nothing.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. They were not meant to repulse an attack, a three-man post, only to observe the violations of the cease-fire which had come about through our initiative in 1971. They were not meant to engage in any fighting.

Mr. GROSS. But the fact of their presence and the fact of their showing the U.N. flag was meaningless, was it not? What would their presence mean in a 3,000-man force, as you say, if either side elected to renew hostilities? It would not mean much, would it?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I think that the establishment of even observer groups in small numbers is a deterrent to action unless either side is fully determined to launch a full-scale offensive. I don't think that U.N. emergency forces under this provision of the charter or that U.N. observer groups are meant in effect to repulse any attacks which might take place but I think their presence is a deterrent. They have the two sides under constant observation and they do move quickly wherever they can in order to maintain the cease-fire or the positions of the two sides.

COSTS OF PEACEKEEPING

Mr. GROSS. You say that the cost for 6 months is $30 million?
Mr. SCHAUFELE. The estimated cost.
Mr. GROSS. And our share of that percentagewise is what?
Mr. SCHAUFELE. Twenty-nine percent.
Mr. GROSS. Twenty-nine percent.
Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes.
Mr. GROSS. We are not even down to 25 percent, the ratio that goes into effect January 1?
Mr. SCHAUFELE. We are down to the 25 percent. The agreement was that each permanent member would pay 15 percent over and above his normal percent, so we pay 29 percent.
Mr. GROSS. I don't care how you juggle figures, we are still 29 percent of the cost.
Mr. SCHAUFELE. On this particular operation; yes, sir.
Mr. GROSS. On this particular operation. I don't care how you try to fuzz it up, we are still the big spender in this deal.
Mr. YOST. I think the rationale of that, Mr. Congressman, is that we have a stronger interest in the maintenance of this cease-fire there than the average small member of the United Nations does because, as we have seen during the hostilities, continued war there has a very profound effect on us as well as the Soviet Union. Therefore it is argued that we should both be willing to carry a little more of the burden of the peacekeeping.

SOVIET FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Mr. GROSS. As Mr. Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense, expressed it before the committee the other day. He said that in the wisdom of Congress we are going to do thus and so by way of the $2.2 billion bill. I don't call that wisdom at all, I call that playing Uncle Sucker around the world. That is not wisdom. It is just laying out more of the money of the taxpayers of this country that they can ill afford.
Tell me this. The support by the Soviets, what is their percentage contribution?
Mr. SCHAUFELE. The Soviet assessment for the regular budget is about 13 percent, and their share of the UNEF budget is slightly less than 15 percent. Adding the contributions of Byelorussia and the Ukraine, the total percentage of UNEF costs contributed by the three countries comes to just under 17 percent.
Mr. GROSS. About 18 percent.
Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes.
Mr. GROSS. Well, that is par for the course—maybe a little more than par for the course.
Will the fact of their contribution to this U.N. force relieve them of the possible penalty of being ousted from the United Nations, Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. SCHAUFELE. No, sir. Technically under article 19 of the U.N. Charter, that article could be invoked if a country falls 2 years behind in its payments.
Mr. GROSS. Why has it not been invoked in the past?
Mr. SCHAUFELE. There was a great debate on this subject in 1964 and there was agreement among all powers to search for a solution to the

financial problems of the United Nations, and at that time it was agreed that it would not be.

Mr. GROSS. That is nice and that is all I have at this time.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Wolff.

WHAT HAPPENED IN MAY 1967

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like the record to show that I am reading from the statement given to us by the Library of Congress "the UNEF was placed on Egyptian soil with the consent of the United Nations Resolution 998. When on May 18, 1967, Egypt requested that the force be withdrawn, the Secretary General met with the advisory council. The advisory committee chose not to call the General Assembly. UNEF ceased to be operational May 19, 1967, withdrawal complete June 17, 1967." Perhaps Mr. Gross was referring to the fact that the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran were being blockaded in counter to the recommendations of the United Nations order to maintain freedom of access. The Israelis broke the illegal blockade at that time.

I wonder now if we could get down to the future. Since 1967 infractions of the cease-fire have met with condemnations of Israel. Throughout the years I don't believe that there was one single condemnation of any of the terrorist activities of Arab States even those admitted by them including the massacre of innocent civilians at Lod airport by terrorist mercenaries. I am wondering why Israel should have confidence in future U.N. actions or the decisions made by the U.N. observer team or the U.N. force. I wonder if any one of you gentlemen could answer?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Well, perhaps, I could start off, Mr. Congressman. The United States obviously did not agree with all those condemnations of Israel. Perhaps I can best cite the view of some members of the United Nations who are fairly neutral on this subject and that is that terrorist activities carried out by individuals or Palestinian liberation movements are just that, they are carried out by individuals or nonofficial organizations whereas Israel was criticized for actions which were actions as a government.

Mr. WOLFF. How about the questions of the Sudan? Our Ambassador and his aide were killed. Sudan is a member of the United Nations. They gave sanctuary and headquarters to terrorist organizations responsible for the killings. What has the U.N. done about that?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. As a matter of fact, the U.N. has done nothing about it since it was not asked to do so. Sudan has agreed to try the people who were involved.

Mr. WOLFF. The trial has been postponed several times and no action taken against the killers or their employers.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes; I seem to recall it has been opened recently but I cannot swear to that.

ROLE OF NONALINED STATES

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Gross and I don't agree on very many things but we might agree with the ineffectiveness of the U.N. in certain areas, and I think this is certainly one area. You'd believe the U.N. would move since we are the principal financier of the U.N.

I believe, Ambassador Schaufele, that you mentioned nonalined members. What is the definition of a nonalined member?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I don't think that my definition is as important as their definition.

Mr. WOLFF. Well, could we come to some definition of nonalined today? We talk about the nonalined world.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. The nonalined world, if you will indulge me a little bit in being somewhat imprecise because I cannot be precise on that, composes a group of nations which may vary from 75 to 95 members who choose not to aline themselves with any blocs.

Mr. WOLFF. Could we have an example of one or two of these nonalined nations?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Well, they range now in this day and age all the way from Yugoslavia to——

Mr. WOLFF. Yugoslavia is a nonalined nation?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOLFF. They are not a party to any bloc—I don't think the Soviets would agree to that.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. That is why I said their definition is more important than my definition.

Mr. WOLFF. I have no further questions.

Mr. YOST. I will say a word on that if I might, Mr. Chairman. Very loosely nonalined means that these nations don't belong either to NATO or to any other Western or Communist military alliance.

Mr. WOLFF. What you mean is any nation that is anti-American. Yugoslavia does not belong to the Soviet bloc nations?

Mr. YOST. No.

Mr. WOLFF. Or the Warsaw Pact nations?

Mr. GROSS. Does NATO still exist?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. If you would like to listen to Ambassador Malik, he will tell you about it.

Mr. YOST. In the economic field most Latin American countries call themselves nonalined or members of this third-world group, even though on political matters they are much closer to us than to our adversaries. So the definition is very loose.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

RECENT COMPROMISES ON PEACEKEEPING

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to begin by addressing members of the committee.

I am particularly disappointed since I missed Ambassador Yost's testimony since he is an old friend. I was present at Senator Mansfield's reception for President Ceausescu.

I would like to follow up on Mr. Gross' questions on the present emergency force. Whose compromise was it that we were not enthusiastic about agreeing to it? In other words, where did the pressure come from for the permanent members of the Security Council paying the 15 percent additional?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I can perhaps start the answer to that question, Mr. Congressman, by pointing out there is a general feeling in the United Nations as a whole that the permanent members should pay

more for peacekeeping because of their privileged role as permanent members of the Security Council. There is a precedent for a special assessment rate which has been used in the past in which our contribution, if I am not mistaken, is actually higher than that percentage. This particular compromise was based on that general feeling and worked out by a number of middle powers.

I think the actual leader of the group, so to speak, was Brazil in this case and they measured the sentiment among the membership in order to determine what scale of assessment should actually be devised. At first, in all honesty, we were concerned that we might come up—there was one proposal put forward that the United States pay as much as 50 percent of the cost of this operation but wiser heads prevailed and the compromise which was actually worked out was largely done so by responsible middle powers in the United Nations.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You say wiser heads prevailed because it would have been politically unacceptable here if we should do something else.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes.

DETERMINING COST SHARES

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I would think Ambassador Yost has a reasonable position in that if it is in our interest to support an effort like this we should not quibble too far about the percentage. I think it is of doubtful value that the privilege role of the permanent member gives the right to veto. I don't see any value in a situation like this.

You could say any superior member or any wealthy country is privileged to be wealthy, and therefore a wealthy country should have supported the entire thing. In other words, if it is what the vast majority of the nations of the U.N. feel about the situation and they are in the driver's seat, I am surprised we don't have quite a different relationship than actually was produced. In other words, I don't really understand the rationalization for this.

This was a recognition on the part of major nations that there was no alternative but to accept this decision of 15 percent? I don't know why particularly we are interested in this compromise, those that pay more.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Well, I feel that in this case it is very much like the Congress of the United States. In the final analysis you seek a piece of legislation, in this case a financing bill which is supported by the most votes, and in this case this was the proposal that could win the votes. Certainly a proposal under which the permanent members of the Security Council or the wealthier members of the United Nations would underwrite the whole cost would have been equally, if not more, acceptable but we have a strong belief in the principle of collective responsibility. As I pointed out, the Soviet Union has now espoused this and many responsible nations believe that all members of the United Nations should pay a share of peacekeeping operations.

SIGNIFICANCE OF KISSINGER STATEMENT

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I would like to understand a little more about it. Maybe you don't know what the significance of Secretary Kissinger's remarks on September 24 is. It is on page 1 of your statement.

The time has come to agree on peacekeeping guidelines so that this organization can act swiftly, confidently and effectively in future crises. To break the deadlock the U.S. is prepared to consider how the Security Council can play a more central role in the conduct of peacekeeping operations.

As I understand it from your statement the Security Council is where we don't want responsibility; we want to leave it in the hands of the Secretary General and the Soviet Union wants it in the Security Council. Does this indicate that we are moving toward the Soviet position? In other words, is this a compromise of what has been a firm position in an effort to see if we can reach an understanding with the Soviet Union?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. It is the beginning of a compromise effort.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And what we would hope to do is have the Security Council take an occasional interest but not what you call a day-to-day responsibility for peace-keeping operations.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. That is correct. We would like to find that area in which the Security Council might be reasonably expected to make decisions, leaving the other areas of the operation to the control of the Secretary General and the commander of the force.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Presumably there is interest not only in the Soviet delegation but in others in exploring the possibility of movement along the lines that the Secretary has suggested.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. There is great interest in other delegations. We have received no counter signal from the Soviet Union.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I wonder if I might ask you gentlemen whether you would not like to comment on each other's statements. Have you had any disagreements? Have you any comments any of you would like to make? That would be interesting.

Mr. YOST. No; I find myself fully persuaded by Ambassador Schaufele's statement.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Admiral Lee, did you want to say something?

Admiral LEE. No comment, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Wilson.

SOVIET DESIRE FOR A CEASE-FIRE

Mr. WILSON. I want to direct my question to Ambassador Yost first, and I want us to be as an evenhanded as possible. There has been a great deal of discussion in both Foreign Affairs Subcommittees, and there will be more discussion on the floor of the House about the proper extent of American assistance to Israel.

I want to ask you a very simple question: do you think the impetus for the cease-fire would have existed and the Russians would have been interested had Israel not started winning the war?

Mr. YOST. No; I should doubt it.

Mr. WILSON. That is all.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Bingham, I will come to you in a minute or so. I have not asked my questions yet, and I thought you would want to catch up on the statement.

Mr. BINGHAM. Fine.

BIG POWERS AND PEACEKEEPING

Mr. FRASER. Admiral, you have indicated that you don't see any problem with large power involvement in the peacekeeping. Ambassador Schaufele says that at least for the moment the U.S. position is opposed to that because of the possible confrontation that might ensue. Would you want to elaborate on your view a little more? Why don't you share those same fears?

Admiral LEE. With respect, sir, you somewhat overstate my position. There are certainly problems connected with great power participation. There is always the possibility of divergent interests among the principal powers, and when engaged side by side in peacekeeping operations, this could produce a difficult problem of control. I don't think the difficulties would be overwhelming in operating actual joint forces, however.

Second, there is a concern among the smaller powers that the powerful agreed presence of the principal powers could be used to override their interests.

These will continue to be significant problems. They will have to be worked with. Decisions in specific cases should be made with both political concerns and operational effectiveness in mind.

The potential, the weight and the significance, of a U.N. force, in more complicated and larger operations or operations where you need more weight in the force would, I think, be greatly enhanced if you did have major power elements involved. Pushing aside organized Soviet formations would be a more significant operation than pushing aside observers, particularly if you do increase the size and weight of the forces. Disregarding such forces, or running over them, would be a much more serious decision.

You can hear various views about the political aspects of the operation in the Dominican Republic, but mechanically it was first rate. A relatively enormous force was put down between the two contending parties. It was a very heavily armed major force. That at least stopped the violence. For good or ill, the landing force was in control. If you even envisage something like that—not today, but in the future—as a hope of peacekeeping in some situations, you will need to be able to draw upon the major military powers.

Mr. FRASER. I didn't mean to overstate your position but I was just rereading what you said, and I guess I did overstate it. Your suggestion, however, was that we move in the direction of considering big power involvement.

Admiral LEE. Yes; but it was by no means meant as a criticism of keeping them out in the present case.

Mr. YOST. Could I say a word, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. FRASER. Yes. I would be interested in your views, Mr. Ambassador.

USING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH

Mr. YOST. I think this is one issue where we should be flexible and pragmatic. If it should turn out in a particular situation that the presence of the United States or Soviet forces would help to make the operation successful, we certainly should not be prevented by doctrinaire reasoning from joining in it. Of course the two have joined

in providing logistics support and are in this present operation flying in contingents.

I am delighted, for example, to see in this present operation a participation by an Eastern European country, Poland. I think it will make the Soviets more ready to cooperate in U.N. peacekeeping if they feel that their friends are not automatically excluded as they almost always have been in the past.

Mr. FRASER. Ambassador Yost, on that point could I raise a question? There are Eastern European participants in the Vietnam supervisory organization and one of the difficulties seems to be that those powers are rather consistently taking one point of view.

Mr. YOST. This is somewhat a different operation in that those supervisory commissions are almost a law unto themselves. When they get into a deadlock by one member voting one way and other members voting another way, nothing happens at all, you get a complete stalemate, whereas in this case the contingents participating in the U.N. force are not able to do that unless they just choose to withdraw. If they tried to behave in a way that the Secretary General or the commander felt to be partial, that would be immediately reported to the Security Council and you would get a showdown there.

I frankly don't think that is likely to happen but, if it does, that is the way to handle it. However, in this particular Middle Eastern affair, with the intensity of feeling involving the big powers, I think it is just as well that the United States and the Soviet Union are not participating other than in logistics.

THE OCTOBER 24 BREZHNEV NOTE

Mr. FRASER. I would like to follow this a little further and ask Ambassador Schaufele to comment if he wishes to.

As I understand it, Brezhnev in his note to the President indicated alarm that the first cease-fire of the security resolution was not being observed and that both the United States and the Soviet Union should send in forces to implement the cease-fire. This led to a worldwide alert of the U.S. forces, including the strategic bomber force.

Could it be said that here was a case where there might have been a reasonable basis for the Soviet point of view? That is, if the Security Council had agreed on the cease-fire and one or both parties were failing to observe it, wouldn't joint United States-Soviet action consistent with a doctrine of flexibility or pragmatism in an attempt to enforce the cease-fire under those circumstances?

Admiral Lee.

Admiral LEE. Well, I will try to respond.

Mr. FRASER. Admiral, excuse me.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Frelinghuysen feels I misstated the issue.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Surely the note as we know it did not suggest a joint effort on the part of the United States and the Soviets. It suggested quite clearly, as I understand it, there might be unilateral action on the part of the Soviet Union, which is quite another possibility.

Mr. FRASER. If we declined.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Of course. But this is what created the possibility of real trouble, action by one major power.

Mr. FRASER. With the Cuban missile crisis as an example, why not deal with the alternative? I am interested in that aspect of it because obviously if we didn't——

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Maybe he could comment on both aspects. All I meant was we should not leave the possibility of a unilateral action. What actually was proposed.

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

IMPROVISING CAN BE DANGEROUS

Admiral LEE. Well, sir, without any background on this specific situation, it would seem a most dangerous time to improvise a working cooperation between elements of the United States and Soviet armed forces in a confused and fluid action on a battlefield. The possibility of hostile actions between the two external forces would exist, as well as between one or both of them and the fighting armies. It would be extremely difficult to make such arrangements at such a time. It is an extremely sensitive situation in the Sinai, and all sorts of possibilities of very dangerous events would appear to exist.

If, however, adequate preparations and doctrinal preparation were made, and if the international staff were on top of it and directly in control, and if the control had been accepted by the powers, and if there were a mechanism and common communications set up, it would seem to me that handling U.S. and Soviet participation would be quite possible. You would of course have to examine each case specifically. The present case is one where the great power interests are divergent, even though they overlap in a mutual desire for a cessation of violence, and this might not, therefore, be a good case for combining United States and Soviet forces. But in any case it should not be improvised in crisis, and not done on the field of battle.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Yost.

Mr. YOST. Yes, I agree with the admiral that the situation was far too critical and moving too fast for such an unprecedented step as United States and Soviet forces to be sent into the midst at that moment. I think it was far preferable that what happened did happen, that the Security Council acted rapidly to set up a joint force not including the two great powers.

I might just add as a footnote, with regard to what Congressman Frelinghuysen said, that my personal view is that we somewhat overestimated the likelihood of unilateral Soviet action. Probably it could have been deterred by less conspicuous methods, but that is just a side remark.

MR. SCHAUFELE'S VIEW

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Schaufele.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. If I could comment in a personal sense on this, I would just note several things.

The Soviet move came on the basis of the public invitation from the President of Egypt to the United States and the Soviet Union.

Mr. FRASER. That is, President Sadat requested assistance?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes. A request which we quickly rejected.

There was no U.N. mandate for such an operation which would immediately have put us again in a position of the super power acting alone which would have reduced significantly the possibility that the

other members of the Security Council—indeed other members of the United Nations—lending their cooperation to a peacekeeping effort.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, I am interested in exploring that point for a moment. Suppose that in the Security Council both the United States and the Soviet Union reported the request from President Sadat and requested authority from the Security Council to send a modest contingent of equal size from both countries in an attempt to enforce the cease-fire. What would the reaction have been among the other Security Council members?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I find I am a little hesitant to predict what the reaction would be, but when one is talking about a modest force one is talking about a peacekeeping force such as UNEF. We have always certainly believed that these operations should be consent operations.

Mr. FRASER. That is both the States' parties?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes. I question whether the State of Israel would have agreed to such an operation under those circumstances.

Mr. FRASER. So that that would really have been precluded at least in our position?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes, such was the possibility.

MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC)

Mr. FRASER. Admiral, you refer to the military staff provision in the U.N. system. Would you just say a word about that? It seems to be in limbo. Perhaps you can just give us a minute of background and what your view is now.

Admiral LEE. Yes, sir. Limbo is not too strong a word. The MSC is really almost nonexistent. It consists only of a charter provision and a a biweekly meeting, for 10 minutes, by men whose real work is elsewhere. The MSC is incapable of handling any problem whatever at the present time.

Mr. FRASER. What is the charter concept and what was envisioned?

Admiral LEE. Originally, sir, it was right after the war, and the MSC concept was based on the wartime combined Chiefs of Staff. The MSC was composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the veto powers, or their representatives. Our initial U.S. delegation to the MSC was a very senior officer from each of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, supported by about 40 staff officers in New York with a great deal of work in the Pentagon backing them up.

Actually, at the first meetings of the Security Council, the MSC was taken quite seriously. It was given a directive to work out the procedure and doctrine on the basis of the Charter provisions. The MSC worked on the problem for a couple of years, and finally ended with irreconcilable divergencies. A split report was sent to the Council, which was also unable to agree.

I don't think the deadlock was a defect in the military or diplomatic capacities of the then members of the MSC. The problem was simply insoluble at that time and in that climate. The Security Council worked on the MSC report for a month or two, and then sent it quietly to the file, where it remains to this day. Since then, nothing has been done by the MSC.

Mr. FRASER. You say the MSC is analogous to the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral LEE. More closely to the combined Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. FRASER. Would it advise the Security Council on carrying out its military operations?

Admiral LEE. The original concept was that the MSC would be an element in the chain of command. The concept was of a combined force being created by a United Nations effort, and controlled and managed by the Security Council. The Military Staff Committee would be the equivalent of our Joint Chiefs of staff for strategic direction. A general in the field, like General Eisenhower in Europe, would be the commander in the theatre. This concept of a major war-fighting force is of course not now considered. Under current concepts, the MSC should be only advisory.

Mr. GROSS. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

ROLE OF THE MSC

Mr. GROSS. The first real test of the United Nations Military Staff Committee was in the Korean war, was it not? That is, there it was provided the first test of what it could or could not do, is that not correct? It was not worth the paper the provision required to print it in the charter of the United Nations. We could not clear through the MSC our battle plans in Korea with the Communists involved supplying the other side.

Admiral LEE. The Korean operation was unique in that it was set up in the absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council.

Mr. GROSS. Go ahead.

Admiral LEE. The absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council decisions was the critical factor in U.N. participation. The war was essentially run by our own country with information to the U.N. and, as you say, that made it more operationally feasible.

Mr. GROSS. President Truman called it United Nations police action. All military operations are supposed to be cleared through it, are they not, under the charter?

Admiral LEE. All U.N. and military?

Mr. GROSS. Yes, all U.N. military operations. There has always been in the top echelon of the United Nations Military Staff Committee a Soviet, or a Communist from some other nation every year since the United Nations was organized, is that not correct?

Admiral LEE. I think it is correct, sir, that the U.N. peacekeeping is impractical even on the most modest scale without the concurrence of the Soviet Union.

Mr. GROSS. Why pay for it?

Admiral LEE. As Ambassador Yost said, sir, the alternatives are not appealing either.

Mr. FRASER. As I understand it, officers assigned to the MSC are now the officers who also have other responsibilties at the U.N.

Admiral LEE. Exactly, sir. The MSC has only its constitutional position in the charter.

There is a need for military professionalism at the U.N. headquarters. The MSC is the constitutional location to put it. If it is to function, the MSC would have to be manned and staffed. If this were done, I believe the MSC could usefully perform the function of advising the Security Council. The MSC should also be assigned to support the Secretary General and do his military planning for him.

Since all peacekeeping operations are unequivocally political, the MSC should not be the executive or even directly in the chain of command. The MSC should supply the Council and the Secretary General with military advice and staff work. The Secretary General is clearly the man to run the operation, not the MSC.

POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR MSC

Mr. FRASER. But the idea is that if progress in détente is real and extends to cooperation in this field, then the possibility exists of reviving the MSC as an operating institution within the U.N.

Admiral LEE. I think the MSC would be quite useful if it were made clear, and I think this could be agreed, that it would not be the executive chain of command over forces in the field.

Mr. FRASER. And do some of the planning by training.

Admiral LEE. Of which there is an immense amount to do, sir. You will have General Rikhye tomorrow who is very experienced in the problems of the U.N. military man. If you wish, he can give you much background on the problems of lack of preparation and lack of logistic support, communications, almost anything.

Mr. YOST. I think the original intent of the authors of the charter was that article 43 would be implemented. There would be special agreements among members placing at the disposal of the U.N. forces and facilities. The Military Staff Committee would advise the Security Council on the organization and employment of these forces.

When because of the cold war article 43 was never carried out, there were not any agreements of this kind, the MSC was really left hanging in the air without any real function. I think, if it should as a result of détente or whatever have any function under the new situation now, it would be more in the line of planning and advice to the Secretary General as to preparations for possible U.N. peacekeeping, along the lines I spoke of in my statement.

The Secretary General has from time to time during the Congo operation, for example, had a little private staff of his own, a military staff, because he could not utilize the MSC in view of the differences of opinion among the major powers. But the Soviets objected to this small staff and it was gradually whittled down so that it is now almost nonexistent. He either should have a little staff of that kind which could give him the necessary military advice that he needs or the Military Staff Committee should be used without veto to give him advice at this time.

Admiral LEE. May I make one more point?

Ambassador Yost is, of course, quite correct that the preparatory planning and supporting role is a task for the MSC, but also such a reinvigorated MSC and its staff would be extremely useful during an operation, and especially at the start, when decisions are made under pressure on what is needed, where it should go, what the arrangements for it should be and so forth. If the Secretary General had a group of military staff men who would work in New York, or be sent at once to the trouble spot to report conditions, or used to man key positions on the staff of a new U.N. commander, men who were read into his thinking and the views and feelings of the Security Council, such men would be very useful tools when one of these operations was being started.

I am sorry to say, Mr. Gross, this manning would cause some additional expense. When you start building up military staffs and resources, it will cost some money.

SOVIET ROLE IN SECRETARIAT

Mr. FRASER. We are quite accustomed to spending a lot of money on the military.

Just one last question that is related to this so we can get this identified clearly.

One of the questions about the MSC has been that a Soviet officer was assigned to the key role, and that this is a matter which has continued to cause concern about the operation.

Mr. YOST. I don't think the Soviet member of the MSC has any more role than any other member. This really has not mattered. What has aroused the apprehension of a lot of people is that the Under Secretary in charge of political and security affairs in the Secretariat has by informal agreement reached at the outset always been a Soviet citizen. It has been, as I say, a source of apprehension that he would be able to block peacekeeping actions, peaceful settlement or whatnot by the U.N., of which the Soviet Union might disapprove.

Fortunately that has proved not to be the case because whenever the Security Council or the General Assembly has chosen to take some action along these lines, whether or not the Soviet Union agreed with it, means have been found by the Secretary General and the interested powers of carrying out that action regardless of what may be the views of this individual. So in my opinion those apprehensions have proved unwarranted.

Whether or not he may have wanted to interfere he has never been able to do so. Peacekeeping operations have normally been carried out, as far as the Secretary General is concerned, primarily with the advice and assistance of Americans and this is what has caused the Soviet Union a great deal of aggravation and annoyance. It has been people like Andy Cordier and Ralph Bunche who have played the major role up until now.

Mr. FRASER. Do you want to try to clarify that?

U.N. IS NOT EFFECTIVE

Mr. GROSS. Yes. We are not talking about peacekeeping operations exclusively. We had a war in Korea where 35,000 Americans were killed, another 200,000 were wounded, and we financed at least 95 percent of it. What I am saying is that the U.N. Military Committee has not amounted to the cost of the paper on which that provision in the U.N. Charter was set up. Nothing has been cleared through it and you know it. You know that we didn't dare go through the United Nations with any military information during the Korean war?

Mr. YOST. The MSC was already on the shelf before the Korean war broke out.

Mr. GROSS. It should have been used if it amounted to anything. We ought to get the United Nations out of the country. The hell with it, but nobody else wants it.

Mr. YOST. The MSC is intended to advise and assist the Security Council, and if the Security Council does not want its advice and as-

sistance it does not have to take it. The MSC is in no position to block that action, it is merely available if the Council wants it.

Mr. GROSS. It has been a Soviet or a member of one of the satellites of Russia in one of the top spots, if not the top spot, ever since the United Nations was organized. Go look up the record.

Mr. YOST. Oh, absolutely, but they have not been able to prevent action by the U.N. which the membership has wanted to take.

Mr. GROSS. Nor have they made any contribution from the standpoint of their military.

Mr. YOST. Maybe not.

Mr. FRASER. I think we have that nailed down.

Mr. Bingham.

CONGO OPERATION

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I find all of these statements most interesting. I am particularly interested in the question of the relative responsibilities of the Secretary General and the Security Council. I think it might be worth spending a moment or two to recall what happened in the Congo operation because in my view this was probably the outstanding case of a successful United Nations peacekeeping operation: it resulted eventually in a pretty stable country which otherwise would have been torn to pieces and might have led to East-West conflict in that area.

That was a case, of course, where the Security Council having laid down certain basic resolutions to start with with the consent of all the great powers, the Secretary General kind of took over and from then on it was pretty much the Secretary General's operation and a lot of what he did he did over the bitter opposition of the Soviet Union. I wish Mr. Gross would recall some of this history because it is interesting history.

Mr. GROSS. I know that in the Congo they now sing "the Third Internationale."

Go right ahead.

Mr. BINGHAM. The Soviets tried for several years—and Ambassador Yost was deeply involved in this—to block what was being done there. Nevertheless, with the support of I guess most of the powers, the Secretary General carried on an operation that was eventually successful.

Now are you gentleman all saying that that kind of peacekeeping operation under the control of the Secretary General, carried on in spite of the opposition of one of the great powers, can't be repeated, that that is not in the cards any more?

Mr. YOST. I would be inclined to think that, if we want U.N. peacekeeping to be widely used, I would rule out that sort of operation. If we want it to be more widely used we would have to move more in the direction that Secretary Kissinger indicated in his Assembly speech of making some concessions to the Soviet Union on the role of the Security Council in supervising such operations.

I have always been convinced that it is possible to reach agreement along the lines that Ambassador Schaufele discussed in which there would be somewhat more supervision, somewhat more reporting, somewhat more opportunity for the Council to take action as the operation proceeded if it were to do so without hamstringing the operation. It

should be possible to give the Council a closer watching brief without enabling the Soviet Union to dictate to the Council. It could present its views to the Council but only if it could persuade the Council to make some substantial change in the process which it has initiated would such a change be made.

SECURITY COUNCIL'S ROLE

Mr. BINGHAM. Well, clearly that is so if it requires action by the Security Council to reverse something that it did before but I don't understand, for instance, Admiral Lee's suggestions to be limited to that. If that is all that you are talking about, I don't see any change from the Congo situation. Any time the Soviet Union could have persuaded the Security Council to reverse the instructions that it had given the Secretary General it would have done so and that would have been the end of it, but that I take it is not what you are talking of. You are thinking of some requirement that the Security Council give a sort of continuing approval to what is being done and that continuing approval would be subject to veto by one of the great powers, is that not so?

Ambassador YOST. I think there are all sorts of possible variations. An effective compromise might be that, as in the present case, the Council would approve the commander of the force and the countries participating in it. This was done quickly and without any serious damage to the operation that I can see.

Moreover, the Council could approve the maintenance of the force for a specific term. It would then require positive action by the Council to alter the mandate during that specific term. At the end of that term obviously there would be a chance to block its extension if the Soviet Union wished to, but short of that it would not be able to alter the mandate without further positive action by the Council which would require the support of the statutory majority of members. So I continue to believe, as I have for many years, that a compromise on this issue is entirely possible and is in our interest, I hope it will be facilitated by working together on this current issue.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. If I could address myself to that, Congressman Bingham.

Mr. BINGHAM. Please.

Mr. SCHAUFFLE. I concur in Ambassador Yost's analysis. I think an operation like that one is very improbable. The Secretary General at that time took great authority, moved rapidly and forcefully, much to the distress of the Soviet Union as you pointed out, and he paid a price for that—a price which the succeeding Secretary General was well aware of. We should not in citing the Soviet Union objection forget the other members of the Security Council. There is increasing restiveness among the small powers on the Security Council to be kept informed and participate in the decisionmaking. It is not just the Soviet Union.

Mr. WILSON. Would you yield, Mr. Bingham?

Mr. BINGHAM. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. When you talk about the smaller powers do you mean Britain and France?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. No.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. China.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. China does not participate in peacekeeping.

Mr. WILSON. I was being facetious, of course, but doesn't that deal with Britain and France?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. To a certain extent; yes, sir.

Mr. WILSON. That is all.

SECURITY COUNCIL OR SECRETARIAT

Mr. BINGHAM. It seems to me that to the degree that the Council has to be involved in continuing the operation of something like the Middle East peacekeeping force, to that degree it is going to be affected by the political composition of the Council. In this case with whatever it is, eight nations that don't recognize Israel, it seems to me just about impossible to get an evenhanded action out of the Security Council, whereas once you can get the operations over into the secretariat and under the control basically of the Secretary General, drawing upon maybe outside advisers or his own staff or whatever, then you can have a genuinely international operation not afflicted with the impact of national political pressures, and to that extent you may have an effective international operation.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. In reply to that, Mr. Congressman, the first part of your statement is in effect an argument for the veto.

Mr. BINGHAM. Yes.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. We are very well aware of the usefulness of the veto.

I just think in terms of political reality that no Secretary General is going to get that power under present circumstances, and I am not sure that any Secretary General under present circumstances would seek it because there are a great many pitfalls in it.

Mr. BINGHAM. I understand. I am merely pointing that out. I agree with you about the veto. Incidentally, I find myself in disagreement with my old friend Ambassador Yost on the use of the veto. What was your wording, Charlie, "The permanent membership should reserve their use of the veto to cases in which they are directly involved." In the practical world I don't see how we can do that.

Mr. YOST. Well, I would urge that we move in that direction. I realize that there may be exceptions to it. We, of course, have been the first to protest over the years what seemed to us use of the veto by the Soviet Union in dozens and dozens of cases where it was not directly involved but was merely trying to, in our view, earn brownie points with various other countries around the world.

Mr. BINGHAM. I know we were for a long time in that position and I think we maintained that position too long. I think today, for example, in the Middle East unless we were known to be prepared to use the veto we would be getting some pretty impossible resolutions out of the Security Council.

Mr. YOST. Well, I would not advocate that we, at this time, adopt a total self-denying ordinance.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you very much.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. No questions.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. No questions.

LANGUAGE PROBLEM

Mr. FRASER. Could I ask just one or two practical questions? How does the language problem work out? For example, concerning the initial forces sent from Cyprus to the Middle East, how do they converse with the people over there?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. English is the language of the force as it is in nearly all peacekeeping operations. English is the language of the force.

Mr. FRASER. How about when they are operating a checkpoint?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. There are English-speaking officers there. Also, they operate in English with the Israelis and the Egyptians.

Mr. FRASER. And the Israelis and Egyptians are both assigned officers to work with the checkpoint?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. In some cases this has been done. In some cases you will have a U.N. checkpoint with an Israeli group 200 or 300 yards away because the checkpoints are now established from Suez to Cairo and the U.N. has those checkpoints. So there are always liaison officers there.

COMMUNICATIONS WITH NEW YORK

Mr. FRASER. What about communications back to New York? Are there effective direct communication links not dependent on national means?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. As you know, the commander of the force was formerly the chief of staff of the Truce Supervisory Organization. He has limited communications of his own. Canadian Signals Company has now arrived in Cairo and will be providing the communications for the force. They may already be in operation but I don't think they have been using national means.

Mr. FRASER. Are these direct radio communications?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Direct from the Middle East to New York?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes; and they also have their own codes anyway.

Admiral LEE. They have a network from the U.N. with a center in Geneva and in the Far East that can tie in. I am not familiar with it in detail.

Mr. FRASER. Are they relay stations; that is, the Geneva equipment can pick up the signal and retransmit it to New York?

Admiral LEE. I believe Jerusalem works to New York, perhaps through Geneva.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I would say I suspect that the arrival of the Canadian company significantly upgrades the communications.

Mr. FRASER. Is the U.N. itself not able to put into the field the necessary communications capability? Does it have to rely on component forces?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. It either relies on component forces or buys equipment. That has been done in the past.

Mr. FRASER. There has been some interest in having some satellite channels assigned to the U.N. Nothing has happened on that, I gather.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Would that significantly augment the capability of the U.N.?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. I think it certainly would. Also to my knowledge there is no great resistance to the idea but it has fallen prey to the budget mechanism as a lower priority.

Mr. FRASER. You mean in the sense the U.N. would have to purchase the equipment?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes; and install it and maintain it.

Admiral LEE. The U.N. does not get a budget for purchasing military equipment in advance of the authorization for a specific operation. They have two or three small pools of very limited equipment: a few jeeps, a few old radio sets, and so forth. One of the things that is clearly needed is not merely a satellite link, but some investment in and stockpiling of field equipment. There is a small warehouse full of equipment left over from previous operations near Piza, but it is pathetic by standards of any country's military supply resources.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Hamilton.

SOVIET RESPONSE TO U.S. PROPOSAL

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Ambassador, I was interested in your comment a few minutes ago that there had been no countersignal from the Soviets with regard to the Secretary's proposal of the Security Council playing a more central role in peacekeeping. I take it by that you mean they have expressed no interest at all in that suggestion.

Mr. SCHAUFELE. They find it interesting but they have not indicated any direction in which their thinking might go yet. This should not be overestimated, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it too brief a time?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Well, no. It may be the context. They made a statement before the Special Political Committee the other day on peacekeeping which maintained their original position; however, they do expect to go back into the working group in January and I think that they may very well find this a better forum than a public forum.

Mr. HAMILTON. So you are not discouraged by lack of countersignal at this point?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. No.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is our course of action then to try to build up support for his suggestion among other nations in the United Nations?

Mr. SCHAUFELE. Yes, sir. We have consulted with some of the nations most directly concerned with and interested in peacemaking and we will be continuing our consultations perhaps in more concrete terms than we have so far.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Gentlemen, we have finished roughly on time. I want to express on behalf of both Chairman Hamilton and myself our appreciation for your appearance today, and we are grateful not only for that but for the service you are rendering to our country.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon the subcommittees adjourned.]

Mr. Strausz. I think it certainly would. Also, to my knowledge there is no great reluctance in the [illegible] but it has fallen prey to the [illegible] of a lower priority.

Mr. [illegible]. You mean in the sense the F.S. would have to purchase the equipment?

Mr. Strausz. Yes; and install and maintain it.

Admittedly, the F.S. does not get a budget for purchasing military equipment [illegible] of the [illegible] for [illegible] operation. They have to go through the [illegible] pool of [illegible] surplus [illegible] and radios and so forth. One of the things that is [illegible] it [illegible] equipment. There is a small warehouse full of equipment [illegible] I [illegible] by [illegible] of the country's [illegible] supply [illegible].

Mr. [illegible]. Mr. [illegible].

[illegible]

Mr. [illegible]. [illegible] I [illegible] in [illegible] equipment [illegible] from the [illegible] with regard to [illegible] I [illegible] that [illegible] equipment [illegible] which [illegible] in [illegible].

Mr. [illegible]. I [illegible] very much.

[illegible] and [illegible] with [illegible] in [illegible].

Mr. [illegible]. [illegible] Thank you.

Mr. [illegible]. Mr. [illegible].

[illegible]

Mr. [illegible] of both [illegible] and [illegible] and we are very grateful [illegible] for [illegible].

[illegible] very much.

[illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible].

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1973

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS AND ON THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met at 10:20 a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the Near East and South Asia Subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. Today the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements and the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia are holding their second and final joint session on United Nations peacekeeping in the Middle East.

In yesterday's session we had a very productive discussion of our two main points of concern: the current situation in the Middle East regarding the establishment of the new U.N. Emergency Force; and the institutional problems in working out effective guidelines for future U.N. peacekeeping guidelines in view of the longstanding U.S.-Soviet deadlock.

This morning we will continue that discussion with four more distinguished witnesses.

I am pleased to announce that Congressman John Buchanan of Alabama, our colleague on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, had agreed to testify this morning. Congressman Buchanan is serving with distinction as a U.S. delegate to the U.N. General Assembly this year and has played a central role in making the arrangements for the new U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East.

We have asked Mr. Martin F. Herz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, to focus his testimony today on the problems involved in setting up guidelines for future U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Maj. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye of India, one of the world's few genuine "international soldiers," is uniquely qualified to speak on peacekeeping in view of his experience as the U.N. military adviser for the Congo operation and a commander of the former Emergency Force in the Middle East.

Prof. Lincoln Bloomfield of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is one of the Nation's most prominent academic experts on the United Nations in general and peacekeeping in particular.

Without objection, we will place in the appendix of the record of the hearings an address by Adm. John M. Lee entitled "Article 47—Military Staff Committee—Its Problems and Functions." (See appendix, p. 92.)

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The Chair requests that members of the subcommittees withhold their questions until all four witnesses have delivered their opening remarks, so that they may be questioned as a panel.

Gentlemen, we are very pleased to have you with us this morning and I presume each of you have statements.

We will begin with you, Mr. Herz, if you will, and proceed in line across the table one after the other.

STATEMENT OF MARTIN F. HERZ, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. HERZ. Thank you, since I am not the leadoff witness for the Department of State, Ambassador Schaufele having ably presented our views yesterday, I have no prepared statement. But I thought it might be useful if I supplemented some of the observations that were made yesterday, trying to bring out some points that were not made and helping to focus the discussion on the more general aspects of peacekeeping about which you wish me to testify.

DEVIATION FROM U.N. CHARTER

The first point is that when we talk about peacekeeping, and perhaps this was not clarified sufficiently yesterday, we are not really talking of the kind of operations that were envisaged when the charter of the United Nations was drafted.

The charter looks toward enforcement actions and when we use the word "peacekeeping" we have in mind consent operations, or as a colleague of mine calls it, "no-fault peacekeeping", the kind of operation which takes place when parties are willing to have the United Nations interpose itself rather than an operation that would impose the will of the United Nations on a particular situation.

Second, there was little mention yesterday of the role of China in the context of the discussion of the Middle East and in the context of the peacekeeping operation and peacekeeping in general.

During the Security Council meetings on the Middle East, the Chinese did not play a very active role but they said enough to show a certain amount of distrust and distaste, not only for the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Middle East but for peacekeeping in general.

This suggests that we be very careful in the way we move, and certainly it suggests that the problem of negotiating peacekeeping guidelines is not one of just finding a meeting ground between the United States and the Soviet Union.

VARYING VIEWS ON PEACEKEEPING

Of course, in addition to China, there are other countries involved who have strong views on peacekeeping. These include the middle powers whose cooperation is essential if future peacekeeping operations are to be possible and successful.

It also suggests that an attempt to be very specific in negotiating guidelines may create more difficulties than we would have if only general guidelines were discussed, leaving specifics to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

In other words, it is reasonable to suppose that the People's Republic of China would be more likely to go along, to acquiesce in a particular peacekeeping operation in the future than to commit itself to peacekeeping in general and to procedures that have to be observed in all specific cases.

Their performance in the case of the renewal of the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in Cyprus suggests that this approach that I have outlined, this rather more cautious approach, may have merit from the point of view of the diplomatic negotiations that will be resuming early next year.

UNIQUE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

My third point is that, when we talked about the terms of reference of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East (UNEF), a number of points were in the document that was approved which perhaps deserve to be highlighted.

The document that was approved was called "A Report of the Secretary General" but in effect this report of October 27 constituted the terms of reference, or if you will, the guidelines for this particular operation. In addition to what has been mentioned, they called (a) for an integrated and efficient military unit and (b) for complete impartiality on the part of the operation.

These two points, it seems to me, were not perhaps brought out sufficiently yesterday, and they involve a principle which certainly is relevant to the future negotiations. This is a consideration that should be borne in mind in connection with the stipulation that the contingents should be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned and with equitable geographic representation.

Finally, the terms of reference as approved for the Middle East peacekeeping operation said, "All matters which may affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the force will be referred to the Council for its decision."

This could be fairly interpreted to mean that if one of the members of the Security Council objects to a particular facet of the operation after it has been launched, that member would have to ask for a Security Council meeting to be called and would then have to ask for a decision to overturn or to stop the particular operation of which he disapproved.

ROLE OF MSC

My fourth observation in connection with yesterday's hearings relates to the role of the Military Staff Committee. The United Nations Charter and the writers of the charter did not specifically contemplate that the Military Staff Committee would be used for peacekeeping operations of the kind we are discussing here.

We have an open mind on the role of such a committee. Persuasive arguments have been made why the committee should be activated and why it can play a constructive role in connection with peacekeeping operations.

On the other side, one could say that when UNEF was set up just now, there seemed to be no compelling need to activate a committee of

this kind and the operation has gotten underway without the need for such a body.

This is not to say that a military staff committee could not play a useful role under certain circumstances. It does suggest, however, it may not be useful in all future peacekeeping operations.

A minor point with respect to the staff committee. Article 47, paragraph 3 of the charter does say that the Military Staff Committee "shall be responsible for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council."

This would suggest that if the committee were activated and if the implication were made that this charter article applies to all peacekeeping operations, we would have an immediate problem of deciding whether the staff committee should have operational responsibilities.

I would suggest this would be a rather difficult problem to solve.

Mr. Chairman, these are remarks suggested by yesterday's testimony which I hope will help in focusing the discussion. I will reserve some further remarks perhaps in connection with the questioning as we proceed.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, we appreciate your remarks.

We will interrupt and let our colleague, Mr. Buchanan, go ahead with his remarks.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA AND MEMBER, U.S. DELEGATION TO THE 28TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. BUCHANAN. I hesitate to break in because we do have distinguished witnesses, and I will listen with you and profit from their remarks.

Yesterday the committee heard from one of our very distinguished Ambassadors at the United Nations, Bill Schaufele. I trust you were as impressed with his testimony as I have been with the caliber of his work at the U.N.

Indeed, we are led there by a distinguished team at the ambassadorial level, and I think he shows the caliber of leadership we have in that important place.

I appreciate this opportunity to throw the light on one aspect of our effort in connection with the present Middle East crisis there in New York.

UNEF FUNDING

It was my privilege to handle for our delegation the UNEF funding issue in the Committee on Administration and Budget on which I sit.

As I observed this developing crisis, it came as a very reassuring thing to me, Mr. Chairman, that the United Nations demonstrated a capability to perform and handle in a peacekeeping capacity with an effectiveness which I quite frankly was not certain it possessed at this point in history.

Many of us were skeptical of the ability of that organization to handle a crisis of the kind that evolved in the Middle East.

May I underline this is a particularly difficult area, not only because the problems are quite complex, as you are well aware, but also

because even as there are those of our critics who would say that the U.S. Congress is afflicted with a bias toward Israel and would criticize us for having an insufficient balance in our policies in this area, one might say that a bias exists on the other side in the United Nations.

There are a number of Arab nations there; they obviously feel strongly about these matters. The Communist bloc normally echoes what they have to say, and there are other nations who are alined with them politically there who tend to also voice a similar point of view.

So one who is a critic of the U.N. might say the kind of bias against Israel is there that critics of our policy might say is here for Israel in the Congress.

U.N. WAS EFFECTIVE

Under these circumstances, it is not easy for the United Nations to effectively and fairly handle this kind of crisis.

But in this instance, it did so. I was personally impressed as an observer with the ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to get together on joint resolutions.

I was even more impressed with the role of nonalined nations in first coming up with a proposal, a group of them, for a United Nations Emergency Force, and then the role they played in the important funding question and arrangements.

I would point up, first of all, if there were no United Nations organization, if there were not such a mechanism, it would simply not have been possible to achieve the cease-fire and have the steps taken toward peace in this crisis that have been the case.

I think the organization had surprising effectiveness in achieving this.

In the matter of funding itself, I would point up the fact that we arrived at a broad-based compromise of a compromise.

There were other proposals where we would have had to pay a much higher amount. We arrived at a formula in which all members of the Security Council, permanent members, paid 15 percent above their rate for regular budget. However, all other member nations are asked to pay some share of this cost.

This arrangement means for us some 28.9 percent, which is less than this year's assessment for regular budget, but slightly above the 1974 assessment when we begin to pay only 25 percent.

ARRIVING AT A BROAD-BASED DECISION

The thing that impressed me and made me want to testify here was the way we arrived at this broad-based decision.

We had the leadership of a chairman from Tanzania who effectively led toward the achievement of this compromise. He protected the rights of the Israeli spokesman when he sought to speak. He directed our efforts toward the fulfillment of our assigned function. The vice chairman from Iran also added his support to this compromise so this force could be funded and effectively work. His country's leadership in the group of 77 was critical in obtaining support for the plan.

We had restraint shown on both sides of those delegations directly involved, and we had positive statesmanship shown by certain Arab

countries, such as Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan, who were willing to sacrifice proposals that would have brought direct benefit to them economically and the political advantage of pointing an accusing finger at the other side.

They were willing to go along with this compromise and even vote to participate in the funding in order that it might be achieved.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the problems are deep and the situation is complex.

On this very day, we have the new tension in the Middle East, but I wanted to underline the fact that 105 nations were able to get together on the critical question of funding this peacekeeping operation, this peace force, that we had the participation of East and West, of Arab and Israeli, and an active, leading role of nonalined nations.

U.N. SERVED IMPORTANT PURPOSE

Had it not been for the United Nations organization, this thing would not have been possible.

Little nations, developing countries could not have played a role toward achieving peace. The opposing sides could not have had the forum in which these things could have been hammered out.

It would have been more difficult for us to arrive at the kind of solution that is at least in progress.

I want to sound, in what is still a dangerous situation, a note of hope. I believe this year, the 28th session, has underlined the importance of the United Nations organization, its capability as a peacekeeping organization and given new hope for peace not only in the Middle East but in the world because it has effectively functioned, and great statesmanship has been shown by many countries and their representatives in achieving this result.

Mr. HAMILTON. Congressman Buchanan, I don't think you were here when the subcommittee had words of praise for you and your performance in the United Nations, and we certainly appreciate what you have done there.

You have served with distinction, and we are especially appreciative of the role you played with regard to this Emergency Force in the Middle East. It is most encouraging to hear your words of encouragement this morning.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. I didn't want the Congressman to get away without asking him a question if he was not going to be a part of the panel at the end of the proceeding.

Mr. HAMILTON. I think we will proceed with the other witnesses and, if you have a question, you can direct it to Congressman Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would like to include in the record the vote on the funding of the United Nations Emergency Force.

Mr. HAMILTON. That will be included.

[See appendix, p. 77.]

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Bloomfield, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. I will summarize my statement. I would like to divide my remarks between short-term prospects and longer run problems.

The Middle East crisis of 1973 showed once again how immensely valuable it is when the going gets tough—to borrow a popular phrase—to have a politically neutral international force that can get going.

PEACEKEEPING IMPORTANT

U.N. peacekeeping, with all its flaws, is the only device so far invented that can constructively step in when nations are engaged in fighting that may draw in the nuclear powers. The availability of the device in fact gives them a reason to agree to stop fighting as well as providing the rest of the world with a focus for efforts to restore peace.

But we have said all this several times before when U.N. peacekeeping has kept an international explosion from worsening. We said it before in 1948 and 1967 in exactly the same area, as well as in 1960 in the Congo and 1963 in Cyprus, all situations in which after trying fruitlessly all other methods such as suppression, unilateral peacekeeping, and alliance diplomacy, nations reluctantly discovered that only U.N. peacekeeping would pacify the situation while keeping individual meddlers and interveners out.

It is equally clear that between such crises the U.N. has experienced a steady decline, and its peacekeeping potential, instead of growing as the logic of the age dictated, has gone into the deep freeze.

The reasons for the recent doldrums are painfully familiar. To oversimplify, the political right, domestically and internationally, was irritated by the U.N.'s Congo intervention and its damage to commercial interests, plus the growing dominance of the U.N. by third world countries unsympathetic to such concerns.

The unalined countries have not backed peacekeeping, some of the more radical countries suspecting it as neocolonialist and imperialist.

SOVIET POSITION

The Soviet Union in principle doctrinally opposes anything smacking of supranational powers and insists on rigid control through the veto.

In practice of course Moscow has tolerated and even encouraged some peacekeeping.

The United States and much of Western Europe preach progressive international community building in principle, but in practice, except in moments of high crisis and failure of all other expedients, have been unwilling to pay much of a price for the commitment of which our rhetoric so eloquently spoke.

Meanwhile a neutral third party force has again been rushed into place within 24 hours, and may again have saved the world from a perilous confrontation.

Any foreseeable compromise peace arrangements that develop from the forthcoming Geneva conference in the early spring on the Middle

East must depend heavily on U.N. peacekeeping, probably in greater numbers and with increased authority, in such places as the Sinai, the Golan Heights, and the Strait of Tiran.

Additionally, arrangements must be worked out for some form of international custody of the Holy Places in Jerusalem, where perhaps something resembling a U.N. Vatican guard may have to be devised.

Israel will have to be persuaded to abandon her previous insistence that U.N. forces be stationed only outside her territory. This in turn I imagine will require new U.S. guarantees, underwriting more firmly the U.N.'s less reliable assurance.

NEW SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST

The force of events may thus unlock the door to a new stage in multilateral peacekeeping capabilities that no amount of abstract discussion between crises was able to.

Yet all past experience shows that when crises subside, the nations, led by the superpowers, invariably revert to purely unilateral behavior; U.S. peacekeeping, to borrow a Watergrate metaphor, goes off their screen until the next war.

What then can be said of the longer term development of peacekeeping? How can it be built into the system so it does not have to be reinvented each time, and above all so that it is a normal option for action?

The committee is familiar with the underlying issues that remain unresolved even with the new UNEF in place. You know of the attempts by U.N. Secretaries General to secure advance commitments. You have heard proposals from scholars and others, particularly the outstanding work by my friend General Rikhye and the International Peace Academy, for improved ground rules, training programs, financing, and so forth.

You are equally aware that, as before, what is chiefly lacking is the expectation on the part of governments and people that when fighting breaks out—more importantly, before it breaks out—neutral third party personnel would be automatically and routinely available for deployment as observers, fact-finders, and, if necessary, trucekeepers.

ACTING ON EARLY WARNINGS

If there were such an expectation, it would be natural to act when early warning was received of potential war, and action could be certain when fighting broke out. Neither of these is true today except under rare circumstances.

Under those circumstances responsible governments would give their support realizing that, on occasion, their toes would be stepped upon and their friends and clients prevented from having their own way.

We may be far from such a general acceptance and expectation of even noncoercive regularized and codified international peacekeeping. The U.N. Committee of 33 realistically concentrated on developing a model of observation and factfinding for the badly needed conflict-prevention task.

But it deferred the next step on a peacekeeping design until the Soviet Union and the United States resolved their underlying differences.

Those differences turned on the issue of empowerment of the Secretary General in the name of efficiency—which we wanted—versus complete oversight by the Security Council—which Moscow wanted.

I now wonder if the other members should have been content to wait for such agreement; the middle powers might rather have gotten together and sketched out a sensible and attractive plan to which the wise could repair, for which we all might eventually have thanked them.

I think there is an urgent need for new ideas and pressures on the part of the middle powers who, after all, have been the responsible peacekeepers in the postwar years.

SECURITY COUNCIL'S ROLE

But they didn't do this, and the United States-Soviet deadlock remained even after intensive working-level negotiation. Some of us on the outside became convinced that while these doctrinal differences were real enough, in practice the United States had accepted the virtually exclusive mandate of the Security Council, while in practice the Soviets had not opposed any and had favored some of the contemporary peacekeeping efforts.

I don't know if Ambassador Yost mentioned yesterday that at a meeting last April in Moscow of American and Soviet United Nations Association panels on Collective Security and European Security, he and I both felt confirmed in our conviction that the main reason for the continued deadlock was the absence of top-level attention to this problem in both Governments.

We sought to urge on both sides the upgrading of the peacekeeping issue to the summit level, if only to shake both bureaucracies out of their frozen positions.

It was very gratifying to learn that the Department of State began some new activity on this matter this fall, and the new look was reflected in Secretary Kissinger's encouraging reference in his General Assembly speech to compromising the peacekeeping issue.

NEW UNEF

Evidently the October 6 fighting overtook the policy process. When UNEF–II was hastily set up, Secretary General Waldheim's ground rules for its operation were essentially those of 1956; that is, no great powers, no coercion, no side taking—but also no provision to avoid repetition of the 1967 fiasco when Egyptian President Nasser unilaterally kicked out the earlier UNEF.

In this newest act of creation the U.S. Government inexplicably strained at the gnat of Eastern European representation on the force after swallowing a whole series of camels involved in superpower détente.

For its part Moscow played the same perilous brinksman's game it had played in earlier Middle Eastern wars by threatening unilateral intervention—usually, however, after the fighting had been officially stopped.

Despite these weaknesses, the door is now open once again to some forward movement in building this essential factor more securely into the fabric of international peace and security. If, through some

miracle, peace does come to the Middle East, it will go off the front page.

Will the great powers once again lapse into their customary indifference to this subject and wait for the next cliffhanger before we achieve needed reforms in peacekeeping?

Equally to the point, is a stepped-up U.N. peacekeeping capacity likely to be misused by other states in pursuit of their racial, ethnic, or ideological convictions rather than for the real cases of clear interstate aggression—and civil war that threatens to spread into international war because of outside intervention, and therefore should be insulated while change may take place internally.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Taking these considerations into account, against the background of the checkered history of peacekeeping in the 16 years since Suez, what of the longer range future?

Let me suggest five major features of a plan that could, I believe, help strengthen peacekeeping for the common purpose of preventing the escalation and spread of local conflicts on our nuclear-tipped planet:

One. A formula should now be devised to resolve the Security Council-Secretary General arguments that have impeded forward progress for 4 years. The United States can surely agree that in all foreseeable circumstances the Council will be responsible for authorizing the mission, drawing up its mandate, approving its leadership and composition, closely monitoring its execution, and deciding on its termination.

The Soviet Union can surely agree that a committee of members of the Council can deal with day-to-day problems, while the Secretary General is responsible for carrying out details of the mandate, in consultation with the committee.

The committee might be composed of the two superpowers plus a representative sample of Council members. The exclusion of the other permanent members will be painful, but reflects the stark fact that without the Big Two there will be no effective U.N. and with their collaboration there will.

If China is to refuse even to participate in votes on peacekeeping—as in the recent Mideast debates—and if the Sino-Soviet rivalry is to continue, this is the only realistic compromise solution.

EARMARKING SYSTEM AND TRAINING PROGRAM

Two. The earmarking system ought to be substantially upgraded, with powerful encouragement by the Big Two to small and middle powers to earmark and train appropriate units.

The bulk of the earmarkers should not be members of either nuclear alliance—NATO or the Warsaw Pact. But since Canada, Norway and Denmark have long been members of the U.N. peacekeeping operations, it is time to stop playing games and agree to balance them with Eastern European countries, preferably in the logistical roles Canada and Poland play in UNEF–II.

The encouragement from the big powers could take the form of logistics and training funds, supplying equipment depots for rapid de-

ployment, airlift and sealift earmarking long recommended by many, and a permanent peace fund for use when needed in emergencies.

Three. A training program should be started, perhaps building on the splendid Scandinavian model that has been quietly functioning for years. This would broaden the base of trained staff officers and noncoms in special skills, language and the like, representing a way of involving personnel from nonalined countries which have no national capability for such.

Four. The sensitive and even revolutionary rule should be faced, debated, and adopted to the effect that a U.N. peacekeeping force established by the Security Council with the consent of the warring sides may not be removed without the consent of both parties to the agreement—the warring sides and the Security Council.

To be realistic, the Security Council vote should not be subject to veto, otherwise one state could in theory keep a force indefinitely in an area where no one else wants it to stay—an obviously absurd situation.

The specified vote should either be procedural, requiring a simple majority; or a qualified majority such as two-thirds, including the two superpowers. The fact that the charter does not specify such a qualified vote is no reason not to make the organization more flexible and responsive through nonconstitutional adaptive devices such as that suggested.

The problem will remain of parts of a U.N. force melting away in the face of a threat such as Nasser's in 1967, even if new legal requirements specify a prior Council vote.

This is an additional reason for a much broader roster of small and medium states available for peacekeeping missions—and for the concurring Council vote requirement.

FINANCING OF PEACEKEEPING

Five. The financing of peacekeeping remains unresolved, and this time China has worsened matters by following the unhelpful former Soviet-French lead and refusing to pay any share of assessed costs for UNEF–II.

The ultimate absurdity would be a new article 19 crunch, which no one would enforce, against China. Once again it is clear that only an assured source of revenue will permit escape from this chronic bind.

My own recommendation continues to call for independent sources of U.N. revenue, such as a modest percentage of royalties from high seas deep-sea mineral and oil extraction—which will hopefully be licensed by the U.N. anyway; from international transactions such as trade, airmail, cable and satellite communications traffic; or from a new capital fund to which all would subscribe, and which would be reserved for peacekeeping operations.

The decisions about actually using the accumulated funds would be unchanged and control by the responsible powers would be, if anything, tightened by using the Security Council more than before.

SECURITY COUNCIL NOT IMPARTIAL

Having said all this, it is painfully true that, in the present case at least, the Security Council is simply not impartial. Rather, it is

loaded in favor of the Arab side. Similarly, in December 1971 it was loaded toward the Indian side. In both cases the favored parties were the ones who started the particular round of fighting. It is not a tribunal of judges and never will be.

This seems to me yet another reason why greater emphasis must be placed on the kinds of conflict prevention and war-averting strategies that have, vainly it seems, been advocated to avoid the bloody crisis through which the world continues to lurch.

But to even begin on the ascent to a new plateau, the indispensable condition is something we have not had—a solid commitment by major governments, including our own, to both the concept of conflict-prevention, and the strengthening of peacekeeping through multilateral organization, a commitment not just at times of international bankruptcy and panic, but when there is time for orderly planning, negotiating and organizing.

All of what I say assumes that the Soviet Union will continue to pursue its own interests, and dogmatically oppose any explicit empowerment of nonvetoable activities that may clash with its interests.

It assumes that many third world countries will suspect imperialistic motives on the part of the big powers, and will remain obsessed with southern Africa as the only real threat in their line of vision.

It also assumes continuing tendencies in the U.S. Government, both executive branch and Congress, to try to keep full control of U.S. money and commitments, even while calling for expanded U.N. capabilities.

Someone said that the great thing about experience in that it enables you to recognize the same mistake every time you make it. Hopefully we can count on the new mood in the Congress and on the known reasoning powers of the new Secretary of State to combine to force the pace, and help strengthen this essential building block of world peace.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Following is Professor Bloomfield's prepared statement:]

PEACEKEEPING AND THE MIDDLE EAST 1973

I will divide my remarks between short-term prospects and longer-run problems.

The Middle East crisis of 1973 showed once again how immensely valuable it is when the going gets tough (to borrow a popular phrase), to have a politically neutral international force that can get going.

U.N. peacekeeping, with all its flaws, is the only device so far invented that can constructively step in when nations are engaged in fighting that may draw in the nuclear powers. The availability of the device in fact gives them a reason to agree to stop fighting as well as providing the rest of the world with a focus for efforts to restore peace.

But we have said all this several times before when U.N. peacekeeping has kept an international explosion from worsening. We said it before in 1948 and 1967 in exactly the same area, as well as in 1960 in the Congo and 1963 in Cyprus, all situations in which after trying fruitlessly all other methods such as suppression, "unilateral peacekeeping," and alliance diplomacy, nations reluctantly discovered that only U.N. peacekeeping would pacify the situation while keeping individual meddlers and interveners out.

It is equally clear that between such crises the U.N. has experienced a steady decline, and its peacekeeping potential, instead of growing as the logic of the age dictated, has gone into the deep freeze. The reasons for the recent doldrums are painfully familiar. To oversimplify, the political right, domestically and interna-

tionally, was irritated by the U.N.'s Congo intervention and its damage to commercial interests, plus the growing dominance of the U.N. by third world countries unsympathetic to such concerns. The unaligned countries have not backed peacekeeping, some of the more radical countries suspecting it as "neocolonialist" and imperialist. The Soviet Union in principle doctrinally opposes anything smacking of supranational powers and insists on rigid control through the veto. In *practice* of course Moscow has tolerated and even encouraged some peacekeeping. The United States and much of Western Europe preach progressive international community-building in principle, but in practice, except in moments of high crisis and failure of all other expedients, they have been unwilling to pay much of a price for the commitment of which their rhetoric so eloquently spoke.

Meanwhile a neutral third-party force has again been rushed into place within 24 hours, and may again have saved the world from a perilous confrontation. Any foreseeable compromise peace arrangements that develop from the forthcoming Geneva conference on the Middle East must depend heavily on U.N. peacekeeping, probably in greater numbers and with increased authority, in such places as the Sinai, the Golan Heights, and the mouth of the Strait of Tiran. Additionally, arrangements must be worked out for some form of international custody of the Holy Places in Jerusalem, and something resembling a "U.N. Vatican Guard" may have to be devised. Israel will have to be persuaded to abandon her previous insistence that U.N. forces be stationed outside her territory. This in turn will require new U.S. guarantees, underwriting more firmly the U.N.'s less reliable assurance.

The force of events may thus unlock the door to a new stage in multilateral peacekeeping capabilities that no amount of abstract discussion between crises was able to. Yet all past experience shows that when crises subside, the nations, led by the superpowers, invariably revert to purely unilateral behavior; UN peacekeeping, to borrow a Watergate metaphor, goes off their screen until the next war.

What then can be said of the longer-term development of peacekeeping? How can it be built into the ssytem so it does not have to be reinvented each time, and above all so that it is a normal option for action?

The Committee is familiar with the underlying issues that remain unresolved even with the new UNEF in place. You know of the attempts by UN Secretaries General to secure advance commitments. You have heard proposals from scholars and others for improved ground rules, training programs, financing, and so forth. You are equally aware that, as before, what is chiefly lacking is the *expectation* on the part of governments and people that when fighting breaks out—more importantly, *before* it breaks out—neutral third-party personnel would be automatically and routinely available for deployment as observers, fact-finders, and, if necessary, truce-keepers. If there were such an expectation, it would be natural to act when early-warning was received of potential war, and action would be certain when fighting broke out. Under those circumstances responsible governments would give their support realizing that on occasion their toes would be stepped upon and their friends and clients prevented from having their own way.

We may be far from such a general acceptance and expectation of even noncoercive regularized and codified international peacekeeping. The U.N. Committee of 33 realistically concentrated on developing a model of observation and fact-finding for the badly-needed conflict-prevention task. But it deferred the next step on a peacekeeping design until the Soviet Union and United States resolved their underlying differences. Those differences turned on the issue of empowerment of the Secretary General in the name of efficiency—which we wanted—*versus* complete oversight by the Security Council—which Moscow wanted. I now wonder if the other members should have been content to wait for such agreement; the middle powers might rather have gotten together and sketched out a sensible and attractive plan to which the wise could repair, for which we all might eventually have thanked them.

But they didn't, and the U.S.-Soviet deadlock remained even after intensive working-level negotiation. Some of us on the outside became convinced that while these doctrinal differences were real enough, in practice the U.S. had accepted the virtually exclusive mandate of the Security Council, while in practice the Soviets had not opposed any and had favored some of the contemporary peacekeeping efforts.

This last April at a meeting in Moscow of American and Soviet United Nations Association panels on Collective Security and European Security, Ambassador Yost (who may have mentioned this here yesterday) and I both felt

confirmed in our conviction that the main reason for the continued deadlock was the absence of top-level attention to this problem in *both* governments. We sought to urge on both sides the upgrading of the peacekeeping issue to the summit level, if only to shake both bureaucracies out of their frozen positions.

It was very gratifying to learn that the Department of State began some new activity on this matter, and the new look was reflected in Secretary Kissinger's encouraging reference in his General Assembly speech to compromising the peacekeeping issue. Evidently the October 6th fighting overtook the policy process. When UNEF–II was hastily set up, Secretary General Waldheim's ground rules for its operation were essentially those of 1956, i.e. no great powers, no coercion, and no side-taking—but also no provision to avoid repetition of the 1967 fiasco when Egyptian President Nasser unilaterally kicked out the earlier UNEF. In this newest act of creation the U.S. government inexplicably strained at the gnat of Eastern European representation on the force after swallowing a whole series of camels involved in superpower detente. For its part Moscow played the same perilous brinksman's game it had played in earlier Middle Eastern wars by threatening unilateral intervention (always, however, after the fighting had been officially stopped).

The door is now open once again to some forward movement in building this essential factor more securely into the fabric of international peace and security. If through some miracle, peace does come to the Middle East it will go off the front page. Will the great powers once again lapse into their customary indifference to this subject and wait for the next cliff-hanger before achieving needed reforms in peacekeeping?

Equally to the point, is a stepped-up U.N. peacekeeping capacity likely to be misused by other states in pursuit of their racial, ethnic, or ideological convictions rather than for the real cases of clear inter-state aggression (and civil war that threatens to spread into international war because of outside intervention, and therefore should be insulated while change may take place internally).

Taking these considerations into account, against the background of the checkered history of peacekeeping in the sixteen years since Suez, what of the longer range future? Let me suggest five major features of a plan that could, I believe, help strengthen peacekeeping for the common purpose of preventing the escalation and spread of local conflicts on our nuclear-tipped planet:

(1) A formula should now be devised to resolve the Security Council-Secretary General arguments that have impeded forward progress for four years. The U.S. can surely agree that in all foreseeable circumstances the Council will be responsible for authorizing the mission, drawing up its mandate, approving its leadership and composition, closely monitoring its execution, and deciding on its termination. The Soviets can surely agree that a *committee* of members of the Council can deal with day-to-day problems, while the Secretary-General is responsible for carrying out details of the mandate, in consultation with the committee. The committee might be composed of the two superpowers plus a representative sample of Council members. The exclusion of the other permanent members will be painful, but reflects the stark fact that without the Big Two there will be no effective U.N., and with their collaboration there will. If China is to oppose and even refuse to participate in votes on peacekeeping (as in the recent Mid East debates), and if the Sino-Soviet rivalry is to continue, this is the only realistic compromise solution.

(2) The earmarking system ought to be substantially upgraded, with powerful encouragement by the Big Two to small and middle powers to earmark and train appropriate units. The bulk of the earmarkers should be not members of either nuclear alliance—NATO or the Warsaw Pact. But since Canada, Norway and Denmark have long been members of U.N. peacekeeping operations, it is time to stop playing games and agree to balance them with Eastern European countries, preferably in the logistical roles Canada and Poland play in UNEF–II. The encouragement from the big powers could take the form of logistics and training funds, supplying equipment depots for rapid deployment, airlift and sealift earmarking long recommended by many, and a permanent peace fund for use when needed in emergencies.

(3) A training program should be started, perhaps building on the splendid Scandinavian model that has been quietly functioning for years. This would broaden the base of trained staff officers and noncoms in special skills, language, and the like, representing a way of involving personnel from non-aligned countries which have no national capability for such.

(4) The sensitive and even revolutionary rule should be faced, debated, and adopted to the effect that a U.N. peacekeeping force established by the Security Council with the consent of the warring sides may not be removed without the consent of both parties to the agreement—the warring sides *and* the Security Council. To be realistic, the Security Council vote should not be subject to veto, otherwise one state could in theory keep a force indefinitely in an area where no one else wants it to stay. The specified vote should either be procedural, requiring a simple majority, or a qualified majority such as two thirds, including the two superpowers. The fact that the Charter does not specify such a qualified vote is no reason not to make the organization more flexible and responsive through non-constitutional adaptive devices such as that suggested.

The problem will remain of parts of a U.N. force melting away in the face of a threat such as Nasser's in 1967, even if new legal requirements specify a prior Council vote. This is an additional reason for a much broader roster of small and medium states available for peacekeeping missions—*and* for the concurring Council vote requirement. (The difficulty of finding truly impartial nations also argues for a much broader roster to draw on.)

(5) The financing of peacekeeping remains unresolved, and this time China has followed the former unhelpful Soviet-French lead and refuses to pay any share of assessed costs for UNEF–II. The ultimate absurdity would be a new Article 19 crunch, which no one would enforce, against China. Once again it is clear that only an assured source of revenue will permit escape from this chronic bind. My own recommendation continues to call for independent sources of U.N. revenue, such as a modest percentage of royalties from high seas deep-sea mineral and oil extraction (which will hopefully be licensed by the U.N. anyway); from international transactions such as trade, airmail, cable and satellite communications traffic; or from a new capital fund to which all would subscribe, and which would be reserved for peacekeeping operations. The decisions about actually *using* the accumulated funds would be unchanged and, if anything, tightened by using the Security Council more than before.

Having said all this, it is painfully true that, in the present case at least, the Security Council is simply not impartial. Rather, it is loaded in favor of the Arab side. Similarly, in December 1971 it was loaded toward the Indian side. In both cases the favored parties were the ones who started the particular round of fighting.

This seems to me yet another reason why greater emphasis must be placed on the kinds of conflict-prevention and war-averting strategies that have, vainly it seems, been advocated to avoid the bloody crises through which the world continues to lurch.

But to even begin on the ascent to a new plateau, the indispensable condition is something we have not had—a solid commitment by major governments, including our own, to both the concept of conflict-prevention, and the strengthening of peacekeeping through multilateral organization, a commitment not just at times of international bankruptcy and panic, but when there is time for orderly planning, negotiating and organizing.

All of what I say assumes that the Soviet Union will continue to pursue its own interests, and dogmatically oppose any explicit empowerment of nonvetoable activities that may clash with its interests. It assumes many third world countries will suspect imperialistic motives on the part of the big powers, and will remain obsessed with southern Africa as the only real threat in their line of vision. It also assumes continuing tendencies in the U.S. Government, both executive branch and Congress, to try to keep full control of U.S. money and commitments, even while calling for expanded U.N. capabilities.

Someone said that the great thing about experience is that it enables you to recognize the same mistake every time you make it. Hopefully we can count on the new mood in the Congress and on the known reasoning powers of the new Secretary of State to combine to force the pace, and help strengthen this essential building block of world peace.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Professor Bloomfield.

General Rikhye.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. INDAR JIT RIKHYE (RETIRED), FORMER COMMANDER OF U.N. EMERGENCY FORCE IN GAZA; PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY, NEW YORK

General RIKHYE. My remarks pertain to UNEF–I, the present and future trends.

UNEF–I was established in the Middle East toward the end of 1956 after the Suez war, was a novel experiment in the use of military forces to keep the peace.

The force was denied the right to use force except in self-defense and had to accomplish its tasks by peaceful means.

INTENTIONS OF UNEF I

This force was intended to: one, interpose between Anglo-French-Israeli and Egyptian forces; two, protect the canal clearing operations; three, follow up the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from the canal area, of Israeli forces from the Sinai, and later, four, supervise the armistice demarcation line in the Gaza Strip and the international frontier along the Sinai and insure free passage of shipping through the Strait of Tiran at Sharm al-Shaykh.

This force proved successful in accomplishing its tasks until it was withdrawn on May 18, 1967. Its success can be attributed to the leadership and the diplomatic skill of Dag Hammerskjold and to its first commander, Lt. Gen. E. L. M. Burns of Canada; second, to the wide international support it received; and third, to Egyptian cooperation; and last but not the least, to the performance of the troops in scrupulously and conscientiously carrying out their responsibilities without resort to force.

The force was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution passed by the Assembly earlier to avoid a Security Council veto. Thus, the authority of the force stemmed from chapter VI of the charter; that is, the provision relating to peaceful resolution of conflicts, rather than chapter VII of the charter, that which authorizes enforcement action. The consent of Egypt and Israel was essential for the introduction of the force, and because Israel refused deployment of any part of the force on its territory, it abandoned its right to influence the decision when Egypt requested its withdrawal in May 1967.

While the force had kept peace and quiet in the area, the situation along Israel's borders with Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon proved different. There were almost daily border violations, and as Palestinian guerrilla activity increased, it met Israeli retaliation, starting a cycle of incidents and escalation that would only lead to war. Meanwhile, there was little progress in getting any serious negotiations under way to resolve the conflict.

PEACEKEEPING TODAY

The United Nations is presently engaged in three peacekeeping operations. In Cyprus it continues to keep the Greek and Turkish Cypriots apart while the dialog between the two parties continues with a view to finding a lasting solution. In Kashmir, an observer group has kept a helpless watch while India and Pakistan have fought two major wars. In the Middle East, following the Yom Kippur war, a

new force has been introduced to supervise the cease-fire. Some 2,500 troops have been introduced so far. While Egypt and Israel argue over the question of withdrawal to the lines held on October 22, the deployment of the force has been delayed by bitter dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union over questions relating to composition and financing of the force. These issues have been explained by the distinguished Congressman, Mr. Buchanan, and have now been resolved, and it is hoped that the force will reach its full strength of about 7,000 in 6 weeks. There is also an increase in the size of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, and for the first time, Soviet observers have been included, though they have yet to be employed—eight U.S. observers have already been serving there.

SOME PEACEKEEPING SUCCESSES

The United Nations has achieved a measure of success in peacekeeping and in the settlement of disputes. But 28 years after the signing of the charter, it has yet to create an effective international system to insure peace, security, and world order. United Nations involvement in peacekeeping indicates that its degree of success can be measured against the support and cooperation given by the great powers. There are clear indications from deliberations of the Committee of 33 appointed by the General Assembly to resolve the major issues relating to peacekeeping operations, that if the United Nations is to achieve success, it must have the complete support of not only the small and middle nations which urgently need an international system of world security, but also the support and collaboration of the great powers.

Conflicts such as the Middle East, where there is great power involvement and near confrontation, if escalated, could prove dangerous to world peace, as we have seen in this particular case in the Middle East. After years of bilateral and unilateral actions on the part of the member states, the United Nations Charter principles are beginning to look more realistic again. It is in the interests of the two superpowers, separately and collectively, not only to avoid the possibility of armed hostilities but also to establish a world system that will reduce violent conflicts and strengthen the United Nations for the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

There are a number of smaller problems which can be solved while the larger issues concerning peacekeeping continue to be debated in the Committee of 33, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union. Ad hoc peacekeeping operations have little preparation and organization, inadequate institutional arrangements at the United Nations, weak command and control, poor signal communications and liaison, and shoestring type of administration and logistic support. These perhaps may not be very important politically but they are of tremendous importance to the people actually responsible for carrying out the tasks assigned to them.

THE NEW UNEF FORCE

All these limitations are manifested once again as the new United Nations Emergency Force is now being established in Egypt. If such operations have been successful in any degree, it is due more to the

determination of the participants than to the support that the other Member Nations of the United Nations provide. The inability of the United Nations to institutionalize peacekeeping by the provision of suitable staff and informational resources can be remedied. Command and control, both at the United Nations headquarters and in the field, can surely be improved. Many governments have already instituted plans, as Lincoln Bloomfield pointed out, for the preparation of their personnel and troops on a standby basis, and this arrangement needs every encouragement and coordination.

The United States, as part of its aid program around the globe, assists the military preparedness of many nations within regional or bilateral agreements. Preparation for peacekeeping operations by these armed forces, and by their personnel who attend the many training courses organized by the United States, could surely be accomplished with little added cost.

Recently I had an occasion to visit Fort Bragg, and there at the John F. Kennedy Center very light training is under way which could be of tremendous value to many of the countries to whom the United States provides military assistance.

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. Congress resolved some years ago that the military aid program could be used to equip recipient countries for peacekeeping. This resolution has never been implemented, and is certainly worthy of being revived.

PENDING ISSUES

There will, of course, still remain several important issues to be settled: (1) the procedure for establishing peacekeeping missions and the conditions under which they may be withdrawn—as has been referred to by Professor Bloomfield; (2) clarification of the provisions of the charter under which peacekeeping missions are established; (3) the extent of involvement by the Military Staff Committee and other competent United Nations organs, such as the Security Council, in the day-to-day administration of peacekeeping operations—and it was referred to by Mr. Herz that, if the Military Staff Committee were given the responsibility in the Middle East, it would also have strategic direction, which is surely required. But while we deny the force strategic direction, we have also denied military support.

Issue (4), the utilization of the Secretary-General's good offices; (5) the financial arrangements required to maintain peacekeeping machinery; (6) the desirability of establishing standby United Nations peacekeeping forces; and last but not least (7) the development of parallel peacemaking machinery.

CHOICES AVAILABLE

There are only two choices available, Mr. Chairman, to the states members of the United Nations when confronting a serious crisis. One is to seize an early opportunity where there is a common interest in resolving it. This kind of opportunity is inherent in the Middle East situation. Quite obviously, the two superpowers have not shown any desire to go to war to support their respective commitments to the two sides in the Middle East. The new United Nations Emergency Force and its enlarged United Nations observer group in the Middle East can serve as a model for future peacekeeping machinery.

The alternative is to continue the status quo with its obvious potential for disastrous results.

United Nations experience has established that more effective peacekeeping machinery can be created, given the support of the great powers. There is little doubt that this machinery is needed to help the small and medium powers, but recognition of the fact that it would also benefit the big powers has been slow in coming. The argument of these remarks, then, is that it is in the interest of all nations to strengthen the United Nations ability to keep the peace and reduce the cause of violence. Recent events in the Middle East have again demonstrated that there is no other alternative.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[General Rikhye's prepared statement follows:]

UNEF–I AND FUTURE PEACEKEEPING

The United Nations Emergency Force, established in the Middle East toward the end of 1956 after the Suez war, was a novel experiment in the use of military forces to keep the peace. The force was denied the right to use force except in self-defense and had to accomplish its tasks by peaceful means. This force was intended to: (1) interpose between Anglo-French-Israeli and Egyptian forces; (2) protect the canal-clearing operations; (3) follow up the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from the canal area and of Israeli forces from the Sinai, and later, (4) supervise the armistice demarcation line in the Gaza Strip and the international frontier along the Sinai and insure free passage of shipping through the Strait of Tiran at Sharm el Sheikh.

This force proved successful in accomplishing its tasks until it was withdrawn on May 18, 1967. Its success can be attributed to the leadership and the diplomatic skill of Dag Hammarskjold and to its first commander, Lt. Gen. E. L. M. Burns of Canada; secondly, to the wide international support it received; and thirdly, to Egyptian cooperation; and last but not the least, to the performance of the troops in scrupulously and conscientiously carrying out their responsibilities without resort to force.

The force was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution passed by the Assembly earlier to avoid a Security Council veto. Thus, the authority of the force stemmed from chapter VI of the Charter, i.e., the provision relating to peaceful resolution of conflicts, rather than chapter VII of the Charter, that which authorises enforcement action. The consent of Egypt and Israel was essential for the introduction of the force, and because Israel refused deployment of any part of the force on its territory, it abandoned its right to influence the decision when Egypt requested its withdrawal in May 1967.

While the force had kept peace and quiet in the area, the situation along Israel's borders with Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon proved different. There were almost daily border violations, and as Palestinian guerrilla activity increased, it met Israeli retaliation, starting a cycle of incidents and escalation that would only lead to war. Meanwhile, there was little progress in getting any serious negotiations underway to resolve the conflict.

The United Nations is presently engaged in three peacekeeping operations. In Cyprus it continues to keep the Greek and Turkish Cypriots apart while the dialog between the two parties continues with a view to finding a lasting solution. In Kashmir, an observer group has kept a helpless watch while India and Pakistan have fought two major wars. In the Middle East, following the Yom Kippur war, a new force has been introduced to supervise the cease-fire. Some 2,500 troops have been introduced so far. While Egypt and Israel argue over the question of withdrawal to the lines held on October 22, the deployment of the force has been delayed by bitter dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union over questions relating to composition and financing of the force. These issues have now been resolved, and it is hoped that the force will reach its full strength of about 7,000 in 6 weeks. There is also an increase in the size of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, and for the first time, Soviet observers have been included, though they have yet to be employed—eight U.S. observers have already been serving there.

The United Nations has achieved a measure of success in peacekeeping and in the settlement of disputes. But 28 years after the signing of the Charter, it has yet to create an effective international system to ensure peace, security, and world order. United Nations involvement in peacekeeping indicates that its degree of success can be measured against the support and cooperation given by the great powers. There are clear indications from deliberations of the Committee of Thirty-Three appointed by the General Assembly to resolve the major issues relating to peacekeeping operations, that if the United Nations is to achieve success, it must have the complete support of not only the small and middle nations, which urgently need an international system of world security, but also the support and collaboration of the great powers.

Conflicts such as the Middle East, where there is great-power involvement and near confrontation, if escalated, could prove dangerous to world peace. After years of bilateral and unilateral actions on the part of the Members States, the United Nations' Charter principles are beginning to look more realistic again. It is in the interests of the two superpowers, separately and collectively, not only to avoid the possibility of armed hostilities but also to establish a world system that will reduce violent conflicts and strengthen the United Nations for the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

There are a number of smaller problems which can be solved while the larger issues concerning peacekeeping continue to be debated in the Committee of Thirty-Three, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union. Ad hoc peacekeeping operations have little preparation and organisation, inadequate institutional arrangements at the United Nations, weak command and control, poor signal communications and liaison, and a shoe-string type of administration and logistic support. All these limitations are manifested once again as the new United Nations Emergency Force is now being established in Egypt. If such operations have been successful in any degree, it is due more to the determination of the participants than to the support that the other Member Nations of the United Nations provide. The inability of the United Nations to institutionalise peacekeeping by the provision of suitable staff and informational resources can be remedied. Command and control, both at the United Nations headquarters and in the field, can surely be improved. Many governments have already instituted plans for the preparation of their personnel and troops on a standby basis, and this arrangement needs every encouragement and coordination.

The United States, as part of its aid programme around the globe, assists the military preparedness of many nations within regional or bilateral agreements. Preparation for peacekeeping operations by these armed forces, and by their personnel who attend the many training courses organised by the United States, could surely be accomplished with little added cost. The United States Congress resolved some years ago that the military aid programme could be used to equip recipient countries for peacekeeping. This resolution has never been implemented, and is certainly worthy of being revived.

There will, of course, still remain several important issues to be settled: (1) the procedure for establishing peacekeeping missions and the conditions under which they may be withdrawn; (2) clarification of the provisions of the Charter under which such peacekeeping missions are established; (3) the extent of involvement by the Military Staff Committee and other competent United Nations organs, such as the Security Council, in the day-to-day administration of peacekeeping operations; (4) the utilisation of the Secretary-General's good offices; (5) the financial arrangements required to maintain peacekeeping machinery; (6) the desirability of establishing standby United Nations peacekeeping forces; and last, but not least, (7) the development of parallel peacemaking machinery.

There are only two choices available to the States Members of the United Nations when confronting a serious crisis. One is to seize an early opportunity where there is a common interest in resolving it. This kind of opportunity is inherent in the Middle East situation. Quite obviously, the two superpowers have not shown any desire to go to war to support their respective commitments to the two sides. The new United Nations Emergency Force and its enlarged United Nations observer group in the Middle East can serve as a model for future peacekeeping machinery.

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recognition of the fact that it would also benefit the big powers has been slow in coming. The argument of these remarks, then, is that it is in the interest of all nations to strengthen the United Nations' ability to keep the peace and reduce the cause of violence. Recent events in the Middle East have again demonstrated that there is no other alternative.

Mr. HAMILTON. To each of you, we feel your comments are very helpful and constructive to the committee.

We will begin now with questions by members of the two committees. I will ask Chairman Fraser to begin.

Excuse me. The committee will recess while the members go to vote, and we will resume as soon as we come back.

[Brief recess.]

Mr. HAMILTON. The committee will come to order.

Chairman Fraser, you may continue.

CHINESE POLICY

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Herz, you said that China distrusts peacekeeping in general. Can you enlighten us any further as to the underlying considerations in that attitude?

Mr. HERZ. I think one can conjecture as to their motivations. As you know, the Chinese have looked at the joint role of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East as what they call "superpower hegemony." It is only the fact that the initiative for this peacekeeping operation came from the nonalined that made them acquiesce. They did not participate in the voting and they made certain statements about this operation.

I believe that it is reasonable to suppose that they will look at future peacekeeping operations very much in the light of the desires of the nonalined world, the countries that call themselves nonalined. This is, as they see it, their constituency and they would not wish to be classed with the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of the kind of negotiations that preceded the cease-fire in the Middle East, and probably in future situations they would wish to keep their options open.

I might add, I see it as being in the American interest to facilitate for the Chinese the keeping open of these options and not to force them into a situation where they may have to voice larger objections.

Mr. FRASER. One of my colleagues, on the way over to vote raised this question: Suppose China had vetoed the Security Council resolution?

Mr. HERZ. Well, it is very hard to speculate. It would have been a blow to the cause of peace in the Middle East and it is hard to see how this operation could have been launched with the relative effectiveness and dispatch which attended its launching.

PEACEKEEPING ROLE

Mr. FRASER. Professor Bloomfield, in your prepared statement, you said "equally to the point is a stepped up peacekeeping capacity likely to be misused by other states in pursuit of their racial, ethnic, or ideological convictions rather than for the real cases of clear interstate aggression."

It has not been clear to me, from what you said, that you were looking for a role that went beyond what has been called this morning "no-fault peacekeeping." Were you suggesting a peacekeeping role that would be beyond that?

"No-fault," I assume, means peacekeeping in which there has been some kind of arrangement which would permit the entry of a peacekeeping force.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. I myself don't see very good prospects at this historic stage for what I would call coercive peacekeeping, if I can change the category. No-fault is a very good description of the way the U.N. has approached acts of aggression over a 20-year period. You don't single out the aggressor, or it is very hard to. But it seems to me the other issue is whether the international machinery falls into the category of police powers, as we understand them in a constitutional sense, or whether it is something else. I think there is a major threshold we have not crossed, and I am not sure we should or when we should, which goes under the name of collective security, repelling aggression with "article 43" military forces. We have had trouble even getting a couple of observers into a troubled area before war breaks out.

I see this whole process as involving three levels. We have not been good lately at this relatively easy level of simple observation; in fact it has gotten worse.

The second level is noncoercive, no-fault peacekeeping. This is where we are, and what we are talking about today.

The third level would be true collective security, or coercive peacekeeping. Except for the Korean action of 1950 and the tail end of the Congo operation, there is neither the disposition to do this nor appropriate machinery in existence. I think it is much too early to cross that bridge until we can do a better job with the other two lower levels. That is my view.

Mr. FRASER. So that the problem of misuse at that level would not——

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Well, the problem of misuse could well arise. After all, if you think back to the Congo operation, in which General Rikhye was intimately involved—I visited that operation and tried to study it at the time—there were some contributing countries who I thought were about to misuse it. These contributors were playing their own games in the area to support one or another faction. This is one form of misuse. Fortunately, that was overcome by a very strong, even-handed exercise of authority by the Secretary General, his military adviser, and his representative in the area.

I could conceive of a majority in the General Assembly at some point deciding that a peacekeeping force should go into Rhodesia and peacekeep. But to that majority peacekeeping might well mean politically empowering the black majority, and coercing the white minority which illegally took power. But that would be smuggling in a punitive operation under the guise of noncoercive peacekeeping.

I think that would kill whatever chances there are for U.S. support of the organization, and might also endanger peace in the world by opening the door to forcing any political change a majority might want. I think that danger can be avoided by adopting the position the United States has argued against in principle for several years, that is, the Security Council being the only realistic agency that can launch these operations.

GENERAL RIKHYE'S PEACEKEEPING ROLES

Mr. FRASER. General Rikhye, you were the military adviser to the Secretary General. Was that your principal involvement in peacekeeping? That is, you were not in charge of peacekeeping forces in the field?

General RIKHYE. I was on several occasions given specific assignments where I had direct responsibility for the peacekeeping operation or peacekeeping missions as well. While I was military adviser, I went out and carried out several individual and collective missions for the Secretary General.

Mr. FRASER. In point of view of being in New York as military adviser with a peacekeeping operation underway, what kind of problems do you see that are most acute from the point of view of a commander in control; logistically, what kind of impression do you get running the operation from New York?

General RIKHYE. The greatest difficulty we have already overcome; that is, there is a good deal of expertise within the Secretariat now, which was not the case when I first joined the Secretariat. Since then we have had considerable experience and I think we see this presently manifested in the present setting up of the U.N. force. There is, however, a lack of adequate support in the matter of logistics.

The Secretariat has considerable experience but does not have the means to handle logistics. For instance, in this case the United Nations force has already been in the field for quite some time and they have no logistics support at all. The troops had to bring everything with them from Cyprus or from their country of origin, and it was only a week ago, or less than that, that an agreement in principle was arrived at between Canada and Poland as to the distribution of logistics responsibilities but the logistics yet have to be introduced. This is the kind of capability which I think the United Nations can build and should have access to so that it can support the troop efforts.

LOGISTICS PROBLEMS

Mr. FRASER. By logistics you are not only including military support but such things as food, also?

General RIKHYE. Everything. The United Nations has no bases of its own other than to use bases that exist, as in this case, it was Cyprus. So the first troops sent out from Cyprus were required to take with them sufficient amounts of food. It is not possible to keep a sustained operation by requiring infantry units or companies to take their food for even 1 month. They don't have the personnel to store it, or account for it, or lift it. That is the kind of difficulty the United Nations continues to face.

MILITARY CAPABILITY IN SECRETARIAT

The second area which is missing is the military advice capability in the Secretariat. There again I do wish to compliment the Secretariat because there are a number of political officers who have gained considerable political experience by directing peacekeeping operations in the past and, therefore, they have been able to take care of it and not allow the thing to fall down. But in the absence of utilization of

military staff, the Secretary General has no military expertise available to him at all.

There are a number of situations that have arisen in the Middle East situation where expertise at the Secretariat level would have been very useful.

For instance, we have seen on television here the method of deployment of troops around the tent where the meetings have been held between the Arabs and the Israeli generals, and one of the first principles we have learned from our experience is that you must not use bayonets on the rifles. That is a close quarter weapon and should only be used when troops are used in close quarter battle. This is not a close quarter battle at all. The only person harmed was the public relations office of the Egyptian Government.

These are very small things but somebody should be at the Secretariat who is worrying about these things and getting instructions to the troops.

We also had fisticuffs between the Israeli and the U.N. troops. This could be very harmful.

So these directions, directions in detail and depth have to be worked out at the United Nations. The Security Council issues a resolution and then the Secretary General makes out his political directive to the Force Commander, but somebody has to write a field directive.

Mr. FRASER. Can't the Force Commander do that?

General RIKHYE. More time is spent on diplomatic matters than military matters. This is an inherent weakness in the U.N. peacekeeping situation. The solution arrived at between the United States and the Soviet Union places the responsibility for the implementation of the cease-fire on the Force Commander. The Force Commander is carrying out very high level sensitive diplomatic negotiations and has little time to direct the force.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Buchanan.

APPRECIATION FOR TESTIMONY

Mr. BUCHANAN. I am wearing two hats this morning.

I would like to thank the distinguished witnesses. I don't believe I have any questions of them, and I don't suppose it would be proper to ask questions of myself.

I think each of you has made a valuable contribution, and, General, I think the thrust of your argument is well taken. This present situation has pointed up the need for the peacekeeping machinery, and I appreciate the thrust of your remarks.

I did not know whether the Department would fully pass everything I had to say or not. We negotiate with the Department of State out of New York the way we negotiate with foreign powers and we think we make the foreign policy at the U.N. and they think they make the foreign policy. I am not sure who does, but I didn't speak officially for the mission there or for the Department of State.

I must compliment again their work there. Mr. Herz, I mentioned the Ambassadors and I would also like to praise others with whom I have been working in New York such as David Stottlemeyer, Robert Kitchen, and John Sauls. They also do a fine job for our country.

Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. I have a question for Mr. Buchanan, since he can't ask himself a question.

I was very impressed by your description of the very strong initiative taken by the nonalined countries. I would like to know, and I ask this question, of course, because of my concern with Israel's lack of confidence in the United Nations, which I think is in some stages justified and in some stages perhaps not.

But at what stage of the war did the nonalined countries begin to take this strong initiative?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I think I most factually could answer that at the time there came a confrontation of the superpowers, there came a proposal from India, Indonesia, Panama, Sudan and Yugoslavia for the formation of the emergency force. I suppose there are many ways one can interpret the same set of facts, but there did come a proposal from these nations at a time when there appeared to be a threatened confrontation between two superpowers.

Second, I would point up that a compromise on funding was offered by Brazil and Canada and others were helpful as well. Our committee vice chairman from Iran asserted leadership with 77 nonalined and their support of this compromise of the avoidance of politicizing the issue and of any kind of bias in the result of our action. So I think one has to come down with the proposition that whatever bias may exist in terms of rhetoric and whatever danger there may be for the use of the U.N. machinery for some less than impartial role, that this simply has not been the case in this instance. The fact is that the organization has come down playing a key role in solving a difficult crisis and in setting up the machinery which might keep the peace and keep the momentum of peace going forward. This would be my own interpretation. I understand that there might be those that would feel that the tide of battle had turned in Israel's direction when all this began.

I will let the gentleman speak for himself, if that is what he is getting at.

ISRAELI VIEW OF U.N.

Mr. WILSON. Yes, it was. I asked the same question yesterday of Ambassador Yost and would you agree that, if Israel is to really make the kind of concessions that will be necessary for peace in the area, that it is necessary for them to have a little confidence in the United Nations, that the United Nations has some concern for a war in the Middle East in times other than when Israel is winning it? That is a very real—they are accused often of paranoia in this area but it seems to me they have received some pretty emphatic justification to this and that, in my opinion, is going to be a big problem in terms of Israeli acceptance of these concessions that we feel are necessary.

I was hoping your answer would be the nonalined nations took the initiative when the war started when the outcome was uncertain.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would say the nonalined nations have played a key role from the beginning. I would not raise the charge they began when things started going Israel's way. I think subsequent actions have underlined the fact there was an honest effort to play a meaningful role in a very dangerous and difficult crisis and that the nonalined nations were involved at critical points of leadership at each step along the way. This is my interpretation of what happened.

I would say further I would not want to put the underline on the bias, either, as I said, our critics say that we are biased one way and critics of the U.N. might well say they are biased another way.

What I meant to say, however, was something positive, notwithstanding that such charges can and have been raised.

The organization came through in this crisis well. Israel and Arab countries alike could support the funding proposition, for example, and I think the organization demonstrated it can play an impartial peacekeeping function.

I would say further, if I may put on my other hat as a Member of Congress, that I think the whole world needs to understand that this Nation firmly supports the right of Israel to exist and to exercise the normal rights of sovereign nations and I think this Government has demonstrated that and will do so in the future. I think the Soviets need to understand this and all the Arab countries need to understand this, that we simply are not going to abandon Israel's rights and basic interests as a nation in terms of her survival and her right to live and the right of her people to enjoy the normal rights of a sovereign people and nation.

Everyone in the world must understand this. This is what is perhaps most important to Israel, that that nation knows she does have firm support from this Nation so far as her safety and survival is concerned. But I think at the same time we can in many ways show positive friendship for the other people involved there because that friendship does exist on the part of our country and I again would like to reiterate that whatever may be the case about other things, there was definitely statesmanship shown by Arab countries as well as by others in this situation, including Egypt and Jordan, who were directly involved in the conflict.

WHEN DID ARAB STATES SHOW STATESMANSHIP

Mr. WILSON. I don't want to belabor it and I appreciate everything you have said, but again, did the Arab countries show any statesmanship before they started losing the war?

Mr. BUCHANAN. That is very difficult, I will say to the gentleman. You get into a definition of what constitutes statesmanship. The Egyptian Ambassador said in response to the concept that the Arab nations were aggressors in this conflict that one can't be an aggressor if he is attempting to put his foot in his own door.

Many of us felt very strongly about the military action beginning on a Holy Day as well as other aspects of this thing, but their point of view was they were simply trying to recapture and, from their point of view, liberate their own territory. From their point of view I don't know that they would consider this an act of aggression whether we might or not.

I would say they certainly clearly fought with courage and then, when they had the votes in the United Nations to do whatever they wanted to do they showed statesmanship. We need to understand this: If the Egyptians and the other Arab nations had called upon the people they can call upon in the U.N. and said, "Let's brand Israel as the aggressor, let's cut ourselves out of any share of funding, let's really fix this thing up," they might well have succeeded. I think the great weakness of the United Nations is the people who have the votes

are not necessarily the people who have the wealth and power in the world, and there are certain groups of nations, nonalined, which can win any vote which they see fit to win if they want to be hardline enough about it.

HOPE FOR THE U.N.

The great hope of the United Nations is when these nations that have the power show the statesmanship that I believe was shown in this situation. I believe the whole strength of the United Nations organization depends on statesmanship shown by nonalined nations and such nations as some of the Arab nations I have mentioned.

You know I would say this experience has demonstrated that while they had the votes—and I am certain that is the case—that they used their influence in a way that brought a positive result that can lead to a new hope for peace. I find that very encouraging and very significant.

I don't think it would be in Israel's interest, even if it were in her power under present circumstances, to destroy Egypt, to destroy Syria and win a total military victory. I don't believe that to be in the Israeli interest, or ours, either. Therefore, I think what we need to do is establish the peace. I think the nonalined nations, including a group of the Arab nations and the United Nations Organization itself has played a key role in a better chance for, and more momentum toward, the establishment of peace in the Middle East than I personally have witnessed in many years, and I am cautiously, but thoroughly optimistic, about the prospects and what has been demonstrated by the organization.

Mr. WILSON. If it is not too time-consuming, I would like to ask if any other witnesses would like to address that question.

PRAGMATIC VIEW OF U.N. ACTION

Mr. HERZ. May I take this opportunity to say the statement Congressman Buchanan made before is one I would subscribe to. I am referring to your leadoff statement. There is no question but that you articulated the position not only of yourself and your delegation but of our Government.

I would comment on Congressman Wilson's question in more general terms. I think perhaps what you are suggesting is that in our satisfaction that the United Nations has been able to act constructively, we should not be led into a state of euphoria about the possibility of peacekeeping operations in the future. Certainly we must work to make them possible, we must do everything possible in our negotiations to remove obstacles to peacekeeping operations. But, when you look at the history of conflict in the past decade, you will find that whenever one of the big powers finds it to its interest that a conflict continue, there is no possibility of involvement of the Security Council. I am referring to the conflict in Vietnam in which a number of times we tried to bring the matter before the Council and were thwarted by permanent members of the Council.

BANGLADESH SITUATION

I am also referring to the Bangladesh situation. As you know, we tried to tranquilize the situation by a resolution which was vetoed by

the Soviets. They tried to introduce a resolution which was vetoed by the People's Republic of China. In the Middle East—perhaps I am elaborating on what you are saying—clearly the United Nations did not at first cut a favorable figure. The war was going on and the Security Council was unable to act. Had this situation continued, I think the U.N. would have gotten a very black eye. As it turned out, when the situation evolved on the ground to such an extent that it became necessary for the United States and the Soviet Union to consult bilaterally and when the basis was laid for an armistice, and when it then looked as though this situation might come apart and that regrettably there might have been a possibility of unilateral intervention—at that point the nonaligned countries came forward constructively and created the possibility for the U.N. to interpose itself.

At that time, when the fighting had reached that particular point, it was possible for the U.N. to act. But it was also quite clear that stopping the fighting or interposing forces at a particular point or line where any party sees a tactical advantage, is very difficult.

To the extent you implied a certain amount of skepticism about the general proposition that the U.N. will involve itself, or that the nonaligned majority can be counted on to act constructively, to that extent I would subscribe to that skepticism. But I do not think it detracts from the heartening outcome which was due to active statesmanship on the part of individual members of the United Nations.

U.N. ONLY ONE DEVICE FOR PEACE

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. I think I have a slightly different answer than Mr. Herz', Congressman Wilson. In looking ahead to what would constitute a viable package toward a settlement or the beginning of a settlement to the 27-year-old Middle Eastern Arab-Israeli conflict, it seems to me to require a variety of devices.

The device we are speaking about is U.N. peacekeeping. But the U.N. is not the only source of devices that represent more than the parties facing each other, there are, of course other devices. There are examples since World War II of joint patrolling by great powers in Berlin, and Vienna. Also there are examples of joint patrols of demilitarized areas by the parties. In fact, there might be a better chance of that than of purely U.N. forces in some of the circumstances I can envision in a Middle East package.

There are also possibilities of remote control surveillance of borders or demilitarized zones. So I think we ought to loosen up our thinking and not have a solution depend on the viability of a permanent U.N. peacekeeping operation, since there are some other possibilities as well.

Now, Israel's rather hostile view of the U.N., as I think you said, has some good and bad reasons. I am very sympathetic to their feeling that a majority can always be mustered against Israel in the Security Council; I take this as an unfortunate fact of life. On the other hand, Israel has, I think, become a bit paranoid about U.N. peacekeeping on the ground and I think that has detracted from her own interests.

SOUTH ASIA SITUATION

I would just like to add one more point. Martin Herz mentioned East Pakistan and Bangladesh. That seems to me an example of a case

where the kind of influence only the U.S. Government could have extended when its ally Pakistan was suppressing self-determination in East Pakistan, might have averted a very bloody war. I think the fact that the U.S. Government objected and blamed other great powers when the fighting finally broke out in December is scandalous, given the fact that only the United States had sufficient influence with the Government of Pakistan during the 6 months that preceded it to have perhaps avoided the ultimate tragedy.

With all respect to my friend, Mr. Herz, I think that is a very bad example of U.S. rectitude, but an excellent example of the need for conflict prevention. We have been talking here only about bandaids, not surgery for drastic solutions. We have said nothing about causes. Both the Middle East, where the refugee problem has festered for 27 years, and East Pakistan where issues of self-determination and even genocide were essentially ignored during the prewar period, seem to me marvelous cases in point for the vitally important tasks of conflict prevention. Such tasks are not all that impossible, as ample evidence can demonstrate.

I hope you hold hearings on that subject sometime, gentlemen, because it may be a most important subject in the long run.

EXPECTATIONS OF PEACEKEEPING

General Rikhye. Sir, the expectations of Israel and Egypt with regard to U.N. peacekeeping are identical. In the case of UNEF–I, Israel expected that the United Nations force would be able to keep the peace by all means available, and now Egypt has requested that a United Nations force be introduced into the area toward the same end, that peace would be enforced in that area.

We have seen the development of the U.N. peacekeeping force has been in a different direction. We have seen in the case of UNEF–I particularly as far as Israel was concerned, partly stemming from certain action on their own part, that they refused permission to the force to be deployed on this territory. This created certain problems for the Secretary General that once the force had been deployed only on Egyptian territory, he could not permit contact between the force and Israel because consent of Egypt was required in every instance and the only contact ever made was through a small liaison staff in Tel Aviv. Quite often the commander of UNEF was not allowed to go into Israel. The Secretary General preferred to make contacts with Israel at New York, because of the difficulties he ran into every time he allowed his commander or his chief of staff to go to Tel Aviv and see their opposite numbers in the Israel defense headquarters

Subsequently, when the force was asked to withdraw, Secretary U Thant again proposed to the Government of Israel that the force be deployed on the Israeli side. This, of course, was not agreed to for the same reasons as in the first instance and the force was withdrawn.

We have here a very clear example——

ISRAELI REFUSAL IN PAST

Mr. Wilson. Would you go over that again? When the Egyptians asked the U.N. force to withdraw in 1967, the U.N. then asked Israel if they could perform there?

General RIKHYE. Yes, sir.

Mr. WILSON. That is a generally unknown fact and very important. Israel would not let them?

General RIKHYE. They said for various reasons they could not accept it. In 1956 they would not agree to it again.

Mr. WILSON. What were the reasons given?

General RIKHYE. The reasons given to Secretary General Hammarskjold were the Israeli preventative action was brought about by Egyptian raids across their border and, therefore, the United Nations function was to prevent those raids, and there was a failure to take, preventive actions. The Arabs had kept a sustained war against Israel and, if this could be stopped, there was no further need for them to go to war and they were, therefore, not prepared to have the United Nations on their side. The responsibility was for the United Nations to keep the Egyptians from coming into their territory.

As has been so able and aptly described by Congressman Buchanan, I think the U.N. has played a very important role. But the analysis of developing the whole process of this peacekeeping machinery is, I think, interesting. I think it is beginning to typify what we can expect from the United Nations.

We saw in the first instance that two superpowers were directly involved in this situation because of their friendship and alliance and support of respective governments, and when war broke out the United Nations, whose peacekeeping capability had been frozen over the years, felt no initiative could be taken until such time as the two great powers themselves wished to have some action taken. It is very interesting to note that this only developed after Mr. Kissinger and Chairman Brezhnev reached a certain arrangement in regard to there being a cease-fire.

Mr. HAMILTON. If I may interrupt, I understand Professor Bloomfield has to leave to catch an airplane. If you do have to leave you may do so.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Please forgive me for doing so.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is perfectly all right.

NEED CONSENT OF BIG POWERS

General RIKHYE. The point I am trying to make, Mr. Chairman, is that the Security Council recognizes the fact and the United Nations recognizes the fact now, certainly, that no peacekeeping action is possible until such time as there is either consent, or at least tacit consent, of the great powers. And a new U.N. operation has only come off the ground once the great powers agreed that they did wish to have one.

Now we have seen a very interesting cycle; during the cold war period the thrust was that the nonalined should assume primary responsibility for developing peacekeeping and we, fortunately, had a Secretary General who took up the initiative and used it to the best advantage. But once the cold war was diminishing and there was a détente, or at least a better understanding was coming, we saw the other side of the coin where the great powers would not agree to any serious initiative by the nonalined and, therefore, there was little help for developing any peacekeeping action.

The Middle East has this time, I think, brought us to a more pragmatic approach, if I may put it that way, which is the recognition of

the fact that great powers' approval is essential and that the great powers themselves are unable to develop peacekeeping, that they do require the support of the nonalined and, as Congressman Buchanan said, certainly the nonalined in this instance, as in many instances in the past, like the Congo, have shown great statesmanship and their initiative needs encouragement.

POSSIBLE OPTIONS

If I may say, sir, I would also like to make some remarks following what Professor Bloomfield said that there are other options, too, and it is not necessary always to go to the United Nations. I think one should briefly look at them. We have now had experiences of two multinational peacekeeping operations in Indo China and they both suffered from one very serious weakness, which is that in both instances there was a great absence of a higher echelon to which they could report and obtain direction. I think both the supervisory units have done an admirable job within this limitation but serious weaknesses remain.

Another interesting development in the past few years is increasing reliance on certain organizations, the Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity. In both instances we have seen that the peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts which they have developed have identical weaknesses to that of the United Nations, and more, than what the United Nations capability has been.

So I believe that when a situation develops like the one that we had in the Middle East, the best answer was the way it was finally resolved, and I also have much hope that we would continue to develop the U.N. system that not only keeps the lid on the situation, because we have found from our experience in the U.N. that it is not enough to simply peacekeep, but also it is essential to develop a peacemaking machinery at the same time.

CHINESE VIEW

Here, if I might say I have been exploring particularly the attitude of the Chinese, about which certain remarks were made here by Mr. Herz. My own personal observations are that they—the Chinese—are primarily taking the view of many of the nonalined nations, the third world nations, which is that they do not want the U.N. machinery to be used to simply to put a lid on a situation. They feel that when peacekeeping operations are employed, it must immediately develop a peacemaking machinery with it and if, for unavoidable reasons the peacemaking machinery does not get off the ground, then in their view the United Nations peacekeeping operation should cease to exist because they believe in a period of revolution and a change.

We have also seen the voting pattern in which they have increasingly provided support for liberation movements and so on. So, in other words, to them the use of violence in bringing about a change is an acceptable method and, therefore, the use of peacekeeping machinery is only temporary so that it is possible to make the peace.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman.

CONTROL PROBLEMS

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, with regard to the controls you talked about in your statement, most of those controls appeared to be administrative matters, is that not so? Are they due to lack of financing or internal administrative structure?

General RIKHYE. The primary weakness which exists is that a peacekeeping operation only is born from the time the approval is given or an authorization is given to it by the Security Council. Until that time even though the Secretary General and the Secretariat may anticipate that a peacekeeping operation is about to take place, they have no authorization to carry out any preparation. This is an inherent weakness. Where this has been somewhat offset has been the fact that since establishing the first U.N. Emergency Force, the Secretary General has been able to take advantage of that operation to support the next one, so the Congo was supported primarily by UNEF–I—the first group of staff officers and the Swedish groups were flown out of UNEF–I. They were available and taken from there. The same in the case of Cyprus; we largely used UNEF–I to establish the Cyprus operation. Of course the British troops were there already. And now in the Middle East the second UNEF; the first troops were taken out of Cyprus and the United Nations was also able to transfer its experienced chief of staff of UNTSO to be the commander of this force.

But these are all bandaid arrangements, and one of the very serious drawbacks is the fact that the officers and men who have served the U.N. flag in very large numbers leave the United Nations with a slight disillusion, and it is primarily because the management part—which includes command and control, communications, logistics—has been lacking. Certainly these peacekeeping forces have served a political purpose and I think everybody who has served in the United Nations realizes this, that they are there primarily to serve a diplomatic purpose and if they have achieved their objectives they have served well.

But, at the same time, I think something like 200,000 officers and men who have served under various U.N. flags, coming from different countries, something like at least 50 nations, have gone back not with the confidence in the organization which they should have.

UNEF–I

Mr. GILMAN. What was the life of UNEF–I? When did it come into existence and how long was it in existence?

General RIKHYE. It came into existence toward the end of 1956, soon after the arrangements were made for the cessation of hostilities in the Suez war. As you recall, the British and French had landed in the Suez Canal and Israeli forces came down from Sinai. Soon after that the UNEF–I was established. It was our first experience of military personnel in a peaceful role.

Mr. GILMAN. Did UNEF–I still exist until the time of creation of UNEF–II?

General RIKHYE. No, it was withdrawn May 18, 1967, when President Nasser requested that the United Nations Emergency Force be withdrawn in view of the dangerous situation that existed at that time between Israel and Egypt.

Mr. GILMAN. The Congo expedition and the Cyprus policing were subsequent to that?

General RIKHYE. Yes; they were subsequent to that. The Congo operation started in July 1960 by Security Council resolution and at its peak had over 20,000 officers and men and it was finally withdrawn in 1964 when the situation had sufficiently stabilized for a central government in the Congo to look after its own affairs, and the Congolese Government had made bilateral arrangements to take care of the law and order situation from that time on.

The Cyprus force was established in 1963 soon after the British troops were first called to assist in maintenance of law and order. Although there was a four-party agreement, the Turkish and Greek forces agreed mutually that, because of the fighting between their respective communities, they should not participate, and the fourth element was a military force of Cyprus which never came into existence because of the disagreement between the two communities. So the burden fell on the troops from Britain and it was the British who brought the matter to the U.N.

Mr. GILMAN. From 1967 to the creation of UNEF–II was there any administrative capability for a U.N. peacekeeping force?

U.N. ORGANIZATIONAL SETUP

General RIKHYE. There was none. The United Nations Secretariat is organized so that there are two wings, a political wing and a field service organization under General Services. Both the political as well as the administrative wings have been doing this job for a very long time, but their difficulties are, one, that they are short in manpower because they have been primarily organized to take care of the routine missions like the United Nations maintaining an observer group in India and Pakistan, an observer group in the Middle East, and a small force in Cyprus. Therefore, the organization is primarily geared to look after these small missions. But every time the United Nations is called upon to set up a new force, it requires a machinery it doesn't have, so the resources of the United Nations are stretched to the limit. So though the Secretariat is highly experienced, it needs a lot of technical people with military expertise, which is not usually available.

To give a sort of example, we had in this case, in the case of UNEF–II, troops coming not only from Australia, Ireland, but also Canada and Poland. There is a diversity of equipment that these troops will bring to the area. It means, one needs workshops geared up for repairing the equipment, particularly vehicles. The pipeline for spares is not there for these troops, not there for the radios manufactured by these different nations. This takes time. It takes a workshop capable of looking after those things, and time after time the United Nations has run into the problem of establishing these forces where within about 4 to 6 weeks the equipment begins to wear out, the radios don't operate, the vehicles don't run, the food supply runs out. Again I would like to emphasize there is no shortage of experience, and I think the Secretary is aware of these problems, but they have not been provided with the tools to accomplish these tasks properly.

27-616—74——6

Mr. GILMAN. You mentioned that Israel became disillusioned with the peacekeeping force because of the continuing raids of the terrorist troops across the border. I believe you were commander in the area for a while. Can you tell us why the U.N. force was not able to prevent those raids?

General RIKHYE. I think what I said was that the Israeli were disillusioned because they expected that the United Nations force would keep the peace. The United Nations Emergency Force was only introduced after the Suez war and it has a very good record, not because I commanded it toward the end, but I think over the 10½ years it was there and had several commanders from different countries it was able to keep the peace in the Gaza Strip area as well as Sinai and was able to assure free passage for shipping through the Strait of Tiran.

But the expectation was that the presence of the U.N. as a whole, not only the U.N. Emergency Force, but the U.N. observer groups employed on the Jordan frontier or the Syrian frontier or Lebanese frontier would be able to keep the peace.

While UNEF was completely successful during the 10½ years to keep the peace in the Gaza and southern sector, there was little peace in the other areas, although the United Nations presence was there. The only reason why there was little peace in those areas is because there were only observers there and their task was simply to observe and report. They had no authority to police the lines as the United Nations Emergency Force had. The Israeli thinking, however, is that the U.N. as a whole has failed to keep the peace. That is understandable from their point of view.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Any further questions?

If there are no objections we will place in the record of the hearing a recent article by General Rikhye that appeared in the New York Times. [See appendix, p. 102.]

Mr. HAMILTON. Gentlemen, we appreciate your appearance this morning. You have been very helpful.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

APPENDIX I

LINCOLN PALMER BLOOMFIELD

Lincoln P. Bloomfield, professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has special interests in U.S. foreign policy, international relations, strategy and arms control, the United Nations, and problems of interdependence. He initiated M.I.T.'s teaching and research in political aspects of outer space and developed at M.I.T. the technique of political gaming known as the RAND/M.I.T. Game.

Born July 7, 1920 in Boston, Dr. Bloomfield received his S.B. degree from Harvard University in 1941. From 1942 to 1946 he was a lieutenant in the U.S. Navy. From 1946 to 1957 he served in various capacities in the U.S. Department of State; from 1952 to 1957 he was a special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State. On leaves of absence from the government, Dr. Bloomfield received from Harvard his M.P.A. degree in 1952 and his Ph. D. in 1956.

Dr. Bloomfield joined the M.I.T. Center for International Studies in 1957. He was director of the United Nations Project from 1957 to 1969, and subsequently became director of the Arms Control Project, in which studies of issues of arms control, strategy, and foreign policy have been conducted. His most recent research centered on the control of local conflict, including development of the CASCON conflict-data computer system being used experimentally by the U.S. Government and the United Nations. In recent years he has organized political names for M.I.T., the U.S. and other governments, and the International Peace Academy (Vienna). He now directs a State Department-sponsored study of techniques for the analysis of global interdependence.

He is the author of *Evolution or Revolution? The U.N. and the Problem of Peaceful Territorial Change* (Harvard University Press, 1957), and *The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy: A New Look at the National Interest* (Little, Brown: Boston, revised edition, 1967), and the forthcoming *In Search of American Foreign Policy: The Humane Use of Power* (Oxford University Press, 1974), as well as co-author and editor of *International Military Forces* (Little, Brown, 1964), revised as *The Power To Keep Peace—Today and in a World Without War* (World Without War Council, 1971); *Khrushchev and the Arms Race* (M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1966), *Outer Space: Prospects for Man and Society* (Praeger, New York, revised ed., 1968), and *Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970's* (Knopf, New York, 1969). Dr. Bloomfield is also the author of numerous articles which have appeared in such publications as the *New York Times, Newsweek, Foreign Affairs, World Politics, Foreign Policy* and *The American Political Science Review*. His monographs and other writings have been published by the Foreign Policy Association, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and various newspapers. He is a foreign policy commentator on WGBH–TV and an occasional columnist for newspapers and magazines.

In July, 1970 President Nixon appointed Professor Bloomfield to the Presidential Commission on the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations, which presented its report to Mr. Nixon in April, 1971. He is a member of the Policy Studies Committee of the U.N. Association of the U.S.A., and served on several national policy panels as well as the U.S.-Soviet Parallel panels on nuclear proliferation and collective security.

Dr. Bloomfield was awarded two graduate fellowships at Harvard, a Littauer Fellowship in 1952 and a Rockefeller Fellowship in 1954–55, both on leaves of absence from the U.S. Department of State. In 1956 he was awarded the Chase Prize by Harvard University, given for the best dissertation on a subject tending to promote world peace.

In recent years he has lectured on foreign affairs and related topics in London, Moscow, Geneva, Bucharest, Vienna, Belgrade, Bonn, Ankara, Istanbul, Nicosia, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne, Wellington, and Auckland, and has been Visiting Professor twice at the Institute for Graduate International Studies in Geneva. In 1969 he served as a consultant to Under Secretary of State

Richardson, and in 1972 was named to a two-year term on the State Department Advisory Committee on International Organization Affairs. He was appointed in 1971 to a three-year term on the Social Science Advisory Board of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He also currently serves as a member of the Inter-University Consortium for World Order Studies and of the Council on Foreign Relations Working Group on International Order.

Dr. Bloomfield is a member of the American Political Science Association, the Council on Foreign Relations (New York), the Hudson Institute, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London). He is a member of the Board of Editors of *International Organization*. He has been lecturer at the National War College (where he is also member of the Civilian Faculty Advisory Committee), Foreign Service Institute, International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Canadian Defense College; also he serves as consultant to the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to foreign governments, and to the Under Secretary General of the United Nations. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the United Nations Association of the U.S.A., and Former Director of the World Affairs Council of Boston, the International Student Association of Greater Boston and the Unitarian-Universalist Association.

In 1948 he married Irirangi Pamela Coates of New Zealand. They have three children and live in Cohasset, Massachusetts.

JOHN HALL BUCHANAN, JR.

Republican, of Birmingham, Ala.; born in Paris, Tenn., March 19, 1928; served in the U.S. Navy during World War II; graduated from Samford University in 1949 with majors in economics and history and did graduate work in economics at the University of Virginia; also graduated from Southern Theological Seminary in Louisville; awarded LL.D. degree by Samford University in 1967; served as pastor of churches in Tennessee, Virginia, and Alabama 1952–62; resigned his church in 1962 to be a Republican candidate for Congress; 1962–64, served as supply pastor in the Birmingham area; director of finance for the Alabama Republican Party and chairman of the Jefferson County Republican Committee; married the former Elizabeth Moore of Birmingham, Ala.; two children, Elizabeth and Lynn; member of the Republican Congressional Committee; member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and House Committee on Government Operations; elected to the 89th Congress, November 3, 1964; reelected to the 90th, 91st, 92d, and 93d Congresses.

MARTIN F. HERZ

Born New York July 9, 1917, educated in Vienna, Austria; Oxford, England; New York, N.Y. (Columbia U, B.S. 1937.) U.S. Army 1941 to 1946, private to major, decorated Bronze Star and Purple Heart. Entered Foreign Service 1946, third secretary Vienna, Austria 1946/48; second secretary Paris 1950/54, second, then first secretary, Phnom Penh, Cambodia 1955/57; first secretary, Tokyo 1957/59; adviser and special assistant, Dept. of State, Bureau of African Affairs, 1960–1963. Counselor for political affairs, Tehran, Iran 1963/7; Dept. of State, country director for Laos/Cambodia 1967/68; minister-counselor, Saigon, 1968/1970; deputy assistant secretary for internatl. organization affairs, Dept. of State, 1970–.

Received State Department commendable service award 1960; superior honor award 1970. Author of "Short History of Cambodia", "Beginnings of the Cold War" and of numerous articles.

JOHN MARSHALL LEE

(Vice Admiral, ret. Apr. 1973)

Education: U.S. Naval Academy, 1935; National War College 1957; and USN, 1931–73, line duties.

Pertinent assignments: Military Adviser to U.S. Delegation, United Nations (Charles Yost), 1969–70; and Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1970–73).

MAJ. GEN. INDAR JIT RIKHYE

Born in Lahore on July 30, 1920. He was educated at the Central Model School and Government College Lahore and at the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun. He saw active service during World War II in the Middle East and Italy. Following India's independence, he participated in the Kashmir operations.

In October, 1957, he was appointed Commander of the Indian Contingent with the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza and subsequently Chief of Staff of the Force. On return to India in February, 1960, he commanded the infantry brigade at Ladakh.

In July, 1960, he was appointed Military Adviser to the Secretary General of the United Nations, and was responsible for the Congo, Ruanda Urundi, West Iran, Yemen and Cyprus operations. He also carried out several special missions for the Secretary General.

During the Cuban crisis he was Special Adviser to the Secretary General and accompanied him to Havana. He later went on an independent mission for the recovery of the remains of the U2 pilot shot down over Cuba.

After participating in the Spinelli-Rikhye Mission early in 1965 to Jordan and Israel he was dispatched to establish the United Nations Observer Mission in the Dominican Republic where he remained until the end of the year. He was appointed Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip in January, 1966, which was withdrawn towards the end of May, 1967. On his return to New York, he was Special Adviser to the Secretary on Middle East Affairs and returned to his responsibilities as Military Adviser for 1968.

The United Nations experience had convinced him of the compelling need for practical transnational training in violence control and mediation. He found that many others in both official and private life had reached the same conclusion. In 1967 some of these concerned individuals joined an exploratory group which became the International Peace Academy Committee.

Shortly before leaving the United Nations in January, 1969, he reviewed the Committee's objectives and was encouraged to take on the assignment as its first Chairman. Since then, the Committee's efforts succeeded in establishing a singular international educational institution which has attracted supporters throughout the world. He was appointed President of the International Peace Academy in 1971.

WILLIAM E. SCHAUFELE

Ambassador George Bush at the U.S. Mission to the U.N. today announced the appointment of Ambassador William E. Schaufele, Jr., as Senior Advisor to the U.S. Representative to the United Nations. He will succeed Ambassador Seymour Maxwell Finger who retires on September 1.

Mr. Schaufele, a Career Foreign Service Officer of class 1, has been the American Ambassador to the Republic of Upper Volta since August 1969. The President on July 21 accepted Mr. Schaufele's resignation as U.S. Representative in Ouagadougou in order to return to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

Mr. Schaufele entered the Foreign Service in 1950. He served as a Resident Officer in Bavaria, Germany; and in labor, consular and economic affairs in Dusseldorf and Munich. From 1959 to 1963 he was Political and Labor Officer at Casablanca, Morocco. In 1963 he was Principal Officer at the Consulate in Bukavu in the Congo (Kinshasha) Republic. In Washington assignments he served as a Professor at the Foreign Service Institute, as Officer in Charge of Congo Affairs, Deputy Director of the Office of Central African Affairs, and Alternate Country Director for Central Africa, Malagasy Republic and Mauritius. Prior to his departure to Upper Volta, he was Director for West Central African Affairs.

Mr. Schaufele was born at Lakewood, Ohio, December 7, 1923. Graduated from Lakewood High School, he attended Yale University where he received a B.A., Class of 1945W. He earned a Master's Degree in International Affairs from Columbia University in 1950. From 1942 to 1946 he served overseas with the

U.S. Army. He is married to the former Heather Moon of Bakersfield, California; they have two sons, Steven and Peter.

Hon. Charles W. Yost

Charles W. Yost is a lecturer in foreign policy at the Columbia University School of International Affairs and Counselor to the United Nations Association. He was appointed to both positions in March, 1971.

Mr. Yost joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1930 and was with it for more than 35 years. In addition to serving in a number of overseas posts in his early career, he has been Secretary of the State Department's Policy Committee, Assistant to the Chairman of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and of the San Francisco Conference which founded the United Nations, and was Secretary General of the U.S. Delegation to the Potsdam Conference in 1945.

Following World War II he was charge d'affairés in Bangkok, Minister in Athens and Deputy High Commissioner in Vienna. He served as Ambassador to Laos 1954–56 and subsequently as Minister in Paris, Ambassador to Syria and Ambassador to Morocco.

He was Deputy Representative to the United Nations from 1961 to 1966 and attained the permanent rank of Career Ambassador in 1964. He retired from the Foreign Service in June 1966, to join the Council on Foreign Relations.

In January, 1969 President Nixon recalled him to service and appointed him Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations. He held this post until his retirement in February, 1971.

In 1954, Mr. Yost received a Rockefeller Public Service Award in recognization of his "sustained distinguished service to the United States in the field of Foreign Affairs." He holds honorary degrees from Princeton University, Hamilton College, St. Lawrence University and the University of Louisville.

Mr. Yost is the author of "The Age of Triumph and Frustration: Modern-Dialogues," and "The Insecurity of Nations".

Born November 6, 1907, Mr. Yost is a native of Watertown, New York. He went to school at Hotchkiss and graduated from Princeton University in 1928. Mr. Yost married Irena Oldakowska in 1934. They have two sons and a daughter.

APPENDIX II

VOTE ON THE FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE, RESOLUTION 3101 (XXVIII), DECEMBER 11, 1973

YEAS—108

Afghanistan
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Bahrain
Barbados
Belgium
Bhutan
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burma
Burundi
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
Colombia
Congo
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Dahomey
Denmark
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Federal Republic of Germany
Finland
France
German Democratic Republic
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Guyana
Haiti
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Khmer Republic
Kuwait
Laos
Lebanon
Liberia
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Qatar
Romania
Rwanda
Senegal
Singapore
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Swaziland
Sweden
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukranian S.S.R.
U.S.S.R.
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
U.S.A.
Tanzania
Upper Volta
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zaire

NAYS—3

Albania
Libya
Syria

ABSTENTIONS—1

Portugal

APPENDIX III

United Nations Peacekeeping Forces: Basic Information on UNEF, ONUC, and UNFICYP [1]

United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East (UNEF), November 15, 1956–May 19, 1967

Created by the U.N. General Assembly, at its First Emergency Special Session (called by the Security Council under the Uniting for Peace resolution): A/RES/998 (ES–I), 4 November 1956; A/RES/999 (ES–I), 4 November 1956; A/RES/1000 (ES–I), 5 November 1956; and A/RES/1001 (ES–I), 7 November 1956.

Purpose.—To secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including halting the movement of military forces and arms, withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines, and observance of the provisions of the armistice agreements.

Executed by a U.N. Command and Chief of the Command—both established by the General Assembly and operating under the U.N. Secretary-General who, with the consultation of an Advisory Committee of representatives from seven countries designated by the General Assembly (Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway, and Pakistan), had primary authority for the effective functioning of the Force.

Financing.—A/RES/1089 (XI), 21 December 1956, provided that expenses were to be borne by the United Nations and apportioned among members in accordance with the scale of assessments adopted for the regular budget; expenses in excess of those appropriated for were to be met by voluntary contributions. All contributions were paid into a special account. Expenses for the period July 1, 1962 through June 30, 1963 were financed from the U.N. Bond issue approved by the Assembly in 1961. Certain expenses of nations furnishing contingents to the Force were reimbursed by the United Nations while others were absorbed by the country. This practice varied over the ten and one-half year existence of the Force and varied from country to country. In general, costs which normally existed for the operation of the military unit regardless of its role were borne by the country while the United Nations reimbursed the country for extraordinary expenses such as rotation costs and for salaries of personnel who normally would not be required by the country.

Withdrawal.—UNEF was placed on Egyptian soil "with the consent of the nations concerned," as provided for in A/RES/998 (ES–I). When on May 18, 1967, Egypt requested that the Force be withdrawn, the Secretary-General met with the Advisory Committee and with representatives of three additional countries having contingents in the Force. The Advisory Committee had the authority, under A/RES/1001 (ES–I) to request convening the General Assembly in a matter of urgency and importance. The Advisory Committee chose not to call the Assembly. UNEF ceased to be operational on May 19, 1967, and withdrawal was complete by June 17, 1967.

Participation: Contribution of troops.—A total of ten countries contributed contingents to UNEF which in March 1957 had a peak strength of 6,073. Contingents from Finland and Indonesia withdrew on December 5 and September 12, 1957, respectively. The contingent from Colombia withdrew on October 28, 1958. The seven countries having contingents in UNEF for the major part of the decade and at the time of withdrawal, in an approximate ranking of the size of its contingent, were India, Canada, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. (India usually had the largest contingent). The size of UNEF on May 15, 1967, was its lowest: 3,378. During its existence UNEF suffered 89 fatalities.

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[1] Prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements and the Near East and South Asia Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs by Marjorie Ann Browne, Analyst in International Organizations Foreign Affairs Division, Nov. 30, 1973.

Participation: Financial contribution.—Total U.N. expenditures November 1956–December 1957: $216,400,000. As of December 31, 1972, a total of $49,516,709 in assessed contributions was unpaid; $5.2 million of this amount was in a special account for those arrearages left by the Republic of China on October 25, 1971. Of the 62 countries still left in arrears, 13 have indicated they will not contribute and nine have made no payments. More than 50 countries have paid their asessed contributions and are not in arrears. Total U.S. contributions—both assessed and voluntary—to UNEF, November 1956–December 1967, were $86,452,000; this included $1,191,581 for the cost of the initial airlift provided by the United States, for which the U.S. waived reimbursement. U.S. contributions equaled approximately 40 percent of the total expenditures.

Participation: Contribution of other assistance.—Italy provided the staging area at Capodichino airport as well as extensive airlift for troop and supply movements. It continued to provide facilities at minimum or no cost to UNEF throughout the existence of the Force.

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUS) [OPERATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO], JULY 14, 1960–JUNE 30, 1964

Created by the U.N. Secretary-General on the authority of the Security Council: S/RES/143 (1960), 14 July 1960 (S/4387); S/RES/145 (1960), 22 July 1960 (S/4405); S/RES/146 (1960), 9 August 1960 (S/4426). The fourth emergency session of the General Assembly, convened under the United for Peace Resolution, passed A/RES/1474/Rev. 1, (ES–IV), 20 September 1960.

Purpose.—To restore and maintain law and order and to assist the Central Government in maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the country.

Executed by the Secretary-General who appointed the Commander of the Force and who created a small group—the Congo Club—to operate the Force and keep him informed, as well as a Congo Advisory Committee which included the permanent representative of each of the states providing contingents (see below).

Financing.—A/RES/1583 (XV), 20 December 1960 recognized that the expenses were to be borne by the organization through assessed contributions. A special account was created and members were assessed on the same basis as for the U.N. regular budget. Voluntary contributions were also called for. From July 1, 1962 to June 30, 1963 financing was from the U.N. Bond issue approved by the Assembly in 1961. Normal operating expenses for the contingents were provided by the countries furnishing the personnel while extraordinary expenses, including logistical expenses and support while out of the country, were paid for by the United Nations.

Withdrawal.—The Secretary-General was to assist the Congo government until its national security forces were able "to meet fully their tasks" (S/RES/143 (1960)). When this condition was met, ONUC was withdrawn. Withdrawal was completed on June 30, 1964.

Participation: Contribution of troops.—Thirty-four states provided approximately 93,000 men for participation in ONUC during its four-year existence. Eighty-two percent (actually 82.4) of the manpower came from 19 Afro-Asian states, in particular India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ghana. Thirteen so-called Western nations contributed men, including Canada, Ireland, Sweden, and Norway. The Congo contributed men after August 1962. ONUC reached a peak of 19,828 men as of July 7, 1961 and a low of 3,297 on June 1, 1964. Fatalities totalled 235—34 of natural causes, 75 by accident, and 126 in action.

Participation: Financial contributions.—Total U.N. expenditures, 1960–1964: $368,200,000. The United States contributed 35.9 percent or $132,299,000; this included $10,317,622 for airlift service provided but not charged to the United Nations. As of December 31, 1972, a total of $82,092,029 in assessed contributions was unpaid; $6.6 million of this amount was in a special account for those arrearages left by the Republic of China on October 25, 1971. Of the 54 countries still in arrears, 13 have indicated they will not contribute and 19 have made no payments. More than 55 countries have paid their assessed contributions and are not in arrears. In addition, 14 nations paid $37,753,015 in voluntary contributions to the Congo special account. The costs of airlifts by Canada and the United Kingdom as well as the United States are included in this category.

Participation: Contribution of other assistance.—The USSR paid the cost of airlifting Ghanaian troops, equipment, and supplies: $1.5 million. Switzerland

provided aircraft to assist in transport of food and other supplies. Ethiopia provided Kano airport in south Nigeria as an enroute stop in the support airlifts throughout the operation. Italy provided accommodations for the U.N. support facility at Pisa.

UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP), MARCH 27, 1964–DATE

Created by the U.N. Security Council: S/RES/186(1964), 4 March 1964.

Purpose.—To prevent fighting and maintain and restore law and order.

Executed by Secretary-General who appointed the commander of the Force and created the Force in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The Secretary-General is to report periodically to the Security Council on the operation of the Force.

Financing.—S/RES/186 (1964) provided that all costs would be met by the governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General would also accept voluntary contributions. The Secretary-General set up a special account for the Cyprus Force. Expenses to be reimbursed have been worked out in agreements between the Secretary-General and the contributing country; the arrangements vary in each instance.

Withdrawal.—UNFICYP was created for a three-month period, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, to undertake interposition and law and order functions. It has since been extended for three or six-month periods by the Security Council. It would seem that termination would depend on the action or inaction of the Security Council, the withholding of consent by the Government of Cyprus, or the satisfactory conclusion of its functions. Any one or all of these factors might bring about a withdrawal, although the first would seem to be a necessary ingredient regardless of the latter. UNFICYP's current extension carries it through December 15, 1973.

Participation: Contribution of troops.—Eight countries have provided the major portion of contingents to UNFICYP which had a peak strength of 6,411 on June 8, 1964. On November 13, 1971 the Force had fallen to 3,119 persons. In approximate rank of contribution, contingents are provided by the following countries: United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Austria, and Australia. New Zealand provided civil police support for three years. A substantial part of UNFICYP is composed of contingents from the United Kingdom, one of the permanent members of the Security Council. Troops from a permanent Council member were used in this instance because of their proximity to the location (they were already stationed on Cyprus), their previous function (they had been providing the interposition and law and order functions), and their already existing bases and equipment.

Participation: Financial contributions.—From March 27, 1964 through December 31, 1972 UNFICYP has cost a total of $152.8 million exclusive of extra costs to governments providing contingents, which are estimated to have exceeded $45 million through December 31, 1972. The Secretary-General received voluntary contributions from 50 member states and four non-member governments during this eight-year period totalling $128.6 million, including miscellaneous income. The United States and the United Kingdom have been the largest financial contributors. The United States has contributed $62,954,000 through the end of 1972. This includes $1,254,107 in airlift services not charged to the United Nations.

APPENDIX IV

[From *Orbis*, August 1973]

Breaking the Deadline on U.N. Peacekeeping

(By Seymour Maxwell Finger)

The framers of the United Nations Charter worked in an atmosphere strongly influenced by the 1930's and World War II, particularly in writing Chapter VII. It was natural, therefore, that the kind of action most precisely detailed in the Charter was enforcement action as set out in Article 42 and subsequent articles of Chapter VII. The threat then uppermost in the minds of the five major wartime allies constituting the five permanent members of the Security Council—China, France, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States—was the resurgence of German or Japanese militarism. An indication of this frame of mind can be found in the "transitional articles," Numbers 106 and 107 of the Charter.

But the situation has changed radically since 1945. First of all, there was an open split in the allied coalition, thus removing a precondition of effective coercive action against outlaw nations. And the Germans and Japanese have directed their great energy and competence to economic growth, rather than militarism. Second, rapid decolonialization, desirable as it has been, has resulted in a proliferation of small new nations and has brought with it a degree of instability in what is loosely called the Third World. Third, both of these developments have taken place in the setting of nuclear stalemate, which has deterred big wars but has not prevented small wars. Thus, the threat of small wars getting out of hand became a major concern of the international community, particularly as represented at the United Nations.

With a few exceptions, notably Korea and Viet Nam on the one hand, and Hungary and Czechoslovakia on the other, the kind of peace-threatening situations the world has encountered and will continue to encounter are local conflicts, not directly involving the forces of major powers. UN peacekeeping actions in such situations have been of three types: (1) In quarrels and border disputes between small states, as in the Arab-Israeli conflict, a UN mission could supervise a cease-fire and serve as a buffer. (2) In situations like the Congo and Cyprus, where internal strife threatened to draw in outsiders, the UN has helped to restore order and stabilize the situation. (3) In situations such as in Greece at the end of the 1940's and Lebanon in 1958, the UN helped to spotlight subversion and infiltration.

In more than a dozen such situations since World War II, the United Nations has helped to prevent or end fighting and maintain a truce. But except for Korea, it has not undertaken the more ambitious task of stopping aggression or enforcing the peace. It was unable to take such action, for example, in Hungary, Viet Nam, Laos or Czechoslovakia. In no case has it ordered any forces into coercive action under Article 42, nor have any forces for this purpose been put at its disposal under Article 43 agreements.

This does not imply that UN peacekeeping in disputes involving the superpowers is out of the question. On the contrary, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 the Secretary-General was prepared, if requested by the Soviet Union and the United States, to observe compliance with the agreement on missiles. This was an important matter to the United States, and Khrushchev indicated a willingness to agree. However, Cuba refused to go along, and other methods of verification were used.

The record of these UN actions over the past two decades shows that United Nations peacekeeping, as distinct from enforcement action, has been primarily an *auxiliary to political measures*—an extension of political action to contain conflict and set the stage for peaceful settlement. The purpose has not been to apply military force in the classic sense of coercing the parties to submit to the UN's will. It has rather been to install a political presence which carries out certain

ancillary police duties. The late Adlai Stevenson put it in a nutshell in an article for *McCall's* in October 1964, entitled "No Mission But Peace; No Enemy But War."

The essential function of UN peacekeeping is far more political than military. From this fact, a number of consequences follow. First, the mandate of a peacekeeping force must be compatible with the national security interests of the countries concerned, including the troop-contributing countries. Second, the consent of the host government or governments, on whose soil the force is to be stationed, is deemed necessary for entry of the force. Third, the force should not resort to violence beyond what may be essential to defend itself and to carry out its primarily political mission. Finally, all principal parties to the conflict must be willing to cooperate with the force.

Peacekeeping operations cannot stop the parties from fighting if they are absolutely determined to fight, but where there is a willingness to observe a cease-fire, UN forces or observers can give each side reassurance that the other side is also being observed for honest performance.

Among the major powers, the United States has been the most consistent supporter of UN peacekeeping. But though U.S. support has usually been crucial, it is equally true that these operations were made possible only through the support of middle powers that were prepared to provide personnel and financing—such countries as Canada, Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Yugoslavia, Ireland and the Scandinavian states, to name a few.

For more than twenty years the Soviet Union asserted that there was no such thing as voluntary peacekeeping. Its expressed doctrine held that the only legitimate role for UN forces under the Charter was the enforcement action governed by Article 42.[1] In practice, the Soviets have been more realistic. They have supported or acquiesced in virtually all peacekeeping operations, although they refused to pay the assessments for the Congo and UNEF—thus bringing on the Article 19 crisis of 1964–1965[2]—and have insisted, along with France, that the Cyprus operation be financed by voluntary contributions.

SOVIET-U.S. NEGOTIATIONS

In recent years there have been signs that the Soviets might be prepared to bring their position more into line with the realities of today's world. They have shown some willingness to negotiate guidelines for future peacekeeping operations. This has been the basis of negotiations in a Working Group of eight (now enlarged to thirteen)[3] at the United Nations as well as for informal discussions between Soviet and U.S. representatives. Since some question has been raised by other countries concerning American discussions with the Soviets, these should be seen in their proper context.

Our first efforts after the Article 19 crisis in 1964 and 1965 were to work with the smaller and medium-sized countries on behalf of peacekeeping principles supported by a majority of UN members but strongly opposed by the Soviets: for example, (1) that the financing of peacekeeping is a collective responsibility, with the costs to be apportioned among the members by the General Assembly in accordance with Article 17 of the Charter; (2) that, while the Security Council has *primary* responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly may initiate cooperative action if the Council is stymied by a veto; and (3) that, while authorization of peacekeeping operations is the responsibility of the Security Council or the General Assembly, the Secretary-General should—in the interest of efficiency—be responsible for day-to-day control of operations.

However, the smaller and medium-sized countries displayed little will to bring the issue to a head against the strong opposition of the Soviets. More and more they signaled that the United States should attempt to work out some sort of understanding with the Soviet Union, without sacrificing the principles the majority considered essential. It was with this background and the hints of some flexibility in the Soviet attitude that we began, early in 1970, discussions aimed at breaking the deadlock.

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[1] UN General Assembly, Statements by P. Morozov (USSR) to Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Mar. 6, 1968.

[2] Adlai E. Stevenson, "The UN Financial Crisis," *Department of State Bulletin*, Nov. 9, 1964, pp. 681 ff.

[3] The original eight members of the Working Group were France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt and Mexico. In 1972 Argentina, Brazil, India, Japan, Nigeria and Pakistan were added, while Mexico withdrew.

Both in the Committee on Peacekeeping (the Committee of 33) and in informal discussions with the Soviets, we tried to set aside any disputes over Charter interpretation whose solution was not essential to progress. For example, although the United States continues to believe in the residual authority of the General Assembly to authorize voluntary peacekeeping operations in situations where the Security Council is unable to act, the USSR still does not accept this principle; so we agreed to begin discussions on guidelines for operations authorized by the Security Council. The United States has always held to the Charter principle (Article 24) that the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security. Moreover, it is obviously a less unwieldy body than the General Assembly of 132 members. Nevertheless, the United States would not foreclose completely a new resort to the General Assembly—as in the Middle East crisis in 1956—if in a dangerous situation the Security Council were again stalemated by a veto.

The Soviet-U.S. discussions concentrated on three essential areas:

Financing.—While the observers in Kashmir and the Middle East are financed on a basis of collective responsibility in the United Nations budget, the larger operation on Cyprus depends on voluntary contributions—a system which is inequitable and undependable. Although fifty-two countries, including two nonmembers of the United Nations, have contributed to UNFICYP since its inception, currently such contributions are being made by only nineteen countries out of a total membership of 132. Among the larger members, the most notable omissions are France and the Soviet Union. This is obviously not in accord with the principle of collective responsibility of members. Moreover, it is hardly dignified for the Secretary-General to have to go hat in hand to governments in order to carry out an operation to keep the peace.

Preparation.—A second essential is to assure that personnel and facilities for any peacekeeping force are available and ready on short notice. To this end member countries should be encouraged to earmark in advance military personnel and facilities for use in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Establishment, Command and Control.—Third, there must be agreement on procedures which are both politically realistic and operationally practical for the establishment and direction of UN operations after they are authorized.

The first two of these three main problems presented no major persistent obstacles. On financing, the United States made it clear at the beginning of the bilateral talks that a *sine non* must be a commitment that, if guidelines were agreed, all permanent members of the Security Council must pay their fair share of all future peacekeeping operations carried out in accordance with those guidelines. The Soviets objected to specific emphasis on the permanent members but were willing to include a paragraph requiring *all* members to pay unless the Security Council decided on some other method of financing. There were other differences on the respective authority of the Security Council and the General Assembly in apportioning expenses, but these did not appear to constitute a major obstacle.

On preparations, agreement was reached on the desirability of having member states earmark in advance military personnel and units for potential UN service, and maintaining an up-to-date roster of available personnel and equipment. There was some disagreement on who would request the information from member states and who would maintain the roster, but these problems were largely overcome. It was tentatively agreed that the Security Council would request the Secretary General to inquire of member states what personnel, supplies and equipment they might be prepared to make available for operations authorized by the Security Council, and that he would maintain the roster on behalf of the Council. During meetings in 1971 I urged that we recommend such a step in our report to the Twenty-sixth Session of the General Assembly, and most members of the Working Group agreed. But the Soviets strongly opposed the idea of moving ahead on one aspect of the guidelines until agreement was reached on all aspects. Since we were working by consensus, this step could not be taken.

The real stumbling block was the matter of setting guidelines on how peacekeeping operations, once authorized by the Security Council, would be established, commanded and controlled. Such procedures must be both politically realistic and operationally practical. They must take account of the interest of all parties concerned, must be impartial in both intent and application, and must be calculated to induce the cooperation of contending parties as well as those states on which the operation depends for manpower and funds.

This meant, in the U.S. view, an acceptable and workable balance of responsibilities between the Security Council and the Secretary-General. The Security

Council has ultimate authority over such operations. It should have the power to authorize the operation, determine the key provisions of its mandate, and exercise broad political supervision over it. The Soviets, however, have advocated extending the authority of the Security Council to encompass *operational* decisions—for example, regarding size and composition of the force and designation of the commander—as well as determination of the method of financing.

The discussions have thus focused on where to draw the line of operational responsibility so as to take account of both political and operational necessities. As the United States sees it, the Security Council has a legitimate interest in assuring political responsiveness, but effective management requires that the executive authority of the Secretary-General not be impaired. The Soviets, on the other hand, urged application of Articles 43–48 of the UN Charter, giving command and control to the Security Council and its Military Staff Committee or a special committee of the Council. Problems arose because the Charter provisions in Articles 43–48 were designed for enforcement action rather than peacekeeping.

Despite this fundamental difference in doctrine, bilateral negotiations were carried on intensively over many months, in a good working atmosphere with a minimum of doctrinaire statements and no bombast. Gradually differences were narrowed, and it began to appear that agreement might be reached on an acceptable delegation of operational responsibilities by the Security Council to a special committee and the Secretary-General.

The high point of the negotiations came in June 1970. Ambassador Lev Mendelevich, my Soviet counterpart, was then leaving New York for a new assignment in Moscow. To sum up the results of five months of intensive discussions the U.S. delegation drew up a Working Paper incorporating points of agreement as well as certain suggestions for resolving remaining issues. It was not an agreed paper; however, it represented a serious U.S. effort to meet Soviet concerns expressed during the negotiations. Mendelevich, while clearly unable to commit the USSR at that point, was sufficiently interested in our paper to request five separate meetings with me for clarification during his final week in New York.

We hoped then that a Soviet response would be forthcoming by August or September. Unfortunately it did not come for thirteen months, too late for progress at either the Twenty-fifth or the Twenty-sixth Session of the General Assembly. But the documents submitted in the spring of 1972 to the Secretary-General by the USSR and the United States[4] show some of the progress made during the first half of 1970. Though important and substantial differences remain, I believe a further effort to close the gap is in order.

The Soviet document, which is a response to the U.S. Working Paper and incorporates many parts of it, represents a step forward in the following ways:

(1) It acknowledges something the Soviets long denied, i.e., that *voluntary* UN peacekeeping operations are a legitimate enterprise under the Charter and are something quite different from the enforcement actions envisaged in Article 42 of the Charter.

(2) While urging prompt resumption of negotiations on agreements for the provision of military contingents under Article 43 of the Charter, the Soviet document would give signatory countries the right to decide on the occasion of each operation whether or not such contingents may be used, instead of being obliged to make contingents available to the Security Council "on its call," as provided in Article 43. Thus the agreements would not differ in essence from those made by the Secretary-General since 1956; the difference would be the participation of the Military Staff Committee in negotiating them. In Paragraph IV (4), the document stipulates that contingents may also come from member states of the UN that have *not* concluded Article 43 agreements.

(3) There is no rigid insistence on a "troika" composition of UN forces. Instead Paragraph IV (5) states,

> it is necessary to make all efforts to reach an equitable balance in the composition of the participants in the operation so that no State Member of the United Nations is excluded from participation because of its political, social and economic system or because of its belonging to a certain geographical region. At the same time, the following considerations should be taken into account: the necessity to receive the consent of the host-country, the state of readiness and fitness for the conditions of the situation of furnished contingents, military personnel and facilities, and the necessity to ensure good working relations of the participating personnel with other parties concerned and among themselves.

[4] UNGA Documents A/8669, Mar. 30, 1972, and A/8676, Apr. 3, 1972.

The acknowledgment that contingents and the commander must be acceptable to the host country—a major advance—resulted in part from the fact that the Special Committee has an Egyptian rapporteur who made this point emphatically during Working Group discussions.

In connection with this third point, the agreement concluded between North Viet Nam and the United States in January 1973 to end the war in Viet Nam is relevant. To date no UN peacekeeping operations have included troops from Warsaw Pact countries. In certain cases the United States would have made strong objection. On the other hand, when a UN peace observation group was being organized to observe the mutual withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces after their conflict in 1965, the Secretary-General invited two Warsaw Pact countries to provide military observers, but after some hesitation they declined. The peacekeeping operation established in Viet Nam this year, however, includes Polish and Hungarian as well as Canadian and Indonesian components. Of course, it is not a UN operation (neither North nor South Viet Nam is a UN member, and North Viet Nam has rejected UN involvement) ; it is under the International Commission for Control and Supervision. Yet, if communist units are acceptable in this peacekeeping operation there may well be others—including UN operations—where they could be used.[5] This may help to facilitate Soviet-U.S. negotiations. Also, the end of the fighting in Viet Nam and the very fact that a significant peacekeeping operation has been established there should serve as a stimulus toward agreement on UN peacekeeping guidelines.

The United States, on its side, took certain steps forward to meet the Soviets:

(1) As noted earlier, despite its position that the General Assembly has residual authority to recommend peacekeeping operations when the Security Council is blocked by a veto, the United States agreed to begin the search for guidelines by discussing operations authorized by the Council.

(2) The U.S. proposal[6] acknowledges the ultimate authority of the Security Council over all aspects of a peacekeeping operation, an important point for the Soviets. It also proposes the establishment, in accordance with Article 29 of the Charter, of a Council Committee to be consulted by the Secretary-General on important operational matters; e.g., the choice of a commander, the provision of military observers and contingents, and the preparation of directives for the operation. This would give member states, and notably the Soviet Union, a significantly greater involvement in the conduct of UN operations than in the past, and corresponds to an earlier Soviet proposal.

On many significant points the two documents are parallel; for instance, the establishment of a Special Committee, the establishment and maintenance of a roster of available military observers and contingents, the role of the host country, and the ultimate authority of the Security Council. These parallel points are, in substantial part, the product of the negotiations. Yet the remaining gaps will not be easy to close.

The most serious problem is Soviet insistence that decisions in the committee may be taken only if *all* permanent members of the Security Council agree to them. This extends the veto, which can now be applied to the Council's authorization of an operation, to "*all aspects*" of its establishment, direction and control. Indeed, under Paragraph VI (3) of the Soviet document, if any member objects to any activity by the field commander, he must suspend such activity unless or until it is approved by the committee or by the Council—in both of which the veto would apply. Under such conditions one would have a peacekeeping vehicle with a weak motor, powerful brakes and many hands on the steering wheel, as in Viet Nam.

The. U.S. proposal would allow any member who disagrees with the way the Secretary-General or the commander is carrying out an operation to raise the matter in the committee or in the Council. The obvious difference is that, under the U.S. proposal, a majority would be needed to *stop* the action, not to sustain it.

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[5] In July 1973 Canada withdrew its components, which will be replaced by Iranians. An important element in Canada's decision was frustration at the inability of the Viet Nam peacekeeping force to carry out investigations opposed by the Poles and Hungarians. This might give the Canadians second thoughts about that element of their proposal on UN peacekeeping (described below) which would extend the veto to the Military Staff Committee of the UN Security Council. The numerous violations of the cease-fire in Viet Nam also illustrate another characteristic of peacekeeping; i.e., that it will work only so long and to the extent that the parties are willing to stop fighting.

[6] Annex to UNGA Document A/8676, Part II, Apr. 3, 1972. Working Paper given to the Soviets in June 1970 contained everything in this document plus certain additional concessions offered on a *quid pro quo*, "package deal" basis. That Working Paper is still classified as the Soviets have not yet accepted the package.

Thus, one side fears arbitrary or unjust action by the commander or the Secretary-General contrary to its interests; the other fears paralysis of an operation after its launch. Both fears can be supported by rational argument, but that leads nowhere. Can the differences be reconciled? Before discussing that question, it might be useful to examine the views of other states as expressed during the past year.

VIEWS OF OTHER STATES

Secretary-General U Thant, in September 1971, noting the progress made and the gaps remaining, appealed to member states to strive for "the required degree of political accommodation."[7] This sentiment was reflected in General Assembly Resolution 2835 (XXVI) which, *inter alia*, "stresses the importance of achieving agreed guidelines to enhance the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations" and "requests Member States to make available to the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations before 15 March 1972 any views or suggestions which they may wish to submit to help the work of the Special Committee."

An examination of responses by member states[8] reveals several points of interest.

(1) There were relatively few replies from the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Outside Europe, substantive suggestions came only from Canada, Japan, Brazil, Upper Volta, Madagascar and the United States. This pattern of response appears to reflect a general tendency in the last five or six years for most countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to stand aside, either in resignation or in the hope that the major powers will work out some sort of agreement.

(2) Most respondents echoed U Thant's call for "the required degree of political accommodation" and stressed the crucial importance of peacekeeping to the success of the UN.

(3) Only the Warsaw Pact countries and France upheld the view that peacekeeping operations should be carried out in conformity with Articles 42–48 of the Charter; i.e., that the Security Council should assume supervision over all the operations it orders. The French reply, however, calls for "a rapproachement of the various positions" and the Soviets, as I have indicated, do not appear impervious to negotiation and accommodation.

These general observations aside, we can examine certain individual member replies to see whether and where they might help toward accommodation.

Yugoslavia's reply is of interest not only because of its content but also because Yugoslavia is one of the more active leaders of the "nonaligned" and has participated substantially in past peacekeeping operations. Yugoslavia affirms that "peacekeeping operations should become an integral part of the over-all efforts aimed at strengthening the role and efficacy of the United Nations and at realizing its primary role in the area of preventing the threat to peace, eliminating actions of aggression and promoting peaceful solutions of conflicts." It calls attention to the Third Conference of Nonaligned Countries, held in Lusaka, Zambia, in September 1970, which reiterated "the interest and support of the nonaligned countries for the strengthening of peacekeeping machinery, and speedy solution of this problem."

Yugoslavia advocates that all thirty-three members of the Special Committee be enabled to contribute to the negotiations instead of leaving matters to the Working Group. Most nonaligned countries, however, have remained passive in face of the deadlock. Perhaps most significant in the Yugoslav submission is the statement that the "complex issue of peacekeeping operations . . . demands that all solutions be fully based upon the respect for the *principles* of the Charter and that they serve the realization of United Nations *purposes*." (Emphasis added.) This position, which appears to be supported by a majority of the members submitting replies, stresses that peacekeeping guidelines must be *consistent* with the Charter and need not in all instances be found specifically in Articles 42–48, which deal with *enforcement* operations (the latter a position taken by France).

The Nordic states—Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden—which have been outstandingly active participants in UN peacekeeping, also urge the need for political accommodation on guidelines consistent with the Charter. Further, they recall that each of them maintains standby forces available for UN peacekeeping, as set forth in GA Documents A/AC 121 of March 29, 1968.

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[7] Introduction to the *Annual Report of the Secretary-General*, Document A/8101, Addenda 1–17, September 1971.

[8] UNGA Document A/AC121/1.15, Apr. 17, 1972, and Addenda 1, 2 and 3 thereto.

Only two countries make an issue of the 1950 "Uniting-for-Peace" resolution (GA Resolution 377 (v) of November 3, 1950), which outlines procedures for possible General Assembly action if the Security Council fails to take action to maintain international peace and security in a given situation. Upper Volta favors it, and Madagascar maintains "the greatest reservations."

Japan's reply shows an increased interest in UN peacekeeping and makes certain interesting proposals: (1) On questions where a consensus has not been achieved, the Committee of 33 should submit to the General Assembly "an interim report in which the major views expressed in the course of its deliberations" are set forth, along with a report on those matters on which consensus has been reached. (2) Peacekeeping operations should be defined by adding a new article to the Charter. (3) The People's Republic of China should be invited to participate in the committee's deliberations "at the earliest possible opportunity." These suggestions have borne little fruit. The first has not been acted upon; the second is unlikely, in view of the difficulties of amending the Charter; and China has shown no inclination to participate.

Japan also emphasizes the residual authority of the General Assembly to undertake peacekeeping operations if the Security Council fails to act. While stating that the power of command resides in the authorizing body—the Security Council or the General Assembly—it suggests that "in order to take prompt action to cope with fluid and changing situations and thus to achieve effective results for peacekeeping operations, *the Security Council should delegate limited power to the Secretary-General and/or some subsidiary organs to be appointed by the Security Council (or the General Assembly)*." (Emphasis added.)

One of the most interesting suggestions is made by the Netherlands. The Dutch, like most members, feel that there should be a delegation of authority from the Security Council to a subsidiary organ or committee and to the Secretary-General. Their new idea would be to delegate to the chairman of the subsidiary organ some aspects of the day-to-day management of peacekeeping operations because "experience . . . has shown how important it is that advice, approval and decision should be available to the UN field commander within 24 hours." The Secretary-General, in the Netherlands view, should have the responsibility for administrative and logistic support and should have at his disposal a complete and up-to-date roster of military personnel, contingents, facilities and services which members of the United Nations are willing to provide for peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security Council.

This proposal might be regarded as a compromise between those who, like the Americans, consider that the Secretary-General—as an individual—can provide faster and more efficient management than a committee, and the Soviets and French, who want the Council or its committee to run operations. Also, it would protect the Secretary-General from political repercussions if certain members are dissatisfied with the management of a particular operation. The Netherlands does not specify whether the proposed chairman would rotate monthy, as in the case of the Military Staff Committee, or serve for a year or for the duration of the mandate of a particular peacekeeping operation, as is true of most UN committees. From the standpoint of efficient operation, the latter would clearly be preferable; however, this is a negotiable point.

Canada did not reply last spring but in October submitted a memorandum which was obviously the product of extensive thought and labor.[9] It has two principal new ideas:

(1) It proposes that the Security Council "delegate its responsibilities for operational direction and control to the Military Staff Committee" (MSC). This would be a major departure from current and past practice, under which the Secretary-General has performed such functions. It should not be seen simply as a concession to the French and Soviet view, although it happens to correspond with it. Canada has consistently given generous support to UN peacekeeping, having provided components for all major operations. Canadians I have known have expressed annoyance that previous Secretaries-General have taken important decisions without consulting principal troop contributors; the change of the UNFICYP (Cyprus) commander in 1970 is an example. They have also expressed concern at the lack of military expertise at UN headquarters.

(2) A Headquarters Staff, which would include "a substantial element of professional military expertise," would supply expert advice and information to the MSC and would issue specific orders and instructions to the commander of

[9] UNGA Document A/S PC/152, Oct. 4, 1972.

a mission in implementation of the Security Council mandate and for the conduct of the operation, subject to periodic review by the committee.

The Canadian proposal would retain for the Secretary-General responsibility to conclude, "with the authority of the Security Council," agreements with contributors for the provision of troops, equipment or services as well as Status of Forces agreements with host countries. Also, the Secretary-General would, if so requested by the Security Council, compile a list of potential commanders for United Nations peacekeeping missions and lists of types of units, equipment and services which member states might make available for peacekeeping operations.

Thus, the Canadian proposal offers a number of ideas for bettering the preparations for peacekeeping and for delegating operational responsibility from the Security Council to a somewhat less unwieldly body. In my view, however, it has two serious defects.

First, the MSC, being composed of military men, may not have the political sensitivity required for directing peacekeeping operations. These are not combat operations, and much of the day-to-day guidance required by a field commander involves political judgment. From that standpoint a subordinate body of the Council established under Article 29 of the Charter—as proposed by the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, the United States and others—would be a more appropriate vehicle. The MSC would still be available for advice on military matters, as would the Headquarters Staff proposed by Canada.

Second—and more crucial—the Canadians propose that the MSC, "with membership augmented by the addition of States contributing to the peacekeeping force," would proceed by majority vote, "*including the concurring vote of its permanent members.*" The phrase I have emphasized would extend the veto by any single permanent member to all operational decisions—in the same way as the Soviet proposal. The prospects for stalemate are only too obvious.

An excellent review of the range of proposals was made by the United Kingdom representative to the Special Political Committee in his statement of November 24, 1972,[10] He listed the types of decisions that must be made—authorization, aim, duration, strength and composition of the force, selection of the commander, the directives to be given him, financing, and management. He then recommended that a large chart be drawn up showing the various suggestions on how decisions would be made with respect to each of these questions, and that the Committee of 33 and its Working Group examine each in turn, rather than argue general doctrine.

It should become much easier to continue the discussion if it could only be recognized that inflexibility or cumbersome procedures are certain to hamper the effectiveness of any operation; that a range of options exists for methods of decision-taking; and that the choice of method may vary according to the nature of the decision to be taken—whether it concerns, for example, policy control or day to day management. There is clearly more than one way in which progress can be made; but would it not help efforts to achieve what might be called institutional compromise if the Special Committee and its Working Group could investigate the possibility of applying to each point in the range of questions for decision—the upper scale of the slide-rule, so to speak—a suitable prescription from the lower scale, the range of options?

The range of options, referred to as the "lower scale," would include the Security Council, the MSC, an Article 29 committee, the Secretary-General, the commander, and various combinations thereof.

With reference to how a subordinate organ (committee) of the Council would function, the British posed the following questions:

(1) Should the organ be:
  (a) executive, that is a decision-taking body in its own right, or
  (b) consultative, giving advice to the Secretary-General, or
  (c) on some points one, on others the second?
(2) Should actions or proposals in connection with a peacekeeping operation:
  (a) be made subject to the express approval of the organ, or
  (b) be only subject to disapproval, or
  (c) be a mixture of the two according to circumstances?
(3) Should the decision or advice of the organ be expressed:
  (a) by voting of some sort or
  (b) by the chairman, acting at his discretion but in its name?

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[10] UNGA Document A/SPC/SR 844, Nov. 24, 1972.

(4) If voting of some sort is required, should the organ operate:
  (a) on a basis of unanimity, or
  (b) only with the agreement or absence of objection from the 5 Permanent Members, or
  (c) by simple majority, or
  (d) by majority, but with the view of the Permanent Members being given some special consideration?
(5) If the agreement of the 5 Permanent Members is required, is it:
  (a) agreement on a *challenge* to an act or proposal that is involved, or
  (b) agreement on the act or proposal itself: in other words, should any one Permanent Member by the mere challenging of an act, however arbitrarily, be able to frustrate it—a sort of reverse veto?

RESUMPTION OF SOVIET-U.S. NEGOTIATION?

These views and analyses expressed by various states during 1972 represent a significant contribution to the understanding of the key problems. Along with the chart to be prepared by the Secretariat, they should help the Committee of 33 and its Working Group in their 1973 deliberations. Yet I remain convinced that a breakthrough leading toward agreed guidelines can only be achieved through preliminary Soviet-U.S. negotiations. If these two powers can agree, there should be little difficulty in achieving general agreement; if not, experience has shown that all efforts will be stymied.

In such bilateral Soviet-U.S. negotiations, the British analysis should be most helpful in dividing the problems into negotiable components, and the Netherlands suggestion of delegating authority for day-to-day operations to the chairman of a committee established under Article 29 might provide an avenue of compromise—given the fact that both the USSR and the United States, along with most members, accept the concept of such a committee. Certain ideas might also be drawn from the Canadian proposal.

The bilateral discussions should include the negotiation of a list of decisions, distinguishing between those that would require consultation and those that could be left to the field commander, the Secretary-General, the chairman of the committee, or some combination of these. Surely the Soviets, with their advanced and complex economy, realize that day-to-day management decisions can be made more rapidly, flexibly and efficiently by a single executive than by a committee.

Perhaps agreement would be facilitated if the aim were for a given *trial period*—say, the present term of Secretary-General Waldheim. The Soviets have repeatedly expressed their great confidence in him. Could they not agree to leave certain executive functions to him, subject to consultation with the committee but not to veto? They could always have recourse to the Security Council in the event that he unjustly ignored the strongly-expressed views of an important permanent member—a most unlikely event in view of Waldheim's background and temperament and his indelible memory of the Article 19 crisis which plagues the financial health of the UN to this day.

Among those decisions requiring consultation by the Secretary-General with the committee might be the following: composition of the force; choice of a commander; agreements with the host country and with countries providing contingents; periodic review of the operation. Until the contingents are chosen, the committee—like the Military Staff Committee—would consist of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Then representatives of states providing major parts of the force would be added to the committee to fulfill its role during the balance of the operation.

A critical problem would still be the prospect of a veto blocking necessary action in the committee, as in the Canadian proposal. In order to avoid such a stalemate, the guidelines should provide for a majority vote to sustain a proposed action by the commander or the Secretary-General, *with no veto*. In the absence of a favorable majority, the action could not go forward. (In the Council, of course, the veto would remain, as provided in the UN Charter.) This is not to imply that voting would be customary; on the contrary, I would expect that virtually all questions could be resolved by the commander, the Secretary-General, or by committee agreement rather than voting. The provision for majority voting would be there as a safety valve, to be used when urgent and necessary action would otherwise be blocked or too long delayed.

There is a Soviet precedent for this distinction between voting in the Security Council and an operating body. In connection with the proposed establishment

of an International Disarmament Organization, which would report to the Security Council and make recommendations for action, the Soviets accepted the principle of majority voting in the two inspection and control commissions of the IDO. Speaking in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on December 4, 1946, Foreign Minister Molotov stated:

> It should be quite obvious that the question of the well-known principle of unanimity operating in the Security Council has no relation at all to the work of the commissions themselves. Consequently, it is entirely wrong to consider the matter in the light that any government possessing the "right to veto" will be in a position to hinder the fulfillment of the control and inspections. The control commissions are not the Security Council, and therefore, there are no grounds whatsoever for saying that any power making use of the "right to veto" will be in a position to obstruct the course of control.

Unfortunately, there has been no agreement on establishing the International Disarmament Organization. Nevertheless, Molotov's statement suggests that the Soviet position on the veto in operating organs reporting to the Security Council may not be graven in stone.[11]

Such majority voting involves a risk for the United States and other permanent members as well as the Soviets. With the changing pattern of representation in the Security Council, the United States might well find itself in a minority on certain decisions of the committee. Indeed, on the last four votes of the Security Council on major controversial resolutions, the United States has been in the minority. It vetoed resolutions on the Panama Canal Zone, the Middle East (July 1973) and Rhodesia and abstained on the resolution adopted by the Council in April 1973 condemning Israeli attacks on Lebanon. But to my mind the risk of paralysis by extension of the veto to the committee is graver than the risk that the United States might be outvoted. Furthermore, both the Soviet Union and the United States, as permanent members of the Security Council, would have a veto over the *authorization* of any operation or its *extension*.

The United States should also reconsider its opposition to any use of the Military Staff Committee in voluntary peacekeeping. It is true that the Charter concept of the MSG envisaged enforcement action rather than peacekeeping, but the Charter does not forbid such use either. For more than two decades the MSC's work has been limited to one *pro forma* meeting of about five minutes every two weeks. Yet the MSC includes many experienced military men whose advice to the Security Council on military matters might occasionally be useful. As the Soviet document now reads, it appears likely that the USSR would rely principally on a committee set up under Article 29 to assist in the establishment and conduct of peacekeeping, leaving relatively little for the MSC to do. Still, if acceptance of Paragraph II (2) of the Soviet document, with its reference to the MSC, would bring agreement, and if the Soviets would on their part forgo the veto in the committee, I do not see that any harm would be done. The MSC might turn out to be quite useful on certain military aspects of peacekeeping; e.g., cooperating with the Secretary-General on arrangements for standby forces, including any training that might be required. Many officers I have known who served on the MSC during the last seven years have been men of unusual ability.

All of the foregoing steps toward reaching agreement would be conditioned on a firm understanding that all members of the UN, and especially the principal contributors, would commit themselves to pay their fair share of future peacekeeping operations.

There are numerous arguments made for not bothering to close the gap. In the State Department many experienced officials have felt that the *ad hoc* procedures used in the past have been reasonably effective; they fear that changes made to accommodate the Soviets are bound to impair flexibility and efficiency. They believe that, when the need arises—perhaps in connection with an Arab-Israeli settlement—guidelines will be worked out. Their argument implies that the Soviets will be less rigid in the face of an actual situation than in the establishment of general guidelines. They may be right. However, the guidelines the Soviets submitted to the Big Four discussions on the Middle East were no more flexible than those they set forth in the UN document cited above.

It is also argued that the will to use UN peacekeeping is more important than procedures. I would agree, if it is a case of either/or. I suspect, however, that the absence of agreed guidelines, the crippling deficit from past operations, the lack of any assured financing for future operations, and the absence of any sys-

[11] It should also be noted that, in Security Council elections for judges of the International Court of Justice, there is no veto (Statute of the ICJ, Article 10).

tematic preparation for peacekeeping have had a demoralizing effect which in itself affects the willingness of countries to rely on UN peacekeeping. Consequently, I feel that every effort should be made to restore the momentum of negotiations on guidelines, using the Netherlands, Canadian, Soviet and American documents along with other proposals.

A Soviet-U.S. agreement, of course, would not guarantee acceptance by the entire membership of the U.N. Action would then have to be taken by the Working Group of the Committee of 33, the Committee itself, the General Assembly, and the Security Council. As in the case of the various arms control agreements negotiated in Geneva, some modification may be brought in by other members and accepted. But these arms control agreements have also demonstrated how prior U.S.-Soviet accord gives tremendous impetus toward general acceptance on peace and security issues.

Based on both formal and informal statements I heard from representatives of many states during the years I represented the United States in the Committee of 33 (1966–1971), I am convinced that a Soviet-U.S. agreement, if it can be achieved, would be widely welcomed by other members and would pave the way toward generally agreed guidelines, thus providing a firm foundation for launching and financing future UN peacekeeping operations. A review of the written statements submitted in the spring of 1972 and the oral statements in the General Assembly last fall, with their constant emphasis on the need for a political accommodation, strengthens this conviction.

The People's Republic of China has thus far declined to participate in the work of the Committee of 33 and has submitted no written statement in response to the request in General Assembly Resolution 2835 (XXVI). Its eventual position must, therefore, be a matter for conjecture. Yet the PRC has paid its share of the cost of the UN observer missions in Kashmir and the Middle East, both established before it took its seat at the UN. If, as appears likely, a Soviet-U.S. agreement obtains general support among the nonaligned countries—perhaps with minor modifications—there is nothing in the record of the PRC to date to indicate that it could sabotage such a general accord.

It is, therefore, my conviction that Moscow and Washington should get serious about peacekeeping negotiations—serious enough to challenge their own doctrines, to involve the highest officials in both capitals, and to make a strenuous, sustained effort to close the gap. Otherwise, an opportunity to strengthen the UN in one of its crucially important functions may be lost.

27-616—74——8

APPENDIX V

International Peace Academy Seminar II, "U.N. Peacekeeping," Remarks by Vice Adm. John M. Lee, April 8, 1972

Presentation and Discussion of Problem II: "Article 47—Military Staff Committee—Its Functions and Problems"

Our problem in this session is to discuss the Military Staff Committee. To set the stage, I have been asked to briefly remind you of what was the original concept of the MSC and how it ran promptly into a brick wall, to summarize the MSC's state during the remainder of its existence up to the present, and to note some current positions on its proper role. Finally, I will subject you to a few entirely personal views on the MSC's possible utility that may serve as one of our points of departure for subsequent discussion.

Original concept.—We should keep in mind the concepts that lay behind the charter articles referring to the MSC. Clearly it was to be an approximation of the combined Chiefs of Staff of the Second World War. It was to be formed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council. Under the MSC, U.N. field commanders would be like World War II theater commanders, on the order of General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters Europe. It was with this rather grandiose concept of a great military alliance, ready to conduct a great classic war against some new Hitler, that the military terms of the charter were drafted, and that the initial MSC sat down to do its work.

Early history.—Initially, the MSC was taken entirely seriously. Getting it started was on the agenda of the very first meeting of the Security Council. At the 23rd Security Council meeting, in February 1946, after considering the MSC's report on its rules of procedure and statute, the Security Council adopted a directive to the MSC, reading, in part, as follows:

> * * * Council * * * direct the Military Staff Committee, as its first task, to examine from the military point of view the provisions contained in Article 43 of the Charter * * *.

The MSC was given substantial resources for its work. From the United States, as probably the largest example, there were three very senior officers, one each from Army, Navy and Air Force, supported in New York by over 40 staff officers, plus appropriate other ranks, and backed up by the Joint and Service Staffs in the Pentagon.

This strongly staffed MSC worked on the Article 43 study a year, without agreement. In February 1947, the Security Council indicated impatience, and set a deadline of April. The MSC met that deadline by submitting an unagreed paper. Of 41 points which they had considered, 16—and these were central issues—showed conflicting views, in some cases, several conflicting views.

In brief, the splits showed that the United States wanted very large forces of all services; Russia, England, France and China wanted smaller forces. All but the Soviet Union wanted comparable, but not necessarily identical, force contributions; the Soviets wanted identical contributions. The Soviet Union held that the forces must be based at home except when called up; the United States opposed that restriction.

The motivations of the splits are fairly obvious. There was a developing mutual distrust between East and West, a meticulous effort to insure that the other side did not obtain a mechanism for creating military advantage, and a Soviet effort to get United States forces back home.

It is conventional to say that the MSC failed in the first great assignment. Actually, it's quite clear that the real problem was not in the nature or in the mechanism of the MSC, or in the level of military or diplomatic skills there. The problem was that the grandiose collective security concept of the charter was unworkable—certainly amidst the divergences and suspicions of the budding Cold War.

We might remember, in this connection, that the Security Council did no better with the problem. It discussed the MSC report in June and July 1947. It resolved none of the questions. Finally, the Council simply buried the report, and there it remains.

And during the ensuing 25 years, the Military Staff Committee has been resting on its oars.

Current status.—Of course, in this generation of inactivity, the MSC's capabilities have atrophied. I mentioned the large staff resources of the MSC of 1946–47—nearly 50 U.S. officers full time, plus much external help; today no single U.S. officer spends full time, or any substantial amount of his time, on the MSC. I am nearly certain the same is true of the other MSC members, and of the Secretariat.

The MSC has become a name and a set of charter provisions. It is not a functioning agency, nor could it now function. Of course it could be made functional—it has its charter constitution; given staff, housing and equipment, it could go to work.

But until that is done, the MSC exists only formally—its biweekly meetings are brief, standardized sessions by men whose work is elsewhere.

Current views.—It is interesting that within the last month, the USSR and the United States have submitted their divergent peacekeeping views to the Secretary-General. From these submissions, we can gather their positions on the MSC.

Ambassador Bush of the United States, in his letter of March 30, accepts the possibility of using individual MSC delegates as experts, available for advice in national delegations to a proposed Council Subcommittee, but he sees no present role for the MSC itself. In this, he makes a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, current consent-type peacekeeping, and, on the other, enforcement action under Chapter VII. Only for the latter, in some indefinite future, does the United States letter see the MSC playing its charter role.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, in Ambassador Malik's letter to the Secretary-General of March 17, does envision a current place for a live MSC. The Soviet letter, like the American, contemplates a Council Subcommittee, called a Committee on Operations. But, in addition, although most of the functions seem to go to the Committee on Operations, the MSC, and the MSC provisions of the charter, are specifically made part of the Soviet-advocated peacekeeping mechanism.

I am not aware of recent formal statements of position of other interested nations on the subject of the MSC, in the Committee of 33, its Working Group, or elsewhere. There were corridor rumors at one time of a Canadian proposal in the matter, but to the best of my knowledge, that has not surfaced.

So the matter rests, for the time being, in the official arena.

Personal view.—Let me take a moment now to give you an entirely, and I must emphasize this, entirely personal view of the proper role for the MSC. I offer it to you as a straw man; you may wish to shoot at it in the discussion period.

My concept hangs from two convictions.

The first is that the military professionalism of the UN peacekeeping business is not good, that it could be greatly improved by a working professional organism at U.N. headquarters, that this improvement would be well worth making regardless of decisions on the other disputed aspects of planning and controlling peacekeeping, and that such enhanced professionalism would become even more important if the U.N. gets again involved in more combatant types of consent-type peacekeeping (à la Congo) and a fortiori if it ever moves toward enforcement action under Chapter VII.

My second conviction is that the MSC is the correct spot to build this improved professionalism into the headquarters strucure. Why resurrect the MSC? Because, as a charter agency, it has potential status. It reports, basically, to the Security Council. If persuasive to the Security Council, so that the Council adopted its positions, those positions would become authoritative. Military advisers, or other non-charter agency, would lack this leverage, and therefore lack effectiveness.

The professional functions that I would propose to get out of the MSC involve both planning and operations.

In the planning—or preparedness—side, there are literally hundreds and thousands of man hours of staff work that could be done: drafting doctrines and standards, prescribing and conducting training, inspecting, establishing logistic and communication arrangements; all the problems of standardization, preparation and readiness.

In the operations area, the MSC and its staff could usefully do urgent reconnaissance in crisis, could recommend the composition and size of required forces, could provide some highly trained staff officers for the first weeks of a new force, could advise on deployment locations and on operational instructions to the force, could work out logistics and communications, etc. It would be of enormous utility in crisis to have U.N.-trained military resources available at U.N. headquarters for immediate reconnaissance, and for professional recommendations to the Secretary-General on military requirements for peacekeeping forces for the specific task in hand. Further, it would be invaluable to have similarly available a few key staff officers for the field commander, fully trained up on headquarters thinking, and ready on hours notice to help get the commander's staff started in the field. One of the profoundest lacks of the United Nations, in the military field, is a capacity for such fast, efficient, ad hoc military reconnaissance, evaluation, force planning, operational planning, and execution—all tailored to a specific, developing, crisis situation.

A working MSC could greatly improve performance during this critical, initial phase; it could also help substantially with ready professional appreciation, advice, and action throughout the operation.

I would not conceive of the MSC as being in a chain of operational command. Basically, it would work for and report to the Security Council. But the Council could and should direct the MSC to support the Secretary-General. With such a task assigned, I believe the MSC could establish its acceptability and utility in the Secretariat. Since its role would be advisory, both to Council and Secretary-General, the MSC would not be immobilized by the veto; it could if necessary submit split views.

Such MSC functions would require a relatively substantial military staff. While it would be possible to resurrect the post-war system of having the staff work done by national delegations, I am convinced from my own experience that much better, and much more international, work could be done if an international military staff, composed of officers and men seconded to the MSC, not members of delegations, did the basic staff work.

Conclusion.—In conclusion, let me make a final point. The last thing I want to do is sound as though I were proposing another panacea for all the diseases of peacekeeping. As you all know, library shelves groan under such blueprints—some of them sensible and some wild. Still speaking only for myself, I do not know how to improve peacekeeping in any fundamental way without a political consensus on the subject which can be subscribed to by the permanent Council members, and by a healthy majority of all other states in the General Assembly.

Given that consensus, however, I would argue that a revived MSC, with a sound and integrated international staff, organizationally positioned as prescribed in the charter, but also under orders from the Security Council to support the Secretary-General in peacekeeping matters—such an MSC could make badly needed contributions to planning and preparing for peacekeeping, and to the execution of peacekeeping operations, at whatever level of intensity they might take place.

The MSC, in such circumstances, would raise the military professionalism of peacekeeping operations. Let me now turn you over to General Rikhye, who in his long and honored career as an international soldier has suffered many a time and oft from the U.N.'s lack of military professionalism.

APPENDIX VI

[From *Vista*, May–June 1970]

The Perils of Peacekeeping

(By Maj. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye[1])

One of my first experiences as a UN peacekeeper was a shocker. It came during a local crisis that flared up between UN Emergency Force troops and some armed Arabs. As Chief of Staff, I made a strong protest to the local Egyptian authorities. To my utter amazement, an Egyptian official with whom I had developed a warm friendship suddenly accused me of being a Jewish stooge! When I complained to Brig.-General Amin Hilmy el Tani, Chief of Staff UAR Liaison Staff to UNEF, he shrugged and said quietly.

"We have a saying in Arabic, that if you get in between two people having a fight, you must be prepared at least to have your shirt torn." This Arabic saying was to prove true time and time again.

I had no notion at all that I was intended to become a peacekeeper, when I was appointed in command of India's Second Contingent to UNEF in Gaza in October 1957. The Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, General K. S. Thimyya, advised me to ensure that the various components of the contingent, the infantry battalion, logistic units and personnel for Headquarters UNEF fitted smoothly within the framework of the international force under the command of the Canadian Lieutenant General E. L. M. Burns.

On arrival in Gaza I found everyone cordial and helpful. India enjoyed friendly relations with all the countries contributing troops to UNEF, and particularly with Egypt, the host country. The international staff was cooperative and friendly. My Contingent settled down happily and soon distinguished itself at work and play. General Burns spoke favorably of us and when the Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, came to spend Christmas 1957 with UNEF, he was impressed with our performance.

Three months later I was apponted Chief of Staff to General Burns in recognition of the outstanding contribution of my Contingent to UNEF. Thus I became a UN peacekeeper without warning or preparation.

A peacekeeper must at the outset establish good working and personal relations with all his job brings him into contact with. I was fortunate to have done so already as Contingent Commander. I was soon to learn, however, that under the pressures of work and stress of crisis these good relations sometimes can be strained to the limit. A peacekeeper attempting to resolve a crisis with a logical and unbiased approach must be prepared to have his efforts flounder on illogical and emotional blocks. Often the parties involved in a crisis have a very basic approach to peacekeepers who they feel are either for them or against them and that there can be no neutral position. Playing the third party role thus has its inherent problems. The United Nations operations in the Congo were a typical example where many experienced peacekeepers and negotiators working strictly within the framework of directives received from Headquarters United Nations became casualties of bias and slander. ONUC's (United Nations Operations in the Congo) mandate required it to assist in unification of the Congo. Moise Tshombe of Katanga, Antoine Gizenga of Stanleyville and other tribal leaders each in turn accused the UN of acting as a colonial and fascist power. Those of us who represented the UN in the field were labeled racists and anti-African. But in spite of all slanderous charges leveled at him, a peacemaker must learn to shrug them off, never losing sight of his objective, i.e., resolution of the crisis through peaceful means. If this means meeting with those who slander him, he must not hesitate to do so.

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[1] Maj. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye (Indian Army Retired) is former Military Advisor to the U.N. Secretary-General and presently Chairman of the International Peace Academy Committee.

After the initial indignation at being unfairly accused had passed, I developed a skin thick enough to withstand the sharpest barbs. My work often led me to call on Congolese leaders, a duty I had to perform regardless of what they had or had not said about me. They never refused to see me and my perseverance often showed positive results despite the pessimism voiced by some diplomatic observers.

Regardless of the truly international attitude of UN Staff and members of a force or observer missions, many diplomatic representatives and local leadership identify personnel and contingents with the attitudes of their national leaders. When Patrice Lumumba was removed from office as Prime Minister by President Joseph Kasavubu and when later Lumumba was brutally murdered in Katanga. President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana spoke out in his defense and against his political enemies. As a result the highly trained and well led Ghana Contingent in the Congo became suspect and was accused of acting contrary to United Nations orders. Nothing could have been further from the truth. Similarly when the late Jawaher Lal Nehru spoke out in the Indian Parliament against coups d'etat and in defense of Patrice Lumumba, the constitutionally appointed Prime Minister Rajeshwar Dayal, the Indian Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and I became suspect. After Dayal left the Congo, it was deemed in the best interests of ONUC operations that I, too, as an Indian, should return to New York. Even the greatest international civil servant, Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the United Nations, did not escape the charge of being a stooge of the West. Our world organization made up of nation states has yet to develop into a fully operative transnational institution. Those of us who have been privileged to participate in this evolutionary experiment in international relations hopefully have not acted in vain.

A peacemaker has to work long hours over long periods. He has to be ready for sudden travel, his friends understanding of last minute theater and dinner cancellations, and his family able to accept with equanimity the complete disruption of normal home life. During a crisis there are no regular hours for meals or sleep and a peacemaker sleeps and eats when he can.

Dag Hammarskjöld believed in keeping close contact with the field, and I made eleven trips during the first year of ONUC operations. Always on arrival at Leopoldville after a two night trip across the Atlantic Ocean and the continent of Africa, I would go into conference immediately. These meetings might last several days and through the better part of most nights. Often I would be required to rush back to New York, with vital information for the Secretary-General. On one such occasion, after the removal of Patrice Lumumba from office by President Joseph Kasavubu, Dag Hammarskjöld cabled urgently for my immediate return to Headquarters. The Security Council was to meet and he needed more information before making a statement. There were no regular flights out of Leopoldville for the next several hours. ONUC's resourceful Chief Administrative Officer John Oliver requisitioned a U.S. Air Force plane to fly me to France. We left at 2:30 A.M., made a refueling stop at Wheelus Air Force Base, Tripoli, Libya and arrived the next morning in France. A USAF military police car rushed me to Orly in time for the noon Air France flight to Idlewild. Within minutes of my arrival at the UN I was in the Security Council, sitting behind the Secretary-General, rapidly whispering my report into his ear.

When the situation in the Congo stabilized somewhat the tempo of work slowed but only slightly. Then came other new crises: West Irian, Yemen, Cuba and so on. The same sense of urgency prevailed, the sudden travel and work around the clock continued. The recently retired Foreign Secretary of India, M. G. Desai, on a visit to the United States was to dine with me the evening the Security Council decided to dispatch an observer mission to Santo Domingo. After the Council meeting U Thant decided that I should leave immediately with a small staff to set up the mission. I only succeeded in keeping my dinner date through the courtesy of Eastern Airlines who managed to give us reservations on their last flight leaving New York at midnight.

A peacekeeper must accept some risk to life and limb. While every possible precaution is taken to minimize such risks a peacekeeper can hardly be effective if he sits indoors all the time, safe and sound. He must visit in the field, he must see his associates often in remote and inaccessible places and he should meet leaders of parties involved in the crisis. All this requires him to travel by different modes of transport and in aircraft of obscure little airlines. Even when the UN maintains its own aircraft it is sometimes difficult to service them to required standards due to climate in the area and often primitive conditions prevalent at airfields. On one occasion sudden heavy rains swamped the Yugoslav remote out-

post at the southern end of the International Frontier on the Sinai plateau overlooking the Gulf of Aqaba. As soon as the storm lifted I decided to visit the post, to see for myself what could be done to alleviate the damage done by the flash flood. It would have taken two days to get there by road, so I decided to fly to a makeshift airstrip in the adjacent lake bed. The only aircraft immediately available was a single engined Otter. Just then this type of aircraft was not too popular; only a few weeks before there had been a fatal accident in which both the crew had been killed. Since I insisted on flying, the Commander of the Canadian Air Transport Unit, Wing Commander Anderson, decided to fly me there himself. It turned out to be a fortunate decision.

After concluding our visit at the Yugoslav camp we took off over the edge of the Sinai plateau and towards the turquoise blue Gulf of Aqaba. Anderson had the Otter's nose up to gain height. Suddenly the engine spluttered, coughed and then died completely. Anderson jerked the nose down into a steep glide, veered sharply toward the Yugoslav camp and made a forced landing on the first open patch of baked mud he found. But for the experience and coolness of this officer, results could well have been otherwise.

The primary role of a peacekeeper is to stop violence and negotiate critical situations peacefully. These attempts are not always successful and violence does sometimes break out. There was such an unsuccessful attempt on my part and heavy fighting did break out. The Congolese authorities suspicious of Ghana's role in the Congo had ordered the Ghanian ambassador out of the country, threatening force if he refused to go. ONUC provided protection to several diplomatic embassies, including the Ghana Embassy, at their request. While I debated with the Congolese on the inadvisability of physically removing an ambassador, contrary to all diplomatic procedures and immunities, the Congolese security police and Army attempted forcibly to evict Ambassador Welbeck. This attempt, however, was successfully blocked by ONUC troops around the Ghana Embassy.

Just as Nkrumah's personal emissary, British Major General Harry Alexander, and I concluded arrangements to bring Welbeck to ONUC headquarters, prior to departure of Accra, sudden heavy fighting broke out between the Congolese forces and ONUC troops. The Congolese high command could not be reached, so Alexander and I decided to go to the Embassy, get Welbeck out and put an end to the fighting. It was dark already and the Congolese troops, about a thousand of them, fired with wild abandon at anything that moved. They were spread across the suburb containing many beautiful villas housing the embassies. Tracer bullets from Congolese armored cars and machine guns flew in every direction. Alexander and I decided to abandon the jeep and crawl to the embassy. Bullets whizzed over our heads as we inched our way through the mud. Since ONUC troops were centered around the Ghana Embassy a mile away we wondered why the Congolese were under such heavy fire. Then it dawned upon us that in the dark, the Congolese were firing at each other. It was impossible for us to reach the Embassy on our stomachs so we decided to risk hailing the nearest Congolese troops. We sprinted toward an armored car nearby, announced ourselves to the officer and asked him to request his superiors to stop the fight. We were much relieved when he agreed to relay the message. He could have just as easily shot us. Minutes later a jeep with headlights blazing came charging towards us with irate UN Security officers demanding to know where we had been. They had lost us in the dark. In the jeep headlights Alexander and I looked at each other. We were both such a mess, caked with mud from head to toe that despite the gravity of the situation we burst out laughing. But we were lucky to be alive and we finally succeeded in getting Welbeck out unharmed.

Despite the many frustrations, even the slightest improvement in a crisis situation is immensely rewarding. It makes up for all the hard work, tension, mental and physical fatigue, opposition and slander and, not to say the least, the risk to one's career and possibly life. It is this sense of achievement that provides the essential spark necessary in continuing efforts to resolve crisis.

The United Nation peacekeeping operations have varied in size and form in different situations. There were the observer type of operations in the Middle East, the United Nations Truce Supervisor Operations, and in Kashmir the United Nations Observer group in India and Pakistan. But UNEF, the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East, was the first attempt where military units were employed neither to fight nor to enforce but maintain peace and quiet through peaceful means. After the 1956 war in the Middle East, UNEF was established to enable all foreign forces to withdraw, to clear the Suez Canal and finally

to patrol the Armistice Demarcation Line in the Gaza Strip, the International Frontier along the Sinai and Sharm el Sheikh overlooking the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

In the course of ten years, UNEF proved its effectiveness by reducing incidents between Israel and UAR to minor ones. In fact, both sides were able to develop their lands right up to the two foot wide ditch marking the Armistice Demarcation Line and were able to carry out their other pursuits in peace. Conciliation, however, never got under way and there was never a serious attempt to resolve the political crisis. It was evident that as long as UNEF stood between Israel and the UAR there would be peace. UNEF, established by a General Assembly resolution, could only be introduced into the area by consent of the parties involved. Israel refused to accept UNEF on territory under its control; the Force could finally only be established with the consent of the UAR on its territory. When the UAR withdrew that consent on May 17, 1967 the United Nations had little choice but to withdraw the Force without being in any doubt as to the grave consequences. It became apparent from this experience that when a peacekeeping operation succeeds, attempts at conciliation should not be shelved. When U Thant reported to the Security Council that as the consent of the UAR to retain UNEF had been withdrawn, he had no other alternative but to withdraw the Force, neither the General Assembly that had established the Force in the first instance nor the Security Council adopted any measures to avoid the dangers of war forewarned by U Thant. Thus the United Nations, for the very reasons that precluded it from developing conciliatory efforts to resolve the critical situation in the Middle East, proved helpless to prevent war in the area that flared up in June 1967.

West Irian presented another situation. After several years of hostilities the Netherlands and Indonesia agreed that the future of the territory would be decided by a referendum. First, hostilities between the two countries would cease. The Dutch authorities and forces would withdraw, turning over the responsibility to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority and a United Nations Security Force for a period of six months, after which Indonesia would assume all responsibility including that of organization of a referendum. On the evening the Security Council gave its approval to this agreement, the Secretary-General sent me to the territory to arrange cessation of hostilities. With the help of 25 observers from several countries, RCAF and USAF aircraft, I succeeded in concentrating Indonesian forces in the territory at selected areas, halting all fighting. A contingent of about 1000 was requested from Pakistan and its six companies were deployed in West Irian by October 1962, supported by USAF aircraft and Netherlands naval vessels manned by the Pakistan Navy. The UN brought peace to the island and subsequently turned over the responsibility for the territory to Indonesia by due date and departed.

The United Nations had already been in the Congo since July 1960 when it faced its greatest challenge. This proved the largest operation undertaken by the organization since its inception. Besides the enormity of the problem confronting it in the Congo, the operation caused a major political and financial crisis within the United Nations, jeopardizing the development of its peacekeeping ability. The Congo involved great sacrifices from its staff and personnel, including the extreme sacrifice of its Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld. The main facts of the Congo imbroglio are sufficiently known, though unfortunately the situation in the Congo and the United Nations involvement are often portrayed in a very misleading manner. Harassed by mutiny, lawlessness and the collapse of public order and services from within and afflicted by foreign intervention, the young Republic of the Congo appealed to the United Nations for help. The Security Council committed the organization to respond to this appeal and thus made the organization not only a guarantor of law and order and the protector of the Congo against external interference from any source, but also an advisor and helper of the newly independent state which virtually had had no preparation for independence. By filling, in the space of a few hours, a very dangerous vacuum created by the Belgian withdrawal, the urgent danger of a great power confrontation in the heart of Africa was avoided and the territorial integrity of the Congo preserved. In referring to the Congo operation U Thant once said that by this action of the UN the new leaders of the Congo were given at least a short breathing spell in which to find their feet. He added that despite its shortcomings which must be judged in the light of the fearsome complexity of the problem, ONUC was a promising and encouraging experiment in international responsibility and action.

The blue helmets of the UN troops became a symbol of law and order and world authority throughout the Congo. It was under ONUC protection that the Congo-

lese parliament met at the Lovanium University outside Leopoldville (now Kinsasha) to resolve its difficulties and elected Cyril Adoula, as the first constitutional Prime Minister since Patrice Lumumba. ONUC support finally succeeded in reuniting the Congo.

The United Nations became involved in Yemen when, at the request of the UAR and Saudi Arabia, it established an observer mission there. Here the United Nations observed along the Yemen border with Saudi Arabia and brought comparative quiet to the area. The operation was somewhat different from the usual observer type operation as, in addition to observers on the ground, UNYOM included a company of Yugoslav Reconnaissance Battalion with ability to cover wide areas across country and an RCAF Caribou flight for aerial reconnaissance and logistic support. With reduction in fighting the UAR and Saudi Arabia, who paid for the operation, did not ask for an extension beyond September 14, 1964.

The United Nations is currently involved in the Cyprus crisis. On March 4, 1964 the Security Council entrusted the Secretary-General with the responsibility of contributing to the restoration of normal conditions in Cyprus and authorized him to establish a force. As the United Kingdom, under the Treaty of Guarantee at the request of Cyprus, already had some 7000 troops deployed on the island, the United Nations for the first time could organize a force on a planned basis and by April 1964 the United Nations Force in Cyprus—UNFICYP—became operational. It has had its share of difficult and dangerous situations and has met various emergencies squarely under command of able and experienced Generals P. S. Gyani and K. S. Thimyya of India (who died there on duty) and Martola of Finland. Presently Major General Dewan Prem Chand of India, who distinguished himself in Katanga, is in command.

UNFICYP has done much to restore life to normal and to create confidence in the civilian population as to its neutrality and ability to restore law and order. Although the task of mediation has yet to be concluded satisfactorily, if the Greek community regains unity and the present encouraging trends towards mediation between the Greek and Turkish communities continue, the future for Cyprus looks hopeful.

In order to avoid any involvement in the current big financial issue concerning the United Nations peacekeeping, the Security Council introduced a novel system of financing this operation. Financing has been on a voluntary basis and therefore cannot be considered ideal.

The United Nations has by now considerable experience in peacekeeping operations and a variety of military observer and truce supervisory undertakings. They have all been different in nature although they have shared certain common characteristics. On the basis of further experience acquired in the Congo and West New Guinea, Secretary-General U Thant has said:

". . . All three were improvised and called into the field at very short notice; all three were severely limited in their right to use force; all three were designed solely for the maintenance of peace and not for fighting in the military sense; all three were recruited from the small powers and with special reference to their acceptability in the area in which they were to serve; all three operated with the express consent and cooperation of the states or territories where they were stationed; and all three were under the direction and control of the Secretary-General, acting on behalf of the organs of the United Nations."

Recent experience in Cyprus and in the withdrawal of UNEF in May, 1967 has only confirmed that most of these facts are still commonplace.

Judging by standards of normal national military establishments, UN forces have suffered from certain inherent weaknesses. The improvised nature of their establishment caused shortcomings. Personnel in units recruited at short notice do not always fit in with requirements. The units are sometimes hastily prepared and assembled, and suffer inevitable shortcomings. Commanders and staff have met for the first time and have had no previous experience with the units. Logistic arrangements have had to be made hurriedly and supply pipe lines established with heavy dependence for transportation on Member States. There were initial difficulties with signal communications until UN-owned equipment was deployed. Wide differences in training and tradition, in weapons and equipment, in language and staff experience, in pay and allowances have always been present. There have been problems of discipline and morale and last, but by no means least, the difficulty in command and staff work where every decision has serious political implications. Member States can, however, take pride in the fact that these difficulties which at first appear insurmountable have been offset by the pioneering spirit of the officers and men who make up their nation's contingents within the United Nations Force.

Desire to improve and strengthen these operations is hampered by lack of agreement between the great powers on control, direction and financing of peacekeeping operations. Meanwhile, in an effort to meet a growing wish to improve these operations on the part of many states who desire to participate in future UN peacekeeping missions, the International Conference on UN Security Forces as a Means to Promoting Peace held in Oslo in February, 1964 and the UN Peace-keeping Working Level Meeting held in Ottawa in November, 1964 have provided useful forums for an exchange of views and for pooling of knowledge on the technical aspects of these operations.

The late Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, had recommended advance preparation in his Annual Report to the 15th General Assembly. He said:

"It is an entirely different matter if governments in a position and willing to do so, would maintain a state of preparedness so as to be able to meet possible demands from the UN. And it is also an entirely different matter for the Organization itself to have a state of preparedness with considerable flexibility and in the hands of a qualified staff which quickly and smoothly can adjust their plans to new situations and assist the Secretary-General in the crucially important first stages of the execution of a decision by the main organs to set up a UN force, whatever its type or task."

As the Secretary-General of the UN continues to be made responsible for the conduct of these operations, he must be provided with suitable assistance. In view of the existing political difficulties, the Military Staff Committee, established by the Charter and primarily responsible for providing military expertise, has been unable to function. In the absence of such device, the Secretary-General was obliged to include military expertise within his executive office, which proved a useful link between the Secretary-General and peacekeeping forces. This arrangement has been discontinued.

Canada, amongst a few other countries, had already taken the initiative of placing troops for service with the UN on a standby basis. Following the Congo experience, and others which had preceded it, Scandinavian countries have planned in a common venture to establish a standby force consisting of personnel and units designed to meet diverse requirements. The example of these countries is now being followed by several others who have either already made firm arrangements for standby units or are considering it. These pragmatic developments should meet further requirements on the basis of past experience. Realizing the need to prepare commanders and staff for the Congo operation, Dag Hammarskjöld had approved a Field Training Program for civilian and military earmarked for service with ONUC. But before this project could get underway, ONUC became involved in the fighting in Katanga and after Dag Hammarskjöld's tragic death it was no longer possible to pursue these plans. So far only the Nordic countries have established their own institutions to prepare staff and observers, with noticeable results.

From experience gained, the capability of acceptable countries in their contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping operation can be judged. Careful examination leads to deciding type of personnel, units, equipment and ordnance that should be requested from Member States. A flexible bloc system has been developed. When an observer group is to be established, an organization for a minimum observer unit is decided upon, including its equipment and other logistic requirements. The overall organization is then evolved on this bloc system based on consideration of basic factors such as the nature of terrain and essential services available within the area of operations. A headquarters is added again on a bloc pattern, and the overall logistic and administrative support provided. When it is decided to establish a force, a quick study of tasks and factors involved determines its organization. A bloc pattern for every 1,000 men helps in planning and arranging a detailed organization.

It is obvious that improvised peacekeeping forces are not the best and it would be ideal to have a permanent standing force. In his speech to the Harvard Alumni Association on June 13, 1963, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, stated that a permanent standing UN Force would not be practical at the present time even thought he admits that the world should eventually have an international police force. When during 1964 a serious financial crisis developed in the UN, the General Assembly appointed a committee of 33 nations to study

control, organization, conduct and financing of peacekeeping operations and submit proposals to it to help resolve the crisis. The committee under its skillful Chairman, Cuevas Cancino, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the UN, decided to first study military observer operations established or authorized by the Security Council. The working group formed to examine details after years of hard work has yet to resolve basic differences. Meanwhile Member States, non-government organizations and concerned individuals are anxious to find means to improve and strengthen the UN peacekeeping ability.

It is, however, noteworthy that both disarmament plans submitted by the U.S. and USSR include a progressive establishment of a UN peacekeeping force with the implementation of disarmament. While a degree of success has been achieved in narrowing the gap between the views of the two power blocs, more time and effort is needed to reach a stage when it would be practical to establish a permanent peacekeeping force. Until then, the world organization has only the choice of following the pattern of establishing UN peacekeeping operations along the lines already set on the basis of past experience.

Establishing a UN Force for an operation is not a simple proposition. Once the political decision has been taken, the emergency of the situation will set the pace for the action. Until now, improvisation has been the only resort for organizing a Force when the need is urgent. Some preparation can only be done in situations such as in Cyprus, when circumstances allowed some time between the resolution that created the Force and the moment it became operational. The peacekeeping machinery is not equipped with the means for planning in advance, thus permitting a smooth launching of the operation.

Most of the shortcomings would be eliminated by the establishment of a permanent UN Force. However, political difficulties place this project too far away in the future. In the meantime, it is necessary to use ingenuity together with the accumulated experience to produce a mechanism through which the organization would be able to act when called upon to maintain peace.

The UNA–USA National Policy Panel on Multilateral Alternatives to Unilateral Intervention contained in a brochure "Controlling Conflicts in the 1970s" deserves serious study and implementation of many of its pragmatic recommendations to strengthen the UN peacekeeping ability, including narrowing the gap in the views of the great powers and especially between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Experience has proven that UN peacekeeping operations need great power approval and the support of at least one super power. All human endeavors should be channeled toward reducing differences and obtaining a consensus opinion between the great powers to strengthen UN peacekeeping machinery.

Over a year ago a group of concerned individuals, with whom I am happy to be associated, decided that there was a real need to supplement UN efforts by initiating specialized educational programs by and for international personnel. No skill is more necessary to twentieth century man than the ability to settle conflicts without resorting to war or oppression. A committee of which I am the chairman has been formed to develop pilot programs at the Austrian Diplomatic Academy in Vienna this summer to bring together groups of international officials, diplomats, military personnel and scholars to define their own understanding and suggest new concepts which will lead to the structuring of an International Peace Academy. It is intended that such an Academy located in a neutral country would develop programs in different regions preparing large numbers of men and women for a peace role in the future.

At 25—the UN can take pride that despite difficulties, peacekeeping operations have proven useful and, to a great extent, successful. This success depends largely on the operational efficiency of the Force. Quick results can only be achieved if the Force is capable of reaching peak efficiency shortly after its inception. To assemble officers and units of many countries into an effective peacekeeping force demands previous planning and a great amount of preparation which can only be done if the good will and efforts of each country are cemented together by a coordinating element. Twenty-five years of experience have taught us what is needed. Exchanges of ideas and knowledge such as the Oslo and Ottawa Conferences have outlined one possible solution. It is now up to all Member States to produce the proper tools for maintenance of peace.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 4, 1973]

On the Nature of the U.N. Peace Force

(By Indar Jit Rikhye) [1]

A new international peacekeeping effort has been launched in the Middle East. For the second time, a United Nations Emergency Force has been introduced. The first force was established in 1956 following the Suez War and remained in the area until it was withdrawn in May 1967. Generally, the first force (and now the second) was intended to separate the antagonists, provide a buffer, establish cease-fire lines and supervise them and help create peaceful conditions that lead to meaningful negotiations. There are, however, a number of differences between the two forces stemming from their respective backgrounds.

The first was established by the General Assembly at the height of the cold war on an international initiative developed by Lester Pearson of Canada and Dag Hammarskjöld, the United Nations Secretary General. This force was intended to: (1) interpose between Anglo-French-Israeli and Egyptian forces; (2) protect the canal clearing operations; (3) follow up the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from the canal area and of Israeli forces from the Sinai, and later, (4) supervise the armistice demarcation line in the Gaza Strip and the international frontier along the Sinai and insure free passage of shipping through the Strait of Tiran at Sharm el Sheik.

The new force has been established on Egypt's request to supervise a cease-fire "demanded" by the Security Council with the backing of the four great powers (the fifth, China, abstaining from the vote). The United States and the Soviet Union, having entered an era of détente, have strongly supported this peacekeeping effort and were in fact the architects of the Security Council Resolutions of October 21 and 23 in connection with the cessation of hostilities and the resumption of negotiations approved in Resolution 242 of November, 1967.

For the present, the new force is required only to supervise the cease-fire. It is interesting to note, however, that the United Kingdom has already suggested another peacekeeping force when the situation reaches the negotiation stage for a more durable peace. There is no reason why the force cannot be enlarged to perform this function.

On a suggestion by the United States, Egyptian and Israeli military personnel have met to decide on details of establishing the cease-fire lines and their supervision. A Security Council resolution to return to the line of the first cease-fire on October 22 has been agreed to in principle by all the parties involved. These are indeed encouraging signs, but the acrimonious debates in the Security Council between the Arabs and the Israelis and recently between the United States and the Soviet Union do not promise an easy future.

There are a number of questions in regard to the U.N. force which must be resolved; they relate to the yet unfinished deliberations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping established by the General Assembly in 1965.

There is first the question of the role of the Secretary General. The present peacekeeping efforts have been authorized by the Security Council, and the Secretary General has been asked to be the chief executive officer for the forces. The Soviets insist, as they have in the past, on Security Council control of peacekeeping, a demand which arises from their concern to eliminate past weaknesses in peacekeeping operations and to provide for their own veto authority. But surely the United Nations has learned from past experience that great-power consent, and especially that of the super powers, is vital for the success of peacekeeping operations. The difference between the West and the Soviet bloc is more in detail than in principle. This too can and should be resolved.

The Secretary General is trusted, and he is assisted by an able and experienced staff. The Secretary General and his staff, however, do need the guidance, supervision and assistance of the council to perform their functions well. No army in the field has even been run successfully by a committee. Therefore, responsibilities for day-to-day operations, including any urgent decisions that have to be made when there is no time to consult with the council or a committee that may be appointed by it, must be assumed by the Secretary General. Answerable to the council, he must conform with the over-all policy decided by them. These

[1] Indar Jit Rikhye, a retired Indian Army major general, was formerly military adviser to the United Nations Secretary General and the last commander of the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza. He is now the president of the International Peace Academy.

policies should be stated in precise operational directives to the force and in the status-of-forces agreement with the host nations and presented to the council for its approval.

The second major issue concerns the composition of the force. A peacekeeping force is an instrument of peaceful diplomacy and as such is highly political. The participation of the key elements involved in the conflict is therefore vital. Past peacekeeping forces for one reason or another have been notable for their exclusion of the Socialist bloc countries, with the exception of Yugoslavia, with the result that these nations have mistrusted the United Nations peacekeeping system. The present rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union already recognizes the need of their cooperative endeavors.

Because the vital interests of these two powers representing different ideologies continue to have a potential for a dangerous confrontation, as already witnessed on October 25–26, care should be taken to avoid ground for any repetition of such a threat to world peace. It may be wise to exclude NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, as suggested by the United States, in addition to the troops from the great powers, but it remains important and would prove helpful to include representation of the two super powers, the two blocs and the nonaligned nations to give them a sense of participation and intimacy with the operation at all levels. This will insure their assistance when needed in logistics, communications, and transportation as well as their political and diplomatic cooperation.

Thirdly, the administrative and logistic demands of a peacekeeping force remain identical with those of war with the exception that there is little ammunition expenditure, and casualties, if any, are but few. Because of the ad hoc nature of peacekeeping operations, they lack preparation and are more complex. This force has the initial advantage of support from the British base and the United Nations force in Cyprus, but it must rapidly establish its new logistic organization in the field of operations.

Personnel detailed for peacekeeping assignments, admittedly, do not run the same risk of life as would troops sent to fight a war, but they do make serious commitments to maintain peace and are ready to make any personal sacrifice. Therefore, they deserve the same care and support as they would if being sent into battle. The United Nations must recognize this fundamental issue and, accordingly, establish a suitable organization at all levels of command for these crucial services.

Last and not the least is the recognition at all times that peacekeeping operations, though military in form, are highly political in nature. The daily contacts with the host governments, embassies of participating member states, and other interested nations and organizations make heavy demands on a commander for which he has neither sufficient authority nor time. Peacekeeping operations demand a quick response that cannot be always met through headquarters in New York. While a commander can cope with the military part of his responsibilities, a parallel political representation is needed to attend to political and diplomatic problems and matters pertaining to international law.

APPENDIX VII

[From Congressional Record, Nov. 9, 1973]

World Peace and the Need for the United Nations

(Hon. Donald M. Fraser)

Mr. Speaker, the importance of the United Nations to world peace and security was convincingly reiterated in a letter to the editor in the New York Times of November 7. Mr. Murray B. Woldman, staff consultant for Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, notes that during the Middle East crisis, the United Nations provided an indispensable forum through which superpower confrontation and the risks of widened violent conflict were effectively scaled down.

Too often, U.S. foreign policy places the United Nations near the bottom rung of the priority ladder. The result, too often, is a weakened United Nations blamed unfairly for failure to solve problems which were submitted to it too late to find a workable solution. The lesson we should learn from the United Nations' performance in the Middle East crisis, as Mr. Woldman points out, is that—

> If our foreign policy-makers can demonstrate a greater commitment to the United Nations and if we can turn increasingly to it to forestall problems rather than solve them, we just might find that independence of action is not nearly as important as defusing conflicts before they explode in our faces.

The full text of Mr. Woldman's letter follows:

Letter to the Editor:

Since the China vote in 1971, we have heard a great deal of criticism of the United Nations and its inability to deal effectively with threats to world peace and security. Many have suggested that if the UN cannot act to head off conflict, it is no longer capable of carrying out the tasks for which it was established after the Second World War.

Yet we have seen this week that the UN is indeed alive and well. The war in the Middle East has threatened to draw this Nation and the Soviet Union into a dangerously escalating situation. On October 25, the Security Council demonstrated that the UN remains the only international forum we have for the quiet resolution of superpower involvement in potentially explosive regional conflicts. With the active cooperation of eight of the nonaligned nations American foreign policy too often takes for granted a resolution was introduced and passed. It would not be overstating the case to stress that this development has moved us back from a dangerous exercise in brinkmanship, however necessary it might have been which could have brought us into armed confrontation with the Soviet Union.

This exercise in international diplomacy underlines the central role in the UN can play in our foreign policy when it is given the chance. It is highly doubtful whether the parties to the conflict could have among themselves achieved the consensus and set the guidelines for monitoring what we hope will be an equitable and just peace in the Middle East. United Nations peace-keeping procedures, the sorest point in our differences at the UN with the Soviet Union, have a new lease on life as a result of the agreement, however tentative, being orchestrated now at the UN (Editorial October 27).

We should not expect miracles. Failure is possible at any point. But the UN has pulled through. The member states who make up the UN have shown that international cooperation matters to them and that concern for peace can bring nations with great differences together to work out solutions to their problems.

Might not this experience provide an object lesson to our policymakers? The UN was created to keep peace in the world. Peace has many faces. They are

economic, social and legal as well as political and military. If our foreign policy-makers can demonstrate a greater commitment to the United Nations and if we can turn increasingly to it to forestall problems rather than solve them, we just might find that independence of action is not nearly as important as defusing conflicts before they explode in our faces.

MURRAY B. WOLDMAN.

WASHINGTON, *October 26, 1973.*

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